PolySwarm 백서

PolySwarm

원문

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p. 01 Version 15 A Decentralized Cyber Threat Intelligence Market. p. 02 Version 15 Table of Contents PolySwarm in 60 Seconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 03 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04 Reinventing the Threat Intelligence Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 The Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07 Prediction Markets, Arbiters & Mediated Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 09 Determining Ground Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Rewarding Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Bounty Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Offer Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Worker Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Artifact Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Additional Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Token Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 p. 03 Version 15 PolySwarm in 60 Seconds Polyswarm is a decentralized threat intelligence market made possible by Ethereum smart contracts and blockchain technology . Polyswarm incentivizes rapid innovation in the $8 .5B/yr anti-virus and automated cyber threat intelligence space with precise economic incentives that reward timely and accurate threat intelligence concerning the malintent of files, network traffic and URLs . PolySwarm defines a real-time threat detection ecosystem involving enterprises, consumers, vendors and geographically-diverse security experts. Experts develop and hone competing “micro-engines” that autonomously investigate the latest threats, attempting to outperform their competition. PolySwarm’s “Proof of Work” is threat detection accuracy: the market rewards experts who are best able to defend enterprises and end users. Relative to today’s ad hoc market, PolySwarm will lower the barrier to entry, provide broader coverage options, discourage duplicative effort and ensure interoperability among products and threat intelligence feeds. Economically, PolySwarm functions as a skill-required twist on a prediction market2 with thousands of micro-engines (“workers”) investigating the latest in malware evolution at machine speed - no human in the loop. PolySwarm will be developed by PolySwarm Pte. Ltd. with funding derived from the sale of ERC20-compatible Nectar (“NCT”) utility tokens. As a utility token, PolySwarm economically disincentivizes Nectar speculation by rewarding honest market participation through the collection and distribution of Fees (details on page 6) to value- adding, active participants. 1 Jefferies Cyber Security Primer. January 18, 2017. 2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prediction_market p. 04 Version 15 Background Today’s enterprises rely on an ad-hoc mixture of anti-virus subscriptions, threat intelligence feeds, and assorted dynamic analysis engines to defend against evolving adversarial cyber activity . Users must weigh the benefits and drawbacks presented by each solution and decide on the least-worst fit for their environment . Today’s market discourages solutions that provide broad threat coverage. Today’s solutions focus on a comfort zone of threats - a direct result of today’s market economics. Figure A: The black rectangle represents all the threats an Enterprise may encounter; white circles are anti-virus product #1 and #2, respectively. It’s easy (and perhaps justifiable) to ignore an anti-virus solution that doesn’t detect WannaCry3, but in doing so, today’s market effectively rewards overlapping coverage among vendors - a market inefficiency that causes duplicative cost. This is a classic tragedy of the commons situation. Similarly, consider a vendor that chooses to develop expertise outside of this comfort zone. If the comfort zone is defined by the set of threats faced by most enterprises, sales for this specialized vendor will be difficult. How do you convince a potential customer that they 3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry_ransomware_attack p. 05 Version 15 will have to deal with malware that you are uniquely qualified to detect / prevent / mitigate? Finally, defenders cannot mix and match many of today’s solutions, making combinatorial coverage impossible in many scenarios. In contrast, PolySwarm will foster an ecosystem of broad coverage powered by 1000s of “micro-engine” workers, authored by geographically diverse security experts. Figure B: PolySwarm will foster an ecosystem that produces broad threat coverage. PolySwarm provides a legitimate revenue stream for security experts. When local economics cannot support sufficient honest work, some security experts develop ransomware, operate bots and otherwise use their skills for evil. PolySwarm provides a region-free alternative: unencumbered reward for honest work. Experts compete to make the internet a safer place. PolySwarm puts the user first. The PolySwarm market directs economic incentives to where it matters most: toward accurate malintent detection (“threat intelligence”). Accuracy is determined via a novel process we call Mediated Consensus (details on page 10). In short, PolySwarm provides users with timely access to broad, crowdsourced security expertise. Need to quickly triage a suspect file? Just Swarm ItTM. p. 06 Version 15 Reinventing the Threat Intelligence Market PolySwarm's Nectar ("NCT") tokens form the basis of a new market that introduces novel instruments for satisfying demand for timely and accurate assertions regarding the malintent of files, network traffic, and URLs, collectively referred to as Artifacts . These new instruments are structured to directly incentivize innovation in the threat intelligence space with a feedback loop driven by accurate results . PolySwarm employs Fees to discourage spam and incentivize honest and active market engagement. Fees are assessed on transaction types that may be abused for spam, and then distributed to active ecosystem participants; those who are introducing Artifacts and determining ground truth regarding the malintent of Artifacts. This participation is measured in a sliding window fashion, “ageing-off” older market contributions, thereby incentivizing continued market participation. PolySwarm 1.0 (and this document) will focus exclusively on boolean (malicious / benign) determination, but the PolySwarm team has bigger plans than disrupting boolean malintent determination. During PolySwarm 1.0 development, the team will investigate methods to incentivize the production of artifact metadata such as malware family and how core PolySwarm concepts such as smart contract market design, Mediated Consensus and an information security focus can disrupt related markets such as vulnerability bug bounties4. Before introducing PolySwarm’s instruments, we introduce the participant classes that will utilize them. Enterprises Experts Ambassadors Arbiters 4 “HackerOne but distributed, pseudonymous, and unfettered by jurisdictional encumbrances. Powered by blockchain.” Not covered by this document. p. 07 Version 15 The Participants END USERS AMBASSADOR (INFOSEC COMPANY) NO REWARD (ENTERPRISES) SECURITY EXPERT SECURITY EXPERT SECURITY EXPERT OFFER BOUNTY ARBITERS GROUND TRUTH Figure C: Overview of PolySwarm’s Bounty and Offer lifecycles. End Users: Enterprise and home users with suspect Artifacts . End Users participate in the PolySwarm market via Bounties and Offers (more on these in a moment) and extract timely and accurate malintent classifications Security Experts (“Experts”): Geographically diverse malware experts and reverse engineers . Experts dissect the latest suspect Artifacts and maintain PolySwarm-connected detection engines (“workers”) that determine malintent . Experts commit to “Assertions”, public statements that reflect the results of their analysis into the malintent of the Artifact . Those that have committed an accurate Assertion are rewarded (in NCT) for their efforts . As far as core participants go, that’s actually it. Simplicity is good, but this is pretty far from the full PolySwarm story. Technically, PolySwarm could work with only these two classes of participants. Realistically, it won’t because most End Users will prefer to outsource the nitty gritty of interfacing with the PolySwarm market. Before going further, we must introduce Ambassadors (another participant) and a certain subclass of these Ambassadors. p. 08 Version 15 Ambassadors: Companies that make it easy for End Users to benefit from the PolySwarm market . Ambassadors collect traditional fiat (e .g . subscription fees) and suspect Artifacts from their clients (End Users) and introduce Bounties and Offers into the market on their clients’ behalf . It is the Ambassador’s responsibility to distill the Assertions of various Experts into a simple malicious or benign Verdict that they deliver to their clients . A trivial, perhaps naive approach for this distillation might be to simply average the Assertions provided by Experts. It is unlikely, however, that such an algorithm would compete favorably against a Bayesian analysis5, let alone expert human involvement. We expect existing Antivirus and threat intelligence firms to participate in the PolySwarm market as early Ambassadors, augmenting their in-house expertise with PolySwarm-enabled triage of suspect Artifacts. From the User’s perspective, upgrading to PolySwarm-backed protection is an easy process: choose a reputable Ambassador and pay a subscription fee. An Ambassador’s reputation is based on past Verdict performance relative to ground truth. Ambassadors are incentivized to make their Verdicts public due to their inherent desire to build reputation and attract new clients, as well as take advantage of a discount on Fees (this process is detailed later). These public Verdicts enable the creation of an Ambassador “scorecard” that rates real-world performance against non-synthetic Artifacts with data that is simply not available in today’s market6. Arbiters: Top-echelon Ambassadors that are responsible for determining malintent ground truth . A certain percentage of Ambassadors (in terms of Fees generated) will be considered “Arbiters” . During development, PolySwarm will assign Arbitership to existing, reputable threat intelligence vendors that are willing to maintain frequent engagement with the PolySwarm team, help identify and address platform bugs, and help build interest in the ecosystem. Once PolySwarm 1.0 is ready for launch, these designated Arbiters will need to maintain top-echelon Ambassador volumes to maintain Arbiter status. 5 Kantchelian, Alex, et al. “Better malware ground truth: Techniques for weighting anti-virus vendor labels.” Proceedings of the 8th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. ACM, 2015. 6 The closest analog is AV Comparatives (https://www.av-comparatives. org/). p. 09 Version 15 Prediction Markets, Arbiters & Mediated Consensus In the PolySwarm ecosystem, Security Experts develop micro-engine workers that compete to quickly & accurately investigate suspect artifacts . This investigation occurs at machine speed - well before the ground truth concerning an artifact’s malintent has been established . This design shares some similarities with prediction markets, i.e. rewarding past assertions based on accuracy, but differs in two critical respects: 1. No future data is required to accurately classify an artifact. The “correct” answer to whether an artifact is malicious can always be determined with certainty at the time it is made available to workers. PolySwarm is a skill-based design where nothing is left to chance7. 2. Determining ground truth will always require expertise. This is in contrast to the “universal observability” of prediction markets (including crypto markets such as Augur8) that rely on unskilled participants to observe and record events as they occur. Item #1 is PolySwarm’s gambling deterent9. Item #2 introduces a technical challenge: what is the best way to incentivize authorities to continually produce ground truth? PolySwarm’s answer is the Arbiter class and a process we refer to as Mediated Consensus. Mediated Consensus is a generic design paradigm that we hope will find a home in other market design projects. In short, Mediated Consensus is market design that entrusts a critical task to a subset of participants. These participants: 1. Are qualified to complete the task (possess expertise). 2. Have their interests aligned with the overall health of the market (avoiding tragedy of the commons). 7 In theory. In practice, at least two events may introduce uncertainty: (1) arbiters incorrectly determine ground truth resulting in reward distribution to wrong experts, (2) the expert’s analysis is accurate according to ground truth, but the expert disagrees on the boundaries of malintent - a semantic issue that is larger than PolySwarm. Is adware malware or simply a potentially unwanted application? Neither of these variables fundamentally detracts from the skill-based nature of the PolySwarm ecosystem. 8 https://augur.net/ 9 Guessing, betting, gambling or other chance-based wagers on artifact malintent is bad for everyone and PolySwarm is specifically designed to be inhospitable to this misuse of the platform. p. 10 Version 15 We’ve designed Arbiters to satisfy these two constraints. By definition, the Arbiter class is defined as the most active Ambassadors in the PolySwarm ecosystem at any given time. As Ambassadors, Arbiters are contracted by their customers to distill Security Experts’ assertions into Verdicts. Customers trust them to possess and exercise automated - and when necessary - human expertise. These companies already have a vested interest in maintaining a public record of accuracy (item #1). As the most active Ambassadors, Arbiters have the most to gain / lose by an honest / dishonest PolySwarm ecosystem. Their large stake in the faith of the ecosystem aligns their financial interests with the health of the market (item #2). We’ve designed Fees as a supplemental defense against Arbiter abuse such as Arbiter-Security Expert collusion. Determining Ground Truth Most of the technical details of the Arbiter voting process are intentionally left undefined at this time . The reason for this is simple: the specifics of the Arbiter decision process are predicated on the specifics of virtually all other PolySwarm processes - and we expect variations in other processes . That being said, we expect the following high level design choices to provide value in this process: 1. Arbiters reach consensus on ground truth via a majority vote. 2. These votes are mined onto the Ethereum chain en masse (many votes per cycle), saving time and money (Ethereum gas) for the PolySwarm ecosystem. 3. To encourage participation, Arbiters are rewarded with Fees for voting on the ground truth of artifacts. 4. Arbiters may abstain from voting on any particular artifact. Arbiters may choose to do this if, for example, they feel unqualified to determine the malintent of a particular artifact. 5. As necessary, Arbiter voting privileges are automatically delegated to additional Ambassadors (in order of volume) to ensure quorum on all ground truth determinations. p. 11 Version 15 6. As necessary, we expect participants to challenge Arbiters’ determinations as is done today: with a blog post or technical paper describing the malintent or benign nature of an artifact that an authority such as an Arbiter had miscateogrized: an external PR- driven feedback loop. The PolySwarm team will iteratively develop the details concerning Arbiter voting and incentive structures during development. We expect early Arbiter feedback will be instrumental to this design. Topics of research include, but are not limited to: • Minimum Arbiter quorum percentage • Arbiter deferral procedure (for when quorum cannot be achieved) • Appropriate Fee reward structure • Incentive for timely ground truth determination, e.g. only first X Arbiters to vote receive reward • Penalty for non-participation, e.g. Arbiters must vote on ground truth for X% of artifacts in a time window, else their Arbiter status is revoked • (As necessary) additional deterrents against perverse incentives The Instruments PolySwarm exposes two core instruments to End Users and Ambassadors10 that increase the efficacy of the threat intelligence market: Polyswarm Offers: Requests made directly to reputable Security Experts for their malintent prediction . PolySwarm provides frictionless access to thousands of such researchers, enabling traditional information sharing agreements with non-traditional participants . This interaction happens inside Raiden11-style Offer Channels (detailed later) . Once Channels are established, Offers provide millisecond-scale latency for artifact investigation . 10 Hereafter, End Users and Ambassadors is shortened to Ambassadors. End Users may act as their own Ambassador. We expect some large enterprises to participate in this manner. 11 http://raiden.network/ OFFER p. 12 Version 15 Polyswarm Bounties: A wild-west style “Wanted” poster with accompanying Artifact contents (e .g ., Wanted: This Artifact: Malicious or Benign? Reward: 1000 NCT) . Security Experts make a name for themselves (build reputation) by successfully competing for Bounties . No direct analog exists in today’s market . Offers are the closest analogue to today’s on-demand scanning market and operate with millisecond latency. Ambassadors issue Offers and Artifacts directly to chosen Security Experts, optionally under a non-disclosure agreement. Each Expert chooses whether to accept the Offer based on their confidence in rendering an accurate Assertion for the provided Artifact. Experts may choose to decline if they are not confident so as to avoid adversely affecting their reputation. If the Expert accepts the Offer, the Expert commits to providing a malintent Assertion in a timely fashion. Token collection and awards for all instruments are managed and executed entirely by distributed smart contracts. Issuing an Offer requires a certain familiarity with Experts best equipped to dissect the Artifact in question. To ease this matchmaking, Experts advertise their specialties via listings in the PolySwarm Worker Registry - PolySwarm’s analog to Ethereum dApp Registries12 and build public reputation by successfully participating in similar Bounties. Bounties are cheaper than Offers and require no upfront familiarity with specific Experts, but Bounties a
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