Celo 백서

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s. If new stable value currencies are introduced appropriately, they can increase the usefulness of the protocol, increase long-term growth in coin demand, and reduce aggregate demand volatility. And if new crypto-assets are chosen appropriately, they can decrease reserve volatility. Both of these have the effect of further stabilizing the coins supported by the protocol. The governance procedure for introducing these is similar to the governance around technical improvement. At regular intervals, any Celo holder may stake a certain amount of Celo to make a proposal on introducing a new stable value currency (by specifying a peg). Long-term Celo holders vote in proportion to the amount of Celo they own10. If a certain vote threshold is passed, a new stablecoin is introduced on the shared reserve. Similarly, any Celo holder may stake a certain amount of Celo to make a proposal on introducing a new crypto asset to the reserves (by specifying a suggested percentage of future reserve purchases to be allocated to that asset). Long-term Celo holders vote in proportion to the amount of Celo they have at stake11. If a certain vote threshold is passed, then future purchases for the reserves will include the new crypto-asset with an allocation given by the median percentage of all votes (with the allocation of all other assets being diluted pro-rata). The criteria by which these proposals should be evaluated is the extent to which they would increase in the long-term stability of the stable currencies. Introductions of crypto-assets to the reserves that increase the expected appreciation of reserves and decrease the volatility of the reserves would have positive benefits to the long-term coin stability. Introductions of new stable-value coins that increase long-term aggregate coin demand and decrease the possibility of an aggregate crash in coin demand also increase the stability characteristics of the coin. 4.4.3 F utarchical Governance It is possible that in the future, we introduce prediction markets as a supplemental form of governance – where prediction markets will also weigh in on whether a change in the composition of the reserves or the composition of stablecoin portfolio would increase or decrease long-term coin stability. It is even possible to have the prediction markets serve directly as the voting mechanism, in a futarchical governance paradigm [11]. This is a direction for future work. 4.4.4 Partitioned Reserves The introduction of a new local currency does not need to go through the governance process if it is not backed by the shared reserve. One can introduce a new local currency backed by its own reserve, with its own affiliated local reserve currency. In these cases, the default reserve would include in its reserve a basket of diversified crypto assets that can include Celo, the local reserve currency, Celo Dollars, and others. Doing so opens many possibilities. First, these local protocols may choose to distribute some of the local reserve currency to all local inhabitants, effectively creating a social dividend that allows local residents to benefit from the increased adoption of a local currency. These local protocols may also choose to implement the transfer fee in a different way; rather than having the transfer fee payable in the local reserve currency when the reserve ratio is low, they may choose to bolster the reserves by issuing the fee directly on the local stable currency, at regular intervals rather than just when the reserve ratio is lower than the target reserve ratio. This implementation of demurrage has the effect of bolstering the reserves and encouraging circulation of the local means-of- payment currency, at the expense of giving people a moderate incentive to switch out of the currency when possible. Despite this drawback, the literature on demurrage (see, for example, [9, 15]) suggests that more experiments with demurrage are useful. And finally, as more assets get tokenized in the future, the partitioned reserve mechanism allows for the reserves to include real assets. This is helpful from a stability perspective, and also allows for 10and in future versions of the protocol, the amount of time remaining in their stake 11and in future versions of the protocol, the amount of time in their notice period 12 natural-capital-backed means-of-payment currencies (for example, currencies backed by forestland), where the growth in demand for those currencies will increase the amount of natural capital backing them. For a detailed discussion of natural-capital-backed currencies, see [9]. 5 Conclusion We have introduced a protocol for social payments, called the Celo protocol. The Celo protocol com- bines an address-based encryption protocol that allows a sender to use a phone number or email address directly as a public key, with a reserve-backed stabilization protocol to minimize volatility through an elastic supply rule. Together, these allow for a more seamless experience using cryptocurrencies as a means of payment. Further, they enable a monetary ecology that includes local and regional currencies, social dividends, demurrage-charged currencies, and in the future, natural-capital-backed currencies. References [1] Nader Al-Naji, Josh Chen, and Lawrence Diao. Basis: A price-stable cryptocurrency with an algorithmic central bank. 2017. [2] Ferdinando M Ametrano. Hayek money: The cryptocurrency price stability solution. 2016. [3] Eli Ben Sasson et al. 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