Celo 백서

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o-knowledge proof using a variety of cryptographic means, including [10, 3, 5]. 2.2.3 Personalized Pre-T rusted Peers Second, in order to break malicious cliques, and to ensure convergence of the power method and uniqueness of the principal eigenvector, EigenTrust introduces the notion of pre-trusted peers, a group of peers that are active and assumed to be universally trusted. This ensures that the graph is acyclic and strongly connected (and that the matrix is irreducible and that the problem is well-conditioned). However, it requires the system to define a set of universally trusted peers, and concentrates outsized power to confer reputation in those pre-trusted peers. We can address this through personalization. Rather than computing a single global reputation vector, the system can compute a personalized global reputation vector for each peer, that gives the reputation score of each peerj in the network from the point of view of a single peeri. To compute personalized EigenTrust for peeri, one can simply perform a traditional EigenTrust computation, but use the contact list of peeri as the set of pre-trusted peers. This is far more computationally expensive than a single EigenTrust computation; however, we apply many of the computation-saving techniques that enabled personalized PageRank [13] to a per- sonalized EigenTrust computation. 2.2.4 Practical Implications For the social payments case, in which people text money to friends, the address-based encryption scheme suffices as a lightweight identity proxy, allowing people to send money directly to people’s cell phone numbers, even if they have not signed up for a wallet. As people are interested in using the protocol to pay people outside of their direct circle of contacts, it is useful for a user to be able to aggregate the trust signals of those in their network to make purchase, payment, and credit decisions, and to mitigate bad actors. Further, a reputation scheme as we described enables a more robust identity scheme. Most identity schemes are based on attestations from others, and it would be useful to be able to weight those attestations by the reputation score of the attestor. 3 Stabilizing Value Perhaps the biggest hurdle to the use of cryptocurrencies as a means of payment is their volatility. Consumers are unlikely to want to buy a volatile cryptocurrency to spend it, since the purchasing power of their accounts would fluctuate widely with market demand for the currency. Merchants who accept cryptocurrencies are likely to convert to fiat upon payment, because their business model does not involve speculating on cryptocurrencies. And the most successful cryptocurrencies today are not just volatile but deflationary – their success leads to their price rising; as a result, prices denominated 7 in the currency fall. Rational behavior would be to use such currencies as a store of value rather than a medium of exchange, and in practice that is what has happened. Stable-value cryptocurrencies would bring a number of benefits to the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Forone, stablepricesremoveaconsiderablebarrierforusingcryptocurrenciesasamedium-of-exchange; salaries, prices of goods, fixed obligations, can all be set in a stable value cryptocurrency without requiring either party to speculate on the future value of the currency. Further, financial contracts are more easily built with a stable value coin, because the issuer can separate the function of the contract from the price risk of the currency in which it’s denominated. While a single stable-value currency would be helpful, a thriving cryptoeconomy is best-served by a family of stable-value currencies, much as it is well-served by the family of variable-value crypto- assets that we have today. Certainly a cryptocurrency pegged to the US Dollar has several uses, from social payments in the US, to user-initiated dollarization in hyper-inflationary markets, to the efficient settlement of high-frequency crypto-asset trades. At the same time, a cryptocurrency pegged to the Euro would also be useful for many purposes, as would a cryptocurrency pegged to the price of a basket of goods in Greece, as would a cryptocurrency pegged to the price of a barrel of oil, or housing in San Francisco. Stable-value local, regional, and utility currencies allow people to hedge price risk in their lives by denominating a portion of their personal economy in currencies that are stable vis-a-vis the price of the goods they regularly use. 3.1 Elastic Coin Supply and Shifting Volatility Risk Several protocols have been proposed for a decentralized stabilized value cryptocurrency (for exam- ple [17, 2, 1, 19]). While a full review of these proposals is outside of the scope of this paper, they generally share two properties. First, rather than a deterministic coin supply rule (in which the coin supply and growth rate are determined in advance, independent of exogenous information), they each introduce an elastic coin supply rule, that stabilizes the value of the coin by adjusting the supply of the coin to match the demand. Second, they each introduce a multi-asset ecology, in which one coin is intended to be stable, while one or more complementary crypto-assets bear the risk of a decrease in stablecoin demand (and receives a reward in the case of an increase in stablecoin demand). In essence, they each shift volatility risk from the coin holders to the complementary asset holders. The Celo protocol utilizes the same two key intuitions, with five novel features: (a) it introduces a multi-asset tiered reserve that supports several local and regional stable value currencies, (b) it sets expansion and contraction parameters that are tuned to the reserve ratio defined by the tiered reserve, (c) it introduces a decentralized exchange in which the different local and regional currencies and the reserve currency can be traded amongst one another without a central party, and that the protocol can use to perform expansions and contractions, (d) it releases block rewards and other incentives in the reserve currency, and (e) it has a governance mechanism in which long-term stakeholders in the reserve currency are responsible for governing the assets held in reserve and the new local currencies that are introduced. 3.2 Protocol Summary At a high level, the protocol proceeds as follows: 1. The protocol establishes a fixed supply of assets, called Celo (also referred to as the Celo native asset), a portion of which is distributed over time. From the initial asset distribution, a portion is placed in reserve and diversified. 2. The protocol also establishes a means-of-payment currency, called the Celo Dollar, that is in- tended to be pegged roughly to the US Dollar, that adheres to the following elastic coin supply rule: When coin supply needs to expand (when the price of Celo Dollar is above the peg), the protocol creates new coins, as in [17, 1, 2]. But rather than distributing them to token holders, it uses 8 them to purchase a basket of cryptocurrencies4 at market rates through a smart contract. These purchases get added to the reserves. This is analogous to a central bank expanding the money supply by buying financial assets on the open market and depositing them in the reserves. When the coin supply needs to contract, the protocol uses reserve assets to buy Celo Dollars on the open market. This is analogous to a central bank selling financial assets on the open market in order to contract the money supply. 3. The protocol has a variable rate transfer fee on Celo’s native asset, to encourage long-term holding of the reserve currency. The proceeds from the fee goes to bolster the reserves, and the rate is based on the reserve ratio – the lower the reserve ratio, the higher the transfer fee. 4. The protocol uses a proof-of-stake model for governance. The weight of a node in governance decisions is dependent on the amount of Celo they stake5 5. Every time a block reward is distributed, an equivalent portion of Celo is released. If the reserve ratio is substantially higher than the target reserve ratio, then the released amount is largely allocated for incentives (e.g. to developers and users). If the reserve ratio is substantially lower than the target reserve ratio, the released amount goes mostly to towards bolstering the reserves. An analysis of the stability characteristics of this protocol is given in [7]. 3.3 Shared Reserves While a single stable coin would be useful for several purposes (for example in cryptoasset trading and internet commerce), a more robust ecosystem would involve a family of local, regional, and utility stable value coins. The benefits of such a monetary ecology has been discussed broadly, for example in [9, 16, 15], but here we focus on one: a stable currency is only meaningful if it is stable vis-a-vis the price of goods and services that are purchased using that currency. Using a global currency for local transactions would introduce price volatility in regions where regional consumer price dynamics vary from the global consumer price dynamics6. From a protocol perspective, we are interested in two mechanisms here: (a) a governance scheme that determines how the protocol makes decisions on introducing new regional stable coins, and (b) a structure in which the introduction of a new successful stable coin increases the stability characteristics of the coins in the family. As a starting point, we can imagine a protocol where each new stable coin is independent – there is a blockchain and reserve for each new currency introduced. In this scheme, the governance question is straightforward – teams will independently choose to introduce new stable value coins outside of the protocol, and people can choose independently to purchase the new coins and their complementary reserve assets. Governance on this issue is determined outside of the protocol, by the market. However, this simplicity comes at a cost: the introduction of a new successful stable coin has no stabilizing effect on existing stable currencies, and on the margins it has a small destabilizing effect7. To address this issue, we introduce the idea of shared reserves. When the protocol introduces a new stable value coin – for example, a stablecoin pegged to the Euro – the reserves for that coin are the same reserves for Celo Dollars. When the supply of Celo Euros needs to expand, it expands using the same mechanism as with Celo Dollars – the protocol creates new Celo Euros, and uses those to purchase a basket of crypto assets for its reserves. When the supply of Celo Euros needs to contract, the protocol uses the same mechanism as before: it sells reserve assets in exchange for Celo Euros and retires the Celo Euros. 4Initially, the Celo native asset, and longer-term through a basket of cryptoassets via cross-chain decentralized exchanges once available 5future versions of the protocol could be based on amount at stake and length of time remaining in their stake. 6For example, with Greece and the Euro, or with dollarization in Uruguay 7If the demand for the new stable coin is high enough, it could potentially cause a contraction in demand for existing stable coins, reducing the value associated with the complementary assets of those existing coins, and increasing uncertainty around long-term demand of the existing coins. 9 The protocol can make this process more efficient in the following manner: before selling the reserves, it first looks to see if the supply of Celo Dollars needs to expand. If so, it creates Celo Dollars, exchanges them directly for Celo Euros at the prevailing exchange rate, and retires the Celo Euros. This is functionally equivalent to selling reserves in exchange for Celo Euros, retiring the Celo Euros, and then buying reserves in exchange for Celo Dollars; it just disintermediates the reserves. It only uses the reserves directly if the need for contraction of the Celo Euros is greater than the need for expansion of all the other stablecoins supported by the protocol. A shared reserve system must come together with a thoughtful method of governing decisions on what new stable coins to introduce, and when to introduce them. If a new stablecoin is introduced that has negative utility to the ecosystem, it can have a marginal negative impact on the stability of the other currencies if the demand for that currency is high enough and volatile enough (for example, a celebrity vanity stablecoin early on), or if the coin decreases aggregate demand for other coins supported by the protocol (for example, the introduction of several duplicative regional currencies in the same region with no differentiating features, causing confusion). For this reason, it is useful to have a governance model that introduces a new stablecoin only if there is a widespread expectation that its introduction would increase the aggregate demand for the family of coins over the long run. We describe this governance model in Section 4.4.2. It is useful to note that the shared reserve system does not require all new currencies to use the shared reserve. In fact, for local or functional currencies, there are several reasons why it would be useful to not engage in the shared-reserve model; we discuss these in Section 4.4.4. To support these currencies, we also allow for new stabilized assets to be created with their own reserve; we call this partitioned reserves. At a high level, the mechanism works in the same manner as the single stabilized asset case, except that a third party can create the asset and initiate the reserve for that asset. For the partitioned-reserve case, each reserve allocation is initialized at 25% Celo, 25% a local reserve currency, and the remainder the same allocations as the shared reserve. 3.4 Price Discovery and Mechanics of Reserve Asset Purchasing The Celo protocol is implemented as a fork of Ethereum. The cost of computation in the Celo network is paid in Celo, just as Ether is used to pay for gas on the Ethereum network. Celo stable assets are implemented as the equivalent of ERC20 tokens. One difference between the Celo protocol and Ethereum is that while Ether itself is not compliant with the ERC20 token standard, Celo is. This allows a decentralized exchange, through smart contracts, between Celo stable value assets as well as Celo native asset, much like 0x [21]. This allows the automatic purchasing of reserves and distribution of coins without cross-chain decentralized exchanges. To determine the price of Celo stable currencies, the protocol will use a Schelling-point scheme amongst stakeholders, with the weight of the a stakeholder’s vote dependent on the amount of Celo at stake. One can imagine further augmenting the Schelling point scheme with price feeds from exchanges, as determined through a governance scheme. 4 Governance and Incentives A primary incentive mechanism in the Celo protocol is the distribution of block rewards, which are allocated to the various contributors to the system – those who maintain the protocol (by selecting validators, validating transactions, verifying users, and participating in the Schelling-point price dis- covery mechanism), those who contribute to the robustness of the reserves, those who take on risk in the case that there is a contraction, those who use the protocol as their means of payment, those who invite others to use the protocol, and those who improve the protocol (by participating in governance, and by making technical contributions to the protocol). We describe these below. 4.1 Maintaining the System The system uses a proof-of-stake mechanism for selecting the validator set and participating in gover- nance decisions. Both validator election and governance decisions are made through a bonded-stake 10 weighted voting scheme. Any Celo holder may put up a bonded deposit, which involves locking Celo in a smart contract. Votes (for both validators and in governance) are weighted by the amount of Celo in the bonded deposit. Any locked Celo should continue to be locked up for a certain time period after voting, and in the future it would be helpful to weight voting by the length of time remaining in the lockup. This incentivizes long-term holding of the reserve currency and aligns governance decisions with long-term perspectives. Block rewards are distributed amongst those who participate in validator elections and governance decisions. Users don’t vote for validators directly. Instead, validators are expected to organize themselves into groups and account holders vote for these validator groups. Just as anybody in a democracy can create their own political party, or seek to get selected to represent a party in an election, any Celo user can create a validator group and add themselves to it, or ask an existing validator group to include them. Validator elections are held once every epoch, which corresponds to approximately once per day. Validators, once elected, put up a slashable bonded deposit, participate in the consensus scheme, send verification messages, participate in the Schelling-point scheme for price discovery, and receive block rewards to cover their costs and as an incentive for their work to maintain the system. 4.2 Bolstering Reserves and Contracting Stable-Value Currency Supply when Needed Celo holders, through their purchase, give the initial value to Celo’s native asset and introduce other crypto assets into the reserves. Further, Celo holders bear some risk in the case of contracting supply or a dip in the reserves: transfer fees are imposed if the reserve ratio goes below the target reserve ratio, and the value of Celo may go down if there is a contraction in demand for Celo stable currencies. Celo holders may be rewarded for playing these roles in two ways: first, as there is greater demand for Celo stable currencies, there will be more protocol-directed purchases of Celo, increasing the demand for fixed supply. Second, if the reserve ratio is greater than the target reserve ratio, Celo holders are rewarded with a portion of the block rewards (provided that they are participating in consensus on transaction validation, sending verification messages when selected, and participating in Schelling- point voting for price discovery). These rewards are paid in proportion to the amount of Celo at stake 8. 4.3 Increasing User Base and Usage of the System Active users (people who use the payments protocol, participate in phone number validation through the mobile wallet, and maintain a nominal stake in Celo) are rewarded through block rewards. In effect, this reduces transaction fees for active users. (One can even imagine a scenario in which these block rewards are issued by waiving transaction fees for a certain number of transactions in the stable currency per unit time, implemented through part of the block reward going to paying transaction fees of users, set at a rate to ensure a certain transaction speed, and prioritized based on the amount of their stake.) 4.4 Improving the Protocol And finally a continuously evolving protocol requires incentives, and a governance scheme, for improv- ing the protocol. 4.4.1 T echnical Improvements For technical improvements to the protocol, anybody may put up a bonded deposit to make a technical proposal, with a proposed fee-for-implementation, on a regular cycle9. Proposals will be voted on by long-term stakeholders, similar to the voting scheme with Dash’s masternodes [8], with their votes weighted by the amount of their stake and notice period. Funds that are not allocated in a particular cycle are added to the reserves. 8and in future versions of the protocol, the time remaining in the stake 9This mechanism can also be applied to other types of proposals, for example for marketing proposals. 11 4.4.2 Introducing Regional Currencies and Broadening the Reserve Base Over time, it would also improve the protocol to introduce more stable value currencies, and to broaden the reserve holding
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