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While we think that
Terra’s adoption-driven demand will be far more stable than Bitcoin’s speculation-driven demand,
the stability mechanism has been designed to confidently withstand Bitcoin-level volatility.
The second graph shows transaction fees and the Luna burn rate , the two levers used by
the protocol to smooth out fluctuations in unit mining rewards. We observe that both move opposite
to the direction of the economy (which is also the default direction of unit mining rewards).
The third graph shows the annual moving average of unit mining rewards. The growth target
we have set in this example is 15% annually. As was designed, unit mining rewards experience
steady growth with low volatility, unpurturbed by the cycles in Terra’s GDP. The adjustments
in fees and the Luna burn rate have successfully absorbed the expected volatility in unit mining
rewards and created predictable growth. This is achieved with fees that average less than 0.5%
(with a momentary peak at the 1% maximum) and a Luna burn rate that averages roughly 50%
(meaning that on average 50% of seigniorage is granted to the Treasury).
Stable demand for mining is a core requirement for the security and stability of Terra. Unit
mining rewards are the primary consideration and the biggest source of risk for miners. They are
by default highly cyclical, hence highly uncertain. Reducing that uncertainty in the face of volatile
conditions is the key to stable mining demand. We have outlined a simple mechanism that uses
transaction fees and Luna burn as levers to achieve this, and demonstrated its effectiveness in the
most severe economic conditions.
3 Growth-driven fiscal policy
Despite their enormous potential, smart contracts have faced roadblocks in adoption due to the price
volatility of their underlying currency. Price volatility makes smart contracts unusable for most
mainstream financial applications, as most users are accustomed to valuing determinate payouts in
insurance, credit, mortgage, and payroll. Terra will offer a stable dApp platform oriented to building
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financial applications that use Terra as their underlying currency, thus allowing smart contracts to
mature into a useful infrastructure for mainstream businesses. Terra Platform DApps will help to
drive growth and stabilize the Terra family of currencies by diversifying its use cases. In this section
we discuss how the protocol subsidizes the growth of the more successful applications through its
growth-driven fiscal policy.
National governments use expansionary fiscal spending with the objective of stimulating growth.
The hope of fiscal spending is that the economic activity instigated by the original spending results
in a feedback loop that grows the economy more than the amount of money spent in the initial
stimulus. This concept is captured by the spending multiplier — how many dollars of economic
activity does one dollar of fiscal spending generate? The spending multiplier increases with the
marginal propensity to consume, meaning that the effectiveness of the expansionary stimulus is
directly related to how likely economic agents are to increase their spending.
In a previous section, we discussed how Terra seigniorage is directed to both miner rewards and
the Treasury. At this point, it is worth describing how exactly the Treasury implements Terra’s
fiscal spending policy, with its core mandate being to stimulate Terra’s growth while ensuring its
stability. In this manner, Terra achieves greater efficiency by returning seigniorage not allocated for
stability back to its users.
The Treasury’s main focus is the allocation of resources derived from seigniorage to decentralized
applications (dApp). To receive seigniorage from the Treasury, a dApp needs to register for consid-
eration as an entity that operates on the Terra network. dApps are eligible for funding depending
on their economic activity and use of funding.
The funding procedure for a dApp works as follows:
• A dApp applies for an account with the Treasury; the application includes metadata such as
the Title, a url leading to a detailed page regarding the use of funding, the wallet address of
the applicant, as well as auditing and governance procedures.
• At regular voting intervals, Luna validators vote to accept or reject new dApp applications
for Treasury accounts. The net number of votes (yes votes minus no votes) needs to exceed
1/3 of total available validator power for an application to be accepted.
• Luna validators can exercise control over which dApps may open accounts with the Treasury.
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The funding itself is determined by validator voting for each funding period in accordance
with a weight that is assigned to each dApp. This allows the Treasury to prioritize dApps
that earn the most funding.
• At each voting session, Luna validators have the right to request that a dApp be blacklisted,
for example because it behaves dishonestly or fails to account for its use of Treasury funds.
Again, the net number of votes (yes votes minus no votes) needs to exceed 1/3 of total available
validator power for the blacklist to be enforced. A blacklisted dApp loses access to its Treasury
account and is no longer eligible for funding.
The motivation behind assigning funding weights to dApps is to maximize the impact of the stimulus
on the economy by rewarding the dApps that are more likely to have a positive effect on the economy.
The Treasury uses two criteria to determine spending allocations: (1) robust economic activity
and (2) efficient use of funding . dApps with a strong track record of adoption receive support
for their continued success, and dApps that have grown relative to their funding are rewarded with
more seigniorage, as they have a successful track record of efficiently using their resources.
Those two criteria are combined into a single weight which determines the relative funding that
dApps receive from the aggregate funding pool. For instance, a dApp with a weight of 2 would
receive twice the amount of funding of a dApp with a weight of 1.
We lay out the funding weight equation, followed by a detailed explanation of all the parts: For
a time period t, let TV t be a dApp’s transaction volume and Ft be the Treasury funding received.
Then, the protocol determines the funding weight wt for the period as follows:
wt =( 1 ) TV ⇤t + TV ⇤tF ⇤t1
The notation * denotes a moving average, so TV ⇤t would be the moving average of transaction
volume leading up to time period t, while TV ⇤t would be a difference of moving averages of different
lengths leading up to time period t. One might make the averaging window quarterly for example.
Finally, the funding weights among all dApps are scaled to sum to 1.
• The first term is proportional to TV ⇤t , the average transaction volume generated by the
dApp in the recent past. This is an indicator of the dApp’s economic activity ,o rm o r e
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simply the size of its micro-economy.
• The second term is proportional to TV ⇤t /F ⇤t 1. The numerator describes the trend
in transaction volume — it is the difference between a more and a less recent average. When
positive, it means that the transaction volume is following an upward trajectory and vice versa.
The denominator is the average funding amount received by the dApp in the recent past, up
to and including the previous period. So the second term describes how economic activity is
changing relative to past funding. Overall, larger values of this ratio capture instances where
the dApp is fast-growing for each dollar of funding it has received. This is in fact the spending
multiplier of the funding program, a prime indicator of funding efficiency .
• The parameter l is used to determine the relative importance of economic activity and funding
efficiency. If it is set equal to 1/2 then the two terms would have equal contribution. By
decreasing the value of l, the protocol can favor more heavily dApps with larger economies.
Conversely, by increasing the value of l the protocol can favor dApps that are using funding
with high efficiency, for example by growing fast with little funding, even if they are smaller
in size.
An important advantage of distributing funding in a programmatic way is that it is simpler, ob-
jective, transparent and streamlined compared to open-ended voting systems. In fact, compared
to decentralized voting systems, it is more predictable, because the inputs used to compute the
funding weights are transparent and slow moving. Furthermore, this system requires less trust in
Luna validators, given that the only authority they are vested with is determining whether or not
a dApp is honest and makes legitimate use of funding.
Overall, the objective of Terra governance is simple: fund the organizations and proposals with
the highest net impact on the economy. This will include dApps solving real problems for users,
increasing Terra’s adoption and as a result increasing the GDP of the Terra economy.
4 Conclusion
We have presented Terra, a stable digital currency that is designed to complement both existing
fiat and cryptocurrencies as a way to transact and store value. The protocol adjusts the supply of
Terra in response to changes in demand to keep its price stable. This is achieved using Luna, the
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mining token whose stable rewards are designed to absorb volatility from changing economic cycles.
Terra also achieves efficient adoption by returning seigniorage not invested in stability back to its
users. Its transparent and democratic distribution mechanism gives dApps the power to attract and
retain users by tapping into Terra’s economic growth.
If Bitcoin’s contribution to cryptocurrency was immutability, and Ethereum expressivity, our
value-add will be usability. The potential applications of Terra are immense. Immediately, we foresee
Terra being used as a medium-of-exchange in online payments, allowing people to transact freely at
a fraction of the fees charged by other payment methods. As the world starts to become more and
more decentralized, we see Terra being used as a dApp platform where price-stable token economies
are built on Terra. Terra is looking to become the first usable currency and stability platform
on the blockchain, unlocking the power of decentralization for mainstream users, merchants, and
developers.
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References
Liu, Yukun and Tsyvinski, Aleh, Risks and Returns of Cryptocurrency (August 2018). NBER Working
Paper No. w24877. A vailable at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3226806.
Makarov, Igor and Schoar, Antoinette, Trading and Arbitrage in Cryptocurrency Markets (April 30, 2018).
Ava i l a b l e a t S S R N : ht t p s : / / s s r n . c o m / a b s t r a c t = 3 1 7 1 2 0 4 .
Kereiakes, Evan, Rationale for Including Multiple Fiat Currencies in Terra’s Peg (November 2018). A vailable
at https://medium.com/terra-money/rationale-for-including-multiple-fiat-currencies-in-terras-peg-1ea9eae9de2a
Taylor, John B. (1993). "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series
on Public Policy. 39: 195–214.
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