PolySwarm 백서

PolySwarm

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re not for everyone. First, Bounties must be mined into an Ethereum block, which occurs approximately every 15 seconds - by far the dominant time cost in this arrangement. Second, when placing a Bounty, the Artifact must be made public13. After all, wild-west “Wanted” posters wouldn’t be of much help if they weren’t posted in a public place with all known information. In a similar manner, Bounties represent a public, smart (as in contract) commitment to reward providers of information that leads to the quarantine or exoneration of Artifacts. Bounties also form a critical component of the feedback loop that establishes ground truth. BOUNTY 12 See the Worker Registry section on page 23 for more details. 13 True of PolySwarm 1.0, not necessarily true in future iterations. See Artifact Confidentiality. p. 13 Version 15 Rewarding Accuracy In a departure from today’s market, the PolySwarm market offers precise rewards based solely on the accuracy of threat intelligence, incentivizing Experts to optimize exclusively for detection accuracy (minimal false positives and false negatives), and enabling Ambassadors to extract maximal value on behalf of their clients . PolySwarm defines accuracy as agreement (or not) between Experts’ Assertions and Arbiter-defined ground truth . This accuracy feedback loop is driven by PolySwarm Bounties. Each Bounty rewards Experts who render an accurate Assertion and penalizes Experts making an inaccurate Assertion – all whilst avoiding the introduction of collusion incentives between Ambassadors and Experts14. PolySwarm Offers provide a convenient means of achieving traditional 1:1 business relationships, but do not factor into this accuracy equation. Ground truth is produced and consumed in the PolySwarm marketplace in the following manner: 1. An Ambassador places a Bounty on an Artifact, submitting a Fee to do so. 2. Various Experts render Assertions on this Artifact prior to the Bounty’s Assertion deadline. Each Assertion is accompanied by an Expert-chosen NCT amount (a “Bid”) that reflects the Expert’s confidence in their Assertion. A Fee is assessed as a percentage of this “Bid”. These Assertions are confidential up until the Assertion deadline. 3. The Ambassador produces a Verdict, taking Experts’ Assertions into account however they see fit and delivers this Verdict to their client. The Ambassador is incentivized to make this Verdict public in order to build their reputation and take advantage of a Fee discount (detailed later). 4. At a later time (e.g., 7 days after the Artifact was placed on Bounty), Arbiters are offered the opportunity to vote on whether the Artifact is in fact malicious or benign. This later-determined ground truth IS NOT A BLOCKER FOR RAPIDLY RETURNING ARTIFACT VERDICTS. In other words, Ambassadors need not (and should not) wait for ground truth determination before returning a result to their customer. 14 This includes potential collusion interest between Experts and Arbiters who vote on their own Bounties. The PolySwarm Fee structure is designed such that no single Arbiter could sway ground truth sufficiently to cause a colluding Expert to receive a Bounty greater than the Arbiter’s cost for introducing doubt into the market. p. 14 Version 15 5. A quorum of Arbiters determines the ground truth status of the Artifact. The details of this vote to ground truth conversion process are yet to be determined. Possible arrangements are simple majority vote or proportional majority vote (e.g., based on amount of market participation). These specifics will be determined during prototype development. 6. With ground truth established, the Bounty smart contract awards NCT to Experts who rendered accurate Assertions. The amount of NCT awarded is proportional to the Expert’s Bid amount relative to the total pool of accurate Bids. On the surface, it may seem that a classic prediction market would fit well here: Experts render Assertions and, at a later date, these Assertions are compared against ground truth, ultimately triggering rewards and penalties based on their accuracy. The trouble for PolySwarm is that classic prediction markets implicitly assume a source of ground truth that is verifiable by all participants. A prediction market that asks who will win an election or whether the price of gold will exceed an amount by a certain day is easily settled because all participants can verify these data points after the prediction period has closed: Who won the election? Did gold exceed the strike price? Determining the malintent of a suspect Artifact demands expertise that is not uniformly shared among PolySwarm participants. This conundrum has analogues to prediction markets applied to medical diagnoses15, where doctors bring varying degrees of expertise to bear. PolySwarm entrusts ground truth determination to Arbiters. In today’s market, the role of the Arbiter is effectively filled by traditional anti-virus companies. These companies “vote” (and are held publicly accountable) on “ground truth” via services like VirusTotal. In the PolySwarm market, the set of Arbiters is determined solely by market participation, offering opportunity for newer players to shake up the establishment. In summary, we believe this process properly incentivizes Arbiters to commit resources to conduct due diligence when determining ground truth for the benefit of the market as a whole. This concept of an elite group of ground truth “verifiers” has applicability to other sectors. We anticipate that others will explore the feasibility of using this mechanism in other token platforms that demand specialized knowledge to arrive at ground truth. 15 Kurvers, Ralf HJM, et al. "Boosting medical diagnostics by pooling independent judgments." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2016): [201601827]. p. 15 Version 15 Fees Fees are assessed for various transactions in the PolySwarm market and are designed to achieve two goals: 1. Promote efficiency in the PolySwarm market by incentivizing actions that incur minimal Ethereum gas cost. Fixed-rate Fees are applied to PolySwarm transactions to discourage behavior that would generate superfluous transactions (including spam transactions) and therefore incur unnecessary gas cost across the market. PolySwarm’s need to scale these Fees independently of Ethereum gas cost is one of several reasons the creation of NCT is essential to the existence of the PolySwarm market. 2. Reward active PolySwarm market participants in proportion to their (honest) participation. Fees are awarded to participants that are actively utilizing the PolySwarm ecosystem via the introduction of Artifacts (Ambassadors placing Bounties) and the determination of ground truth regarding the malintent of Artifacts (Arbiters reaching quorum on ground truth). During network development, the PolySwarm team will red team the Fee structures presented above, iterating as necessary to best encourage a healthy market. Bounty Placement Fees Paid by Ambassadors When an Ambassador lists a Bounty on the PolySwarm market, the following Fees are rendered on the funds that are held in the smart contract: 1. A fixed listing Fee. This fixed fee encourages the Ambassador to group multiple Artifacts into a single Bounty, reducing strain on the network and gas costs for all. 2. A Fee proportional to the Bounty amount. Bounties with a higher initial Bounty amount will likely attract more Expert responses. This proportional Fee is assessed to scale the Fee with Expert interest (and network strain). Bounty Assertions Fees Paid by Experts When an Expert renders an Assertion against a Bounty, the following Fees are rendered on the funds that are held in the smart contract: p. 16 Version 15 1. A fixed Assertion Fee. This fixed Fee disincentivizes repeated Assertions that may slow down the network. 2. A Fee proportional to the Bid amount. Offer Channel Settlement: Ambassador Fees Offers occur within Raiden-style Offer Channels, established directly between Ambassadors and Experts. When an Ambassador and/or Expert decide to settle their Offer Channel onto the blockchain, the following Fee is assessed by the Channel smart contract: 1. A percentage of the net NCT transfered over the channel. This Fee is assessed on the Ambassador-supplied tokens when the channel is opened. When the channel is closed, these Fees are refunded to the Ambassador in proportion to unused channel tokens. Protocol Details Here we detail Polyswarm Bounties, Offers, Assertions and Verdicts . Bounties and Offers are collectively referred to as Polyswarm Listings . A Polyswarm Statement is any of: Bounty, Offer, Assertion or Verdict . BOUNTY OFFER Bounties Offers Assertions Verdicts p. 17 Version 15 Bounty Lifecycle When an Ambassador wishes to place a Bounty on the market, the Ambassador registers a Statement via a call to the PolySwarm Bounty smart contract . The Bounty Statement contains the following items: 1. Listing GUID: A globally-unique identifier for the Listing. 2. The Ambassador’s Identity. This takes the form of a signature on the Statement, verifiable by anyone in possession of the Ambassador’s address (public keys are derived from addresses). 3. A Bounty Placement Fee. This Fee is a fixed amount + a percentage of the Bounty Amount (described in “Fee” section above). A discount is applied if the Ambassador later publicly commits to a Verdict. 4. The Bounty Amount. This amount is placed into the smart contract alongside the Bounty Placement Fee and is awarded to Experts that render accurate Assertions (or refunded if no Experts respond). This amount is akin to a transaction fee in Ethereum or Bitcoin and is useful to call attention to the Bounty. 5. Cryptographic hash of the Artifact. Configurable, but currently SHA256. This uniquely identifies the Artifact. 6. The URI of the Artifact. Due to storage costs, Artifacts are not stored on-chain. We anticipate a secondary market to arise for outsourcing storage and delivery of Artifacts16 and that some Ambassadors will choose to retain a copy of all swarmed Artifacts for later competitive analysis. 7. Assertion Deadline: Deadline for Assertion. The Ambassador may choose to shorten or lengthen analysis periods based on their requirements for the particular Artifact. Artifacts that require a more in-depth analysis likely require more time (and also likely a higher Bounty amount to attract attention), whereas other Artifacts may require a quick turnaround. Once the Bounty is listed, Experts will determine whether the Artifact fits their skillset and whether their expected reward warrants their attention. This expected reward is a function of their confidence interval regarding the malintent of the Artifact. BOUNTY 16 Commentary on this and other anticipated secondary markets provided later . p. 18 Version 15 Experts that choose to participate place Bids on their Assertions that represent their level of confidence (and risk tolerance). The Bounty amount plus the sum total of all inaccurate Bids are awarded to accurate Bids in proportion to their Bid amount relative to the total accurate Bid amount. Consider the following example (Fees are omitted here for simplicity): 1. An Ambassador places a Bounty with 2 NCT. This 2 NCT is placed into the Bounty smart contract. Thus far, this 2 NCT Bounty Amount constitutes the entire “pot” of potential winnings for accurate Experts. 2. Experts A and B study the Artifact and decide to Assert that the Bounty Artifact is benign. They place a 5 and 3 NCT bid on their Assertions, respectively. 3. Experts C and D study the Artifact and decide to Assert that the Bounty Artifact is malicious. They place a 1 and 4 NCT bid on their Assertions, respectively. 4. At some later time, the Arbiters establish ground truth and determine that the artifact was in fact malicious. Experts A and B therefore rendered inaccurate Assertions; Experts C and D rendered accurate Assertions. 5. The Bounty amount plus the Bids placed by Experts A and B make up the “pot” that is proportionally awarded to Experts C and D. This pot is 2 + 5 + 3 = 10 NCT. 6. Expert C made an accurate Assertion and her Bid represented 1/5 of the total accurate Bid amount. Expert C has her Bid returned plus her portion of the pot: 1 + 1/5 * 10 = 3 NCT. 7. Expert D made an accurate Assertion and his Bid represented 4/5 of the total Bid amount. Expert D gets his bid back plus his portion of the pot: 4 + 4/5 * 10 = 12 NCT. Bounty Assertions contain: 1. Listing GUID + Cryptographic Hash: A unique reference to the prompting Bounty Listing. 2. The Expert’s Identity: Again, as a signature on the Statement. 3. An Assertion Fee: This Fee is a fixed amount + a percentage of the Bid amount (see “Fees” section). p. 19 Version 15 4. Bid Amount. 5. The Assertion: A boolean “Malicious” or “Benign” determination regarding the malintent of the Artifact. Assertions are kept secret until the Bounty’s Assertion deadline expires. We anticipate using blind commitments + a reveal phase to achieve this property. 6. (Optional) Metadata: Information derived during Assertion generation and offered as a value-add to the Ambassador to utilize in their Verdict computation (e.g., malware family). Experts may volunteer this information as a means to differentiate themselves and attract future business. With Assertions streaming in, the Ambassador weighs Assertions and incorporates their own internal due diligence efforts, producing a “malicious” or “benign” Verdict. The Ambassador delivers this Verdict to their client as their ultimate response regarding the malintent of the Artifact. The Ambassador may also choose to make this Verdict public (and is incentivized to do so via a Fee discount) before the Verdict deadline. Public Verdicts contains the following items: 1. Listing GUID: A reference to the prompting Listing. 2. The Ambassador’s NCT Identity: Again, as a signature on the Statement. 3. The Verdict: A boolean “malicious” or “benign” determination regarding the malintent of the Artifact. At some later time, the Arbiters reach quorum on the ground truth regarding the Artifact. This ground truth is compared against each Experts’ Assertions and NCT is awarded for accurate Assertions. p. 20 Version 15 Offer Lifecycle When an Ambassador wishes to issue Offers to a chosen Expert, the Ambassador opens a Raiden-style channel with the Expert . This is done by instantiating an Offer Channel smart contract with the Expert that includes the following: 1. Identities of Ambassador and Expert. 2. Channel Balance: The maximum net NCT that the Ambassador is comfortable settling with the Expert at channel close time (plus Fees). With the Offer Channel established, the Ambassador issues zero or more Offers to the Expert . Each Offer includes the following: 1. Listing GUID: A globally-unique identifier for the Listing. 2. The Offer Amount. This Amount must not exceed the remaining balance on the Offer Channel smart contract (minus Fees). 3. Cryptographic hash of the Artifact. 4. The URI of the Artifact. The Artifact is optionally encrypted to the Offeree’s identity or otherwise access protected to ensure confidentiality. 5. Engagement Deadline: Deadline for Engagement Response (described below). 6. Assertion Deadline: Deadline for Assertion on this Offer. When presented with an Offer, the Expert (Offeree) may choose to engage with the Offer or ignore it. Each Offeree determines whether this Artifact is worth evaluating for the Offered amount in the time allotted. The Offeree’s future business is based on their ability to produce accurate results. If the Offeree is not confident in her ability to produce an accurate result in the time allotted (e.g., the Artifact is a filetype that the Offeree is ill-equipped to analyze), she may choose to reject the Offer. OFFER p. 21 Version 15 If the Offeree decides to reject the Offer, she either actively issues a “decline” Engagement Statement or simply waits for the Engagement Deadline to expire. It likely behooves the Offeree to actively reject, rather than wait for the Engagement Deadline, as Ambassadors will likely favor Experts who do not force them to wait until the Engagement Deadline to determine next steps. If the Offeree accepts the Offer, she issues an “accept” Engagement Statement prior to the Engagement deadline. Engagement Statements contain the following items: 1. Listing GUID + Hash: A reference to the prompting Listing. 2. Engagement Commitment: A boolean “accept” or “decline” that states whether the Offeree will engage with this Offer and commit an Assertion prior to the Offer’s Assertion Deadline. Once the Offeree accepts an Offer, the Offeree has until the Assertion Deadline to render an Assertion against the Offer. These Assertions contain the following: 1. Listing GUID + Hash: Unique reference to the prompting Listing. 2. The Assertion: A boolean “malicious” or “benign” determination regarding the malintent of the Artifact. 3. (Optional) Metadata: Information derived during Assertion generation and offered as a value-add to the Ambassador to utilize in their Verdict computation (e.g., malware family). Experts may volunteer this information as a means to differentiate themselves and attract future engagements. After the Expert delivers her Assertion to the Ambassador, the Ambassador signs a Raiden-style message that commits to also deliver the Offer amount, so at no time is the Expert risking more than the output of a single analysis. The sum of all such delivered amounts are settled to the blockchain when the Offer Channel is closed. Unlike Bounties, Offers do not incorporate an on-chain ground truth feedback mechanism. Instead, Offerees who either fail to render an Assertion before the deadline or render an inaccurate Assertion (as determined by later off-chain analyses) may not attract future engagements. Reputation maintenance therefore becomes akin to an off-chain feedback loop that uses market pressure to keep Offerees honest. p. 22 Version 15 When an Offer Channel is closed, a Fee is collected on the net NCT transfered. As with all Fees, this Fee is awarded to active market participants. The Fee is enforced by the master Offer Channel smart contract which refuses to establish non-conforming Offer Channels. Reputation In contrast with other token platforms (e .g ., Augur), PolySwarm does not attempt to formalize the notion of reputation and build it into market transactions. The reason for this is simple: it is incredibly difficult to anticipate which data points various participants value - and how these data points are weighed. The best fit for Ambassador A may not be the best fit for Ambassador B and it would be futile to try to get them to both operate under the assumption that it was. Instead, PolySwarm mechanics simply mandate or incentivize disclosure of the kinds of data that likely represents useful input into a reputation function. Reputation algorithms will likely be regarded as a trade secret in the same manner as Assertion to Verdict distillation algorithms. Ambassadors will differentiate themselves by engaging with optimal Experts for their Artifact workload. Experts will differentiate themselves by maintaining a favorable track record of correct Assertions when compared against ground truth. And, optionally, by providing metadata, for example, the malware family they believe a particular artifact belongs to. The prototype Ambassador implementation to be developed will distill various data points into a simple reputation “score” and an easy- to-understand color scheme. This reference distillation will likely be helpful to many, but may be replaced or modified as participants see fit. Experts will likely also want to implement a reputation sy
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