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Terra Money:
Stability and Adoption
Evan Kereiakes, Do Kwon, Marco Di Maggio, Nicholas Platias
April 2019
Abstract
While many see the benefits of a price-stable cryptocurrency that combines the best of both
fiat and Bitcoin, not many have a clear plan for the adoption of such a currency. Since the
value of a currency as a medium of exchange is mainly driven by its network effects, a successful
new digital currency needs to maximize adoption in order to become useful. We propose a
cryptocurrency, Terra, which is both price-stable and growth-driven. It achieves price-stability
via an elastic money supply, enabled by stable mining incentives. It also uses seigniorage created
by its minting operations as transaction stimulus, thereby facilitating adoption. There is demand
for a decentralized, price-stable money protocol in both fiat and blockchain economies. If such a
protocol succeeds, then it will have a significant impact as the best use case for cryptocurrencies.
1 Introduction
The price-volatility of cryptocurrencies is a well-studied problem by both academics and market
observers (see for instance, Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018, Makarov and Schoar, 2018). Most cryptocur-
rencies, including Bitcoin, have a predetermined issuance schedule that, together with a strong
speculative demand, contributes to wild fluctuations in price. Bitcoin’s extreme price volatility is
a major roadblock towards its adoption as a medium of exchange or store of value. Intuitively,
nobody wants to pay with a currency that has the potential to double in value in a few days, or
wants to be paid in a currency if its value can significantly decline before the transaction is settled.
The problems are aggravated when the transaction requires more time, e.g. for deferred payments
such as mortgages or employment contracts, as volatility would severely disadvantage one side of the
contract, making the usage of existing digital currencies in these settings prohibitively expensive.
At the core of how the Terra Protocol solves these issues is the idea that a cryptocurrency with
an elastic monetary policy would maintain a stable price, retaining all the censorship resistance
of Bitcoin, and making it viable for use in everyday transactions. However, price-stability is not
sufficient for the wide adoption of a currency. Currencies inherently have strong network effects:
a customer is unlikely to switch over to a new currency unless a critical mass of merchants are
ready to accept it, but at the same time, merchants have no reason to invest resources and educate
staff to accept a new currency unless there is significant customer demand for it. For this reason,
Bitcoin’s adoption in the payments space has been limited to small businesses whose owners are
personally invested in cryptocurrencies. Our belief is that while an elastic monetary policy is the
solution to the stability problem, an efficient fiscal policy can drive adoption. In addition, the
Terra Protocol offers strong incentives for users to join the network with an efficient fiscal spending
regime, managed by a Treasury, where multiple stimulus programs compete for financing. That
is, proposals from community participants will be vetted by the rest of the ecosystem and, when
approved, they will be financed with the objective to increase adoption and expand the potential
use cases. The Terra Protocol with its balance between fostering stability and adoption represents
a meaningful complement to fiat currencies as a means of payment and store of value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the protocol and how stability
is achieved and maintained, through the calibration of miners’ demand and the use of the native
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mining Luna token. We then dig deeper into how stable mining incentives are adopted to smooth
out economic fluctuations. Lastly, we discuss how Terra’s fiscal policy can be used as an efficient
stimulus to drive adoption.
2 Multi-fiat peg monetary policy
A stable-coin mechanism must answer three key questions:
• How is price-stability defined? Stability is a relative concept; which asset should a stable-
coin be pegged to in order to appeal to the broadest possible audience?
• How is price-stability measured? Coin price is exogenous to the Terra blockchain, and
an efficient, corruption-resistant price feed is necessary for the system to function properly.
• How is price-stability achieved? When coin price has deviated from the target, the system
needs a way to apply pressures to the market to bring price back to the target.
This section will specify Terra’s answers to the above questions in detail.
2.1 Defining stability against regional fiat currencies
The existential objective of a stable-coin is to retain its purchasing power. Given that most goods
and services are consumed domestically, it is important to create crypto-currencies that track the
value of local fiat currencies. Though the US Dollar dominates international trade and forex oper-
ations, to the average consumer the dollar exhibits unacceptable volatility against their choice unit
of account.
Recognizing strong regionalities in money, Terra aims to be a family of cryptocurrencies that
are each pegged to the world’s major currencies. Close to genesis, the protocol will issue Terra
currencies pegged to USD, EUR, CNY, JPY, GBP, KR W, and the IMF SDR. Over time, more
currencies will be added to the list by user voting. TerraSDR will be the flagship currency of this
family, given that it exhibits the lowest volatility against any one fiat currency (Kereiakes, 2018).
TerraSDR is the currency in which transaction fees, miner rewards and stimulus grants will be
denominated.
It is important, however, for Terra currencies to have access to shared liquidity. For this reason,
the system supports atomic swaps among Terra currencies at their market exchange rates. A
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user can swap TerraKR W for TerraUSD instantly at the effective KR W/USD exchange rate. This
allows all Terra currencies to share liquidity and macroeconomic fluctuations; a fall in demand by
one currency can quickly be absorbed by the others. We can therefore reason about the stability
of Terra currencies in a group; we will be referring to Terra loosely as a single currency for the
remainder of this paper. As Terra’s ecosystem adds more currencies, its atomic swap functionality
can be an instant solution to cross border transactions and international trade settlements.
2.2 Measuring stability with miner oracles
Since the price of Terra currencies in secondary markets is exogenous to the blockchain, the sys-
tem must rely on a decentralized price oracle to estimate the true exchange rate. We define the
mechanism for the price oracle as the following:
• For any Terra sub-currency in the set of currencies C = TerraKR W, TerraUSD, TerraSDR...
miners submit a vote for what they believe to be the current exchange rate in the target fiat
asset.
• Every n blocks the vote is tallied by taking the weighted medians as the true rates.
• Some amount of Terra is rewarded to those who voted within 1 standard deviation of the
elected median. Those who voted outside may be punished via slashing of their stakes. The
ratio of those that are punished and rewarded may be calibrated by the system every vote to
ensure that a sufficiently large portion of the miners vote.
Several issues have been raised in implementing decentralized oracles, but chief among them is the
possibility for voters to profit by coordinating on a false price vote. Limiting the vote to a specific
subset of users with strong vested interest in the system, the miners, can vastly decrease the odds
of such a coordination. A successful coordination event on the price oracle would result in a much
higher loss in the value of the miner stakes than any potential gains, as Luna stakes are time-locked
to the system.
The oracle can also play a role in adding and deprecating Terra currencies. The protocol may
start supporting a new Terra currency when oracle votes for it satisfies a submission threshold.
Similarly, the failure to receive a sufficient number of oracle votes for several periods could trigger
the deprecation of a Terra currency.
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2.3 Achieving stability with consistent mining rewards
Once the system has detected that the price of a Terra currency has deviated from its peg, it must
apply pressures to normalize the price. Like any other market, the Terra money market follows the
simple rules of supply and demand for a pegged currency. That is:
• Contracting money supply, all conditions held equal, will result in higher relative currency
price levels. That is, when price levels are falling below the target, reducing money supply
sufficiently will return price levels to normalcy.
• Expanding money supply, all conditions held equal, will result in lower relative currency
price levels. That is, when price levels are rising above the target, increasing money supply
sufficiently will return price levels to normalcy.
Of course, contracting the supply of money isn’t free; like any other asset, money needs to be
bought from the market. Central banks and governments shoulder contractionary costs for pegged
fiat systems through a variety of mechanisms including intervention, the issuance of bonds and short-
term instruments thus incurring interest expenses, and hiking of money market rates and reserve
ratio requirements thus losing revenue. Put in a different way, central banks and governments
absorb the volatility of the pegged currencies they issue.
Analogously, Terra miners absorb volatility in Terra supply.
• In the short term, miners absorb T erra contraction costs through mining power
dilution. During a contraction, the system mints and auctions more mining power to buy
back and burn Terra. This contracts the supply of Terra until its price has returned to the
peg, and temporarily results in mining power dilution.
• In the mid to long term, miners are compensated with increased mining rewards .
First, the system continues to buy back mining power until a fixed target supply is reached,
thereby creating long-run dependability on available mining power. Second, the system in-
creases mining rewards, which will be explained in more detail in a later section.
In summary, miners bear the costs of Terra volatility in the short term, while being compensated
for it in the long-term. Compared to ordinary users, miners have a long-term vested interest in
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the stability of the system, with invested infrastructure, trained staff and business models with
high switching cost. The remainder of this section will discuss how the system absorbs short-term
volatility and creates stable long-term incentives for Terra miners.
2.4 Miners absorb short-term Terra volatility
The Terra Protocol runs on a Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchain, where miners need to stake a native
cryptocurrency Luna to mine Terra transactions. At every block period, the protocol elects a block
producer from the set of staked miners, which is entrusted with the work required to produce
the next block by aggregating transactions, achieving consensus among miners, and ensuring that
messages are distributed properly in a short timeframe with high fault tolerance.
The block producer election is weighted by the size of the active miner’s Luna stake. Therefore,
Luna represents mining power in the T erra network. Similar to how a Bitcoin miner’s hash
power represents a pro-rata odds of generating Bitcoin blocks, the Luna stake represents pro-rata
odds of generating Terra blocks.
Luna also serves as the most immediate defense against Terra price fluctuations. The system
uses Luna to make the price for Terra by agreeing to be counter-party to anyone looking to swap
Terra and Luna at Terra’s target exchange rate. More concretely:
• When TerraSDR’s price < 1 SDR, users and arbitragers can send 1 TerraSDR to the system
and receive 1 SDR’s worth of Luna.
• When TerraSDR’s price > 1 SDR, users and arbitragers can send 1 SDR’s worth of Luna to
the system and receive 1 TerraSDR.
The system’s willingness to respect the target exchange rate irrespective of market conditions keeps
the market exchange rate of Terra at a tight band around the target exchange rate. An arbitrageur
can extract risk-free profit when 1 TerraSDR = 0.9 SDR by trading TerraSDR for 1 SDR’s worth of
Luna from the system, as opposed to 0.9 SDR’s worth of assets she could get from the open market.
Similarly, she can also extract risk-free profit when 1 TerraSDR = 1.1 SDR by trading in 1 SDR
worth of Luna to the system to get 1.1 SDR worth of TerraSDR, once again beating the price of
the open market.
The system finances Terra price making via Luna:
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• To buy 1 TerraSDR, the protocol mints and sells Luna worth 1 SDR
• By selling 1 TerraSDR, the protocol earns Luna worth 1 SDR
As Luna is minted to match Terra offers, volatility is moved from Terra price to Luna supply. If
unmitigated, this Luna dilution presents a problem for miners; their Luna stakes are worth a smaller
portion of total available mining power post-contraction. The system burns a portion of the Luna
it has earned during expansions until Luna supply has reached its 1 billion equilibrium issuance.
Therefore, Luna can have steady demand as a token with pro-rata rights to Terra mining over the
long term. The next section discusses how the system offers stable mining incentives to keep the
market for mining and demand for Luna long-term stable through volatile macroeconomic cycles.
2.5 Miners are compensated with long-term stable rewards
Miners play a foundational role in the security and stability of Terra. They provide the former by
participating in PoS consensus. They provide the latter by absorbing short-term volatility in Terra
demand. Stable demand for mining is a core requirement for both security and stability .
To achieve this, the protocol aims to offer stable and predictable rewards in all economic conditions,
booms and busts alike. The network is best off when it can consistently compensate those that
protect it.
The protocol has two ways of rewarding miners for their work:
• Tr a n s a c t i o n f e e s: All Terra transactions pay a small fee to miners. Fees default to 0.1% and
are capped at 1%, meaning that transacting with Terra in e-commerce will be much cheaper
than transacting with traditional payment options such as credit cards 1.
• Seigniorage (Luna burn) : When demand for Terra increases, the system mints Terra and
earns Luna in return. This is called seigniorage — the value of newly minted currency minus
the cost of issuance (which in this case is zero). The system burns a portion of earned Luna,
which makes mining power scarcer. The remaining portion of seigniorage goes to the Treasury
to fund fiscal stimulus.
To understand rewards from the perspective of a miner, we look at the basic calculus one has to
go through to determine the viability of a long-term commitment to mining on the Terra network.
1The fee per transaction is capped at 1SDR (1.39 USD at the time of writing), meaning that larger transactions
also pay considerably less than traditional wire transfers
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After fixed costs, the profit (or loss) from a mining operation for a single unit of mining power (1
Luna) comes down to rewards minus cost of work for that unit. A bit more formally, during a future
work period t, profit or loss for a unit of mining power equals
P (t)= To t a l R e w a r d s(t)LunaSupply (t) Un i t Mi n i n gCo s t(t)
Frequent alternations between profit and loss – positive and negative P (t) – would create highly
unstable mining demand. The goal of the protocol is to make this calculus easier and more pre-
dictable. With that in mind, most of the uncertainty in P (t) comes down to the first term, ie unit
mining rewards. As a consequence, unit mining rewards are the primary consideration for making
a long-term commitment to the network. Stable unit mining rewards produce stable demand for
mining, while volatile unit mining rewards produce the opposite.
By default, there is uncertainty both in total rewards (from fees) and in the supply of Luna, so
both terms contribute to the volatility in unit rewards. First, rewards from fees tend to increase
when the economy grows and tend to decrease when the economy shrinks. Second, Luna supply
tends to decrease when the economy grows (because Luna is burned from seigniorage), and it
tends to increase when the economy shrinks (because new Luna is issued to buy back Terra). The
implication is that unit mining rewards have a tendency to move strongly in the direction of the
economy, either up or down. By extention this also applies to mining demand.
So in order to create mining demand that is long-term stable, the protocol creates pre-
dictable rewards in all economic conditions. To achieve this, the protocol uses transaction
fees and the rate of Luna burn as levers to oppose changes in unit mining rewards. Transaction fees
affect total rewards, while the rate of Luna burn affects Luna supply – the two determinants of unit
mining rewards. The basic logic is the following:
• if unit mining rewards are increasing:
– decrease fees
– decrease Luna burn
• if unit mining rewards are decreasing:
– increase fees
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– increase Luna burn
While working to smooth out fluctuations in miner compensation, the protocol also targets stable
growth in line with the long-term growth of the Terra economy. This is a natural reward for their
long-term commitment to serving the network.
To formalize those ideas, we discuss the mechanism to smooth out unit mining rewards in more
detail 2. Fees and the rate of Luna burn – the “stability levers” – are adjusted every week in response
to changes in unit mining rewards. We define the rate of Luna burn as follows: what portion (%)
of seigniorage does the protocol use to buy back and burn Luna, as opposed to depositing to the
Treasury? Let ft, bt and Rt be transaction fees, the rate of Luna burn and unit mining rewards at
time t respectively. Then the rule for adjusting the values of f and b is the following:
ft+1 =( 1+ g) · Rt1Rt · ft
bt+1 =( 1+ g) · Rt1Rt · bt
The update rules should now make clear what we mean when we say that fees (and Luna burn
rate) oppose changes in unit mining rewards: the current value, ft, is multiplied by the inverse
change in unit mining rewards, Rt1Rt . For example, if unit mining rewards were cut in half then
fees would double in response, and conversely if unit mining rewards were to double fees would be
cut in half in response. The result is scaled by a small growth factor, 1+ g, that permits gradual
growth in unit mining rewards commensurate with the long-term growth rate of the economy.
How well does the mechanism work in practice? We have run extensive simulations to stress-test
and refine it under a breadth of assumptions. In what follows we share and discuss a representative
example that applies significant stress to the mechanism and sheds light on how it achieves its
objective. We consider a simulated 10 year period during which the Terra economy experiences
both rapid growth and severe turbulence. We demonstrate how the protocol adjusts its stability
levers in response to economic conditions, and how those adjustments in turn shape unit mining
rewards.
2The mechanism we present is slightly simplified. We omit a few details, eg the protocol uses moving averages in
mining rewards for robustness and ensures consistent contribution of buybacks relative to fees in all situations.
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The first graph shows simulated weekly transaction volume and its annual moving average.
Transaction volume can be thought of as the GDP of the Terra economy. The economy experiences
rapid growth followed by a severe multi-year recession that wipes out 93% of GDP over 3 years
and requires 6 years for full recovery. This scenario is a stern test – if it were describing the price
of Bitcoin it would be by far the longest bear market in its history and tied for worst in terms
of drawdown (equal to the 93% drop between June and November 2011).프로젝트로 돌아가기