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re not for everyone.
First, Bounties must be mined into an Ethereum block, which occurs
approximately every 15 seconds - by far the dominant time cost in
this arrangement. Second, when placing a Bounty, the Artifact must
be made public13. After all, wild-west “Wanted” posters wouldn’t be
of much help if they weren’t posted in a public place with all known
information. In a similar manner, Bounties represent a public, smart
(as in contract) commitment to reward providers of information
that leads to the quarantine or exoneration of Artifacts. Bounties
also form a critical component of the feedback loop that establishes
ground truth.
BOUNTY
12 See the Worker Registry section on page 23 for more details.
13 True of PolySwarm 1.0, not necessarily true in future
iterations. See Artifact Confidentiality.
p. 13
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Rewarding Accuracy
In a departure from today’s market, the PolySwarm market offers precise
rewards based solely on the accuracy of threat intelligence, incentivizing
Experts to optimize exclusively for detection accuracy (minimal false
positives and false negatives), and enabling Ambassadors to extract maximal
value on behalf of their clients . PolySwarm defines accuracy as agreement
(or not) between Experts’ Assertions and Arbiter-defined ground truth .
This accuracy feedback loop is driven by PolySwarm Bounties.
Each Bounty rewards Experts who render an accurate Assertion
and penalizes Experts making an inaccurate Assertion – all whilst
avoiding the introduction of collusion incentives between Ambassadors
and Experts14. PolySwarm Offers provide a convenient means of
achieving traditional 1:1 business relationships, but do not factor
into this accuracy equation.
Ground truth is produced and consumed in the PolySwarm marketplace in
the following manner:
1. An Ambassador places a Bounty on an Artifact, submitting a Fee to
do so.
2. Various Experts render Assertions on this Artifact prior to the
Bounty’s Assertion deadline. Each Assertion is accompanied by an
Expert-chosen NCT amount (a “Bid”) that reflects the Expert’s
confidence in their Assertion. A Fee is assessed as a percentage of
this “Bid”. These Assertions are confidential up until the Assertion
deadline.
3. The Ambassador produces a Verdict, taking Experts’ Assertions
into account however they see fit and delivers this Verdict to their
client. The Ambassador is incentivized to make this Verdict public in
order to build their reputation and take advantage of a Fee discount
(detailed later).
4. At a later time (e.g., 7 days after the Artifact was placed on
Bounty), Arbiters are offered the opportunity to vote on whether
the Artifact is in fact malicious or benign. This later-determined
ground truth IS NOT A BLOCKER FOR RAPIDLY RETURNING ARTIFACT
VERDICTS. In other words, Ambassadors need not (and should not)
wait for ground truth determination before returning a result to their
customer.
14 This includes potential collusion interest between Experts
and Arbiters who vote on their own Bounties. The PolySwarm
Fee structure is designed such that no single Arbiter could
sway ground truth sufficiently to cause a colluding Expert
to receive a Bounty greater than the Arbiter’s cost for
introducing doubt into the market.
p. 14
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5. A quorum of Arbiters determines the ground truth status of the
Artifact. The details of this vote to ground truth conversion process
are yet to be determined. Possible arrangements are simple majority
vote or proportional majority vote (e.g., based on amount of market
participation). These specifics will be determined during prototype
development.
6. With ground truth established, the Bounty smart contract awards
NCT to Experts who rendered accurate Assertions. The amount of NCT
awarded is proportional to the Expert’s Bid amount relative to the
total pool of accurate Bids.
On the surface, it may seem that a classic prediction market would
fit well here: Experts render Assertions and, at a later date, these
Assertions are compared against ground truth, ultimately triggering
rewards and penalties based on their accuracy. The trouble for
PolySwarm is that classic prediction markets implicitly assume
a source of ground truth that is verifiable by all participants. A
prediction market that asks who will win an election or whether the
price of gold will exceed an amount by a certain day is easily settled
because all participants can verify these data points after the
prediction period has closed: Who won the election? Did gold exceed
the strike price?
Determining the malintent of a suspect Artifact demands expertise
that is not uniformly shared among PolySwarm participants. This
conundrum has analogues to prediction markets applied to medical
diagnoses15, where doctors bring varying degrees of expertise to
bear.
PolySwarm entrusts ground truth determination to Arbiters. In
today’s market, the role of the Arbiter is effectively filled by
traditional anti-virus companies. These companies “vote” (and
are held publicly accountable) on “ground truth” via services
like VirusTotal. In the PolySwarm market, the set of Arbiters is
determined solely by market participation, offering opportunity for
newer players to shake up the establishment.
In summary, we believe this process properly incentivizes Arbiters to
commit resources to conduct due diligence when determining ground
truth for the benefit of the market as a whole.
This concept of an elite group of ground truth “verifiers” has
applicability to other sectors. We anticipate that others will explore
the feasibility of using this mechanism in other token platforms that
demand specialized knowledge to arrive at ground truth.
15 Kurvers, Ralf HJM, et al. "Boosting medical diagnostics by
pooling independent judgments." Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences (2016): [201601827].
p. 15
Version 15
Fees
Fees are assessed for various transactions in the PolySwarm market and are
designed to achieve two goals:
1. Promote efficiency in the PolySwarm market by incentivizing
actions that incur minimal Ethereum gas cost. Fixed-rate Fees
are applied to PolySwarm transactions to discourage behavior
that would generate superfluous transactions (including spam
transactions) and therefore incur unnecessary gas cost across the
market. PolySwarm’s need to scale these Fees independently of
Ethereum gas cost is one of several reasons the creation of NCT is
essential to the existence of the PolySwarm market.
2. Reward active PolySwarm market participants in proportion to
their (honest) participation. Fees are awarded to participants
that are actively utilizing the PolySwarm ecosystem via the
introduction of Artifacts (Ambassadors placing Bounties) and the
determination of ground truth regarding the malintent of Artifacts
(Arbiters reaching quorum on ground truth).
During network development, the PolySwarm team will red team the
Fee structures presented above, iterating as necessary to best
encourage a healthy market.
Bounty Placement Fees Paid by Ambassadors
When an Ambassador lists a Bounty on the PolySwarm market, the
following Fees are rendered on the funds that are held in the smart
contract:
1. A fixed listing Fee. This fixed fee encourages the Ambassador to
group multiple Artifacts into a single Bounty, reducing strain on the
network and gas costs for all.
2. A Fee proportional to the Bounty amount. Bounties with a higher
initial Bounty amount will likely attract more Expert responses. This
proportional Fee is assessed to scale the Fee with Expert interest
(and network strain).
Bounty Assertions Fees Paid by Experts
When an Expert renders an Assertion against a Bounty, the following
Fees are rendered on the funds that are held in the smart contract:
p. 16
Version 15
1. A fixed Assertion Fee. This fixed Fee disincentivizes repeated
Assertions that may slow down the network.
2. A Fee proportional to the Bid amount.
Offer Channel Settlement: Ambassador Fees
Offers occur within Raiden-style Offer Channels, established directly
between Ambassadors and Experts. When an Ambassador and/or
Expert decide to settle their Offer Channel onto the blockchain, the
following Fee is assessed by the Channel smart contract:
1. A percentage of the net NCT transfered over the channel. This
Fee is assessed on the Ambassador-supplied tokens when the channel
is opened. When the channel is closed, these Fees are refunded to
the Ambassador in proportion to unused channel tokens.
Protocol Details
Here we detail Polyswarm Bounties, Offers, Assertions and
Verdicts . Bounties and Offers are collectively referred to as
Polyswarm Listings . A Polyswarm Statement is any of: Bounty,
Offer, Assertion or Verdict .
BOUNTY OFFER
Bounties Offers Assertions Verdicts
p. 17
Version 15
Bounty Lifecycle
When an Ambassador wishes to place a Bounty on the
market, the Ambassador registers a Statement via a call to the
PolySwarm Bounty smart contract .
The Bounty Statement contains the following items:
1. Listing GUID: A globally-unique identifier for the Listing.
2. The Ambassador’s Identity. This takes the form of a signature
on the Statement, verifiable by anyone in possession of the
Ambassador’s address (public keys are derived from addresses).
3. A Bounty Placement Fee. This Fee is a fixed amount + a percentage
of the Bounty Amount (described in “Fee” section above). A discount
is applied if the Ambassador later publicly commits to a Verdict.
4. The Bounty Amount. This amount is placed into the smart contract
alongside the Bounty Placement Fee and is awarded to Experts that
render accurate Assertions (or refunded if no Experts respond). This
amount is akin to a transaction fee in Ethereum or Bitcoin and is
useful to call attention to the Bounty.
5. Cryptographic hash of the Artifact. Configurable, but currently
SHA256. This uniquely identifies the Artifact.
6. The URI of the Artifact. Due to storage costs, Artifacts are
not stored on-chain. We anticipate a secondary market to arise
for outsourcing storage and delivery of Artifacts16 and that some
Ambassadors will choose to retain a copy of all swarmed Artifacts
for later competitive analysis.
7. Assertion Deadline: Deadline for Assertion. The Ambassador
may choose to shorten or lengthen analysis periods based on their
requirements for the particular Artifact. Artifacts that require a
more in-depth analysis likely require more time (and also likely a
higher Bounty amount to attract attention), whereas other Artifacts
may require a quick turnaround.
Once the Bounty is listed, Experts will determine whether the Artifact
fits their skillset and whether their expected reward warrants their
attention. This expected reward is a function of their confidence
interval regarding the malintent of the Artifact.
BOUNTY
16 Commentary on this and other anticipated secondary
markets provided later .
p. 18
Version 15
Experts that choose to participate place Bids on their Assertions that
represent their level of confidence (and risk tolerance). The Bounty
amount plus the sum total of all inaccurate Bids are awarded to
accurate Bids in proportion to their Bid amount relative to the total
accurate Bid amount.
Consider the following example (Fees are omitted here for
simplicity):
1. An Ambassador places a Bounty with 2 NCT. This 2 NCT is placed
into the Bounty smart contract. Thus far, this 2 NCT Bounty Amount
constitutes the entire “pot” of potential winnings for accurate
Experts.
2. Experts A and B study the Artifact and decide to Assert that the
Bounty Artifact is benign. They place a 5 and 3 NCT bid on their
Assertions, respectively.
3. Experts C and D study the Artifact and decide to Assert that the
Bounty Artifact is malicious. They place a 1 and 4 NCT bid on their
Assertions, respectively.
4. At some later time, the Arbiters establish ground truth and
determine that the artifact was in fact malicious. Experts A and B
therefore rendered inaccurate Assertions; Experts C and D rendered
accurate Assertions.
5. The Bounty amount plus the Bids placed by Experts A and B make up
the “pot” that is proportionally awarded to Experts C and D. This
pot is 2 + 5 + 3 = 10 NCT.
6. Expert C made an accurate Assertion and her Bid represented 1/5 of
the total accurate Bid amount. Expert C has her Bid returned plus
her portion of the pot: 1 + 1/5 * 10 = 3 NCT.
7. Expert D made an accurate Assertion and his Bid represented 4/5 of
the total Bid amount. Expert D gets his bid back plus his portion of
the pot: 4 + 4/5 * 10 = 12 NCT.
Bounty Assertions contain:
1. Listing GUID + Cryptographic Hash: A unique reference to the
prompting Bounty Listing.
2. The Expert’s Identity: Again, as a signature on the Statement.
3. An Assertion Fee: This Fee is a fixed amount + a percentage of the
Bid amount (see “Fees” section).
p. 19
Version 15
4. Bid Amount.
5. The Assertion: A boolean “Malicious” or “Benign” determination
regarding the malintent of the Artifact. Assertions are kept secret
until the Bounty’s Assertion deadline expires. We anticipate using
blind commitments + a reveal phase to achieve this property.
6. (Optional) Metadata: Information derived during Assertion
generation and offered as a value-add to the Ambassador to utilize
in their Verdict computation (e.g., malware family). Experts may
volunteer this information as a means to differentiate themselves
and attract future business.
With Assertions streaming in, the Ambassador weighs Assertions and
incorporates their own internal due diligence efforts, producing a
“malicious” or “benign” Verdict. The Ambassador delivers this Verdict
to their client as their ultimate response regarding the malintent of the
Artifact. The Ambassador may also choose to make this Verdict public
(and is incentivized to do so via a Fee discount) before the Verdict
deadline.
Public Verdicts contains the following items:
1. Listing GUID: A reference to the prompting Listing.
2. The Ambassador’s NCT Identity: Again, as a signature on the
Statement.
3. The Verdict: A boolean “malicious” or “benign” determination
regarding the malintent of the Artifact.
At some later time, the Arbiters reach quorum on the ground truth
regarding the Artifact. This ground truth is compared against each
Experts’ Assertions and NCT is awarded for accurate Assertions.
p. 20
Version 15
Offer Lifecycle
When an Ambassador wishes to issue Offers to a chosen Expert,
the Ambassador opens a Raiden-style channel with the Expert .
This is done by instantiating an Offer Channel smart contract with the Expert
that includes the following:
1. Identities of Ambassador and Expert.
2. Channel Balance: The maximum net NCT that the Ambassador is
comfortable settling with the Expert at channel close time (plus
Fees).
With the Offer Channel established, the Ambassador issues zero or more
Offers to the Expert . Each Offer includes the following:
1. Listing GUID: A globally-unique identifier for the Listing.
2. The Offer Amount. This Amount must not exceed the remaining
balance on the Offer Channel smart contract (minus Fees).
3. Cryptographic hash of the Artifact.
4. The URI of the Artifact. The Artifact is optionally encrypted
to the Offeree’s identity or otherwise access protected to ensure
confidentiality.
5. Engagement Deadline: Deadline for Engagement Response (described
below).
6. Assertion Deadline: Deadline for Assertion on this Offer.
When presented with an Offer, the Expert (Offeree) may choose to
engage with the Offer or ignore it. Each Offeree determines whether
this Artifact is worth evaluating for the Offered amount in the time
allotted.
The Offeree’s future business is based on their ability to produce
accurate results. If the Offeree is not confident in her ability to
produce an accurate result in the time allotted (e.g., the Artifact
is a filetype that the Offeree is ill-equipped to analyze), she may
choose to reject the Offer.
OFFER
p. 21
Version 15
If the Offeree decides to reject the Offer, she either actively
issues a “decline” Engagement Statement or simply waits for the
Engagement Deadline to expire. It likely behooves the Offeree to
actively reject, rather than wait for the Engagement Deadline, as
Ambassadors will likely favor Experts who do not force them to wait
until the Engagement Deadline to determine next steps.
If the Offeree accepts the Offer, she issues an “accept” Engagement
Statement prior to the Engagement deadline.
Engagement Statements contain the following items:
1. Listing GUID + Hash: A reference to the prompting Listing.
2. Engagement Commitment: A boolean “accept” or “decline” that
states whether the Offeree will engage with this Offer and commit
an Assertion prior to the Offer’s Assertion Deadline.
Once the Offeree accepts an Offer, the Offeree has until the
Assertion Deadline to render an Assertion against the Offer.
These Assertions contain the following:
1. Listing GUID + Hash: Unique reference to the prompting Listing.
2. The Assertion: A boolean “malicious” or “benign” determination
regarding the malintent of the Artifact.
3. (Optional) Metadata: Information derived during Assertion
generation and offered as a value-add to the Ambassador to utilize
in their Verdict computation (e.g., malware family). Experts may
volunteer this information as a means to differentiate themselves
and attract future engagements.
After the Expert delivers her Assertion to the Ambassador, the
Ambassador signs a Raiden-style message that commits to also
deliver the Offer amount, so at no time is the Expert risking more
than the output of a single analysis. The sum of all such delivered
amounts are settled to the blockchain when the Offer Channel is
closed.
Unlike Bounties, Offers do not incorporate an on-chain ground truth
feedback mechanism. Instead, Offerees who either fail to render
an Assertion before the deadline or render an inaccurate Assertion
(as determined by later off-chain analyses) may not attract future
engagements. Reputation maintenance therefore becomes akin to an
off-chain feedback loop that uses market pressure to keep Offerees
honest.
p. 22
Version 15
When an Offer Channel is closed, a Fee is collected on the net NCT
transfered. As with all Fees, this Fee is awarded to active market
participants. The Fee is enforced by the master Offer Channel smart
contract which refuses to establish non-conforming Offer Channels.
Reputation
In contrast with other token platforms (e .g ., Augur), PolySwarm does not
attempt to formalize the notion of reputation and build it into market
transactions.
The reason for this is simple: it is incredibly difficult to anticipate
which data points various participants value - and how these data
points are weighed. The best fit for Ambassador A may not be
the best fit for Ambassador B and it would be futile to try to get
them to both operate under the assumption that it was. Instead,
PolySwarm mechanics simply mandate or incentivize disclosure of the
kinds of data that likely represents useful input into a reputation
function.
Reputation algorithms will likely be regarded as a trade secret in
the same manner as Assertion to Verdict distillation algorithms.
Ambassadors will differentiate themselves by engaging with optimal
Experts for their Artifact workload. Experts will differentiate
themselves by maintaining a favorable track record of correct
Assertions when compared against ground truth. And, optionally, by
providing metadata, for example, the malware family they believe a
particular artifact belongs to.
The prototype Ambassador implementation to be developed will distill
various data points into a simple reputation “score” and an easy-
to-understand color scheme. This reference distillation will likely be
helpful to many, but may be replaced or modified as participants see
fit. Experts will likely also want to implement a reputation sy프로젝트로 돌아가기