ZEROBASE 백서

ZEROBASE

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ed to accommodate mul- tiple role types, each interacting with the trust-minimized ex- ecution framework via explicit input/output interfaces. These roles are integrated within the system’s Trusted Execution, Proof Generation, and Liquidity modules, forming a modular, reusable, and composable participation paradigm. A. Participation Pathways Resource Contribution Pathway. Individuals possessing idle resources—such as bandwidth, compute power, or legacy GPUs—can contribute to the network via resource aggrega- tors using a ZEROBASE client or embedded SDK. Tasks 9 are scheduled across multiple platforms and executed within SEV-SNP protected TEEs. Upon completion, a verifiable Resource Usage Proof is generated and translated into a structured on-chain credential using zero-knowledge circuits. This credential can be staked, lent, or otherwise deployed within financial strategies, forming a nexus between ”off-chain resource→verifiable state→composable asset.” Strategy Execution Pathway. Asset managers or quant teams with proprietary trading models can encapsulate their logic in TEE-compatible execution images. After remote attestation registers their environment, the strategy runs off-chain against live market data, consistently outputting zero-knowledge in- terval proofs denoting risk metrics and return distributions. On-chain verifiers assess this evidence’s integrity and interact via a zkStaking module. This pathway achieves the design goal of ”invisible strategy, yet transparent risk.” Protocol Integration Pathway. External DeFi or Web3 pro- tocols can incorporate ZEROBASE via standardized inter- faces—e.g., zkRouter or zkReport. Integrators can query proof-of-state from strategy pools or resource tokens to cal- ibrate liquidation thresholds, determine collateral ratios, or orchestrate cross-protocol logic. These interactions do not require off-chain coordination or trusted intermediaries; the entire exchange is driven by structured zero-knowledge proofs and on-chain function hooks, delivering high reusability and low trust assumptions. B. Illustrative Use Cases •Developers use ZBT to access the zkRouter interface, invoking zero-knowledge proofs of off-chain module execution results to verify AI model outputs, content- generation logs, strategy logic risks, etc.—achieving “trustworthy off-chain logic as on-chain, transparently adjustable state inputs.” •Data providers use ZBT to attest to the trustworthiness of their data—for example, providing off-chain ESG data, credit scores, or summary proofs of AI training corpora—so that they can be invoked in Web3 protocols as “trusted data sources.” •Web2 products integrate the zkLogin module, using ZBT as an access threshold to implement “anonymous login + compliant authorization,” enabling game accounts, social accounts, and voting identities to complete authentication without exposing original identities. •AI startups call ZEROBASE’s trusted inference network and use ZBT to access the TEE execution environment to run models and generate verifiable results (such as model output summaries and AI decision processes), suitable for compliance scenarios such as AI safety supervision and accountability traceability. •Content platforms use ZBT to submit proofs of original- ity—for example, news organizations or creators generate tamper-proof “generation signatures” via TEE + ZKP for on-chain indexing and traceability to prevent AI rewriting or copyright disputes. •Hardware manufacturers embed ZBT modules into edge devices—for example, routers, NAS devices, and smart- phones automatically join the Proving Network via an integrated SDK; ZBT is used to identify task-completion status, generate result-access permissions, or attest to contributions. •Cross-chain protocols or middleware projects use ZBT to denote off-chain computation consistency—for example, an L2 network verifies another chain’s state-transition process via zkProof queries, with ZBT used as a valid credential for proof relay. •Education platforms use ZBT to bind students’ anony- mous identities and exam results, accessing education systems via zkLogin to generate verifiable “pass records” or “skill certifications” while protecting personal privacy. •Individual users can run nodes, contribute computing power, and earn participation rights. •Technical developers can join the Prover Network and contribute trusted execution capabilities. •Community members can use ZBT to express preference proposals regarding the ecosystem’s upgrade path. VI. TOKENUTILITY& ECONOMICDESIGN A. Main Information Token Ticker : ZEROBASE (ZBT) Token Type : Utility Token Total Supply : 1,000,000,000 ZBT (fixed, non-inflationary) B. Token Allocation Summary The specific details are shown in Table II. C. Project and Token Utility ZEROBASE is a cryptographic computing infrastructure platform based on zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and trusted execution environments (TEE), dedicated to providing verifi- able off-chain computation services for users and developers without disclosing sensitive data. Its core modules include zkStaking, ProofYield, zkLogin, and a decentralized Proving Network, widely applied in privacy-sensitive scenarios such as DeFi, CeFi, Web3 identity verification, and AI inference verification. ZEROBASE offers a transparent mechanism where users can cryptographically verify the integrity of off-chain tasks, instead of relying on intermediaries. Developers can integrate standardized APIs to route results back on-chain—enabling a new class of composable, verifiable applications. ZBT is the utility token of the ZEROBASE network, used to access protocol services, coordinate the operation of the node network, and participate in community governance processes. ZBT does not represent any ownership, right to income, or security interest, and does not promise future price or market performance; its functions are limited to utility and participation within the protocol. D. Protocol Functions Currently Supported 1) Task coordination and access to computing resources (ProofYield):Users can run lightweight clients to join the network and provide compute or bandwidth resources, partic- ipating in task distribution and data processing. ZBT is used 10 TABLE II: ZBT Token Allocation and Vesting Schedule Category Allocation V esting Schedule Purpose of Allocation Team & Advisors 20% 1-year lock-up (cliff), followed by 48-month linear vesting To incentivize long-term contributions and promote sustainable core product development. Early Investors 11.25% 1-year lock-up (cliff), followed by 24-month linear vesting Allocated to early strategic backers for ecosystem support and protocol growth. Liquidity 2% Fully unlocked at TGE Facilitate initial liquidity. Ecological Fund 15% Fully unlocked at TGE Supports ecosystem growth, market- ing, partnerships, and infrastructure expansion. Airdrop & Early Adopters 8% 5% unlocked at TGE, 3% remaining to be released in the next month Incentivizes early participants who contribute to the bootstrapping of the proving network. Node Stake 43.75% Linear release starting one month post-TGE Ongoing rewards for staking nodes to ensure network security and participation. to denote node activity contributions and serves as a means to coordinate resource allocation and task scheduling within the network. 2) Off-chain execution verification (zkStaking):Users can access ZK-verified computation modules to inspect task pa- rameters, execution ranges, or strategy risks. ZBT can be used to access structured strategy reports or associated data verification modules. 3) Network node participation management (Proving Node):Verified institutions can operate high-performance nodes to assist in completing off-chain computation and cryptographic verification processes. ZBT functions as the internal settlement medium for node-to-node coordination and performance validation. 4) Community parameter proposals and participation mechanism (Governance Signaling):As protocol governance expands, holders can use ZBT to propose or signal preferences regarding module versions, operational parameters, or upgrade priorities.These votes are non-binding in nature and serve as transparent community inputs for protocol evolution. E. Token Allocation and Economic Management The fixed supply of 1 billion ZBT tokens has been de- termined with enduring ecosystem utility and protocol sus- tainability in mind. ZBT is not designed as an investment instrument, and no representations are made regarding its market performance. To support predictable supply dynamics, a token burn mechanism may be implemented through automated onchain processes governed by transparent parameters. This is intended to adjust circulating supply based on network activity and usage demand, not for price targeting or speculative outcomes. F . Node Rewards and Treasury Allocation Framework ZEROBASE’s network incentive model is built upon two distinct node types, each fulfilling a critical operational role in decentralized proof routing and secure computation. HUB Nodes serve as the network’s routing and shared band- width layer, intelligently dispatching zero-knowledge proof tasks from users to available Proving Nodes. They also con- tribute idle bandwidth to improve overall protocol efficiency. No collateral is required to operate a HUB Node. Rewards are distributed in small amounts of ZBT tokens at regular intervals, based on routing performance, traffic contribution, and uptime. This mechanism ensures efficient task distribution, reduces latency for Proving Nodes, and enhances the availability and decentralization of the network. Proving Nodes represent the TEE execution layer opti- mized for the performance of the network. These nodes are responsible for generating zero-knowledge proofs within secure Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), forming the cryptographic backbone of ZEROBASE. Participation requires a minimum collateral of $1,000,000 in stablecoins, and re- wards are distributed in ZBT or stablecoins based on the volume and quality of proof tasks completed. This structure incentivizes consistent, high caliber computing services from proven infrastructure operators. Building upon this dual layer incentive framework, ZER- OBASE implements a buyback mechanism governed by the DAO to ensure sustainable circulation and long-term protocol alignment. All network revenues derived from routing, proof generation, bandwidth sharing, and collateral-based treasury strategies are consolidated through the protocol income mod- ule. A fixed 20% allocation is reserved for the ZEROBASE Foundation, supporting ongoing research, infrastructure main- tenance, and global ecosystem expansion. This percentage is governed by community vote and may be adjusted as the network evolves. The remaining revenues, primarily from low-risk capital management strategies backed by node collateral, are allocated to the ZEROBASE DAO treasury. ZBT token holders may vote on how these funds are used, including whether to initiate buybacks, at what scale, and with what frequency. Upon governance approval, the DAO treasury may execute ZBT buybacks and permanently burn the repurchased tokens, enabling dynamic control of circulating supply and reinforcing the protocol’s monetary coherence and economic resilience. 11 G. Upcoming Protocol Functions 1) Governance module (zkDAO):Users can use ZBT to propose or participate in protocol improvement proposals, covering new module support, parameter adjustments, and the evolution of governance rules. 2) Module access and permission elevation:Users holding ZBT may, based on their participation level or historical con- tributions, obtain advanced access to certain modules, such as early access to specific tools or strategy verification services. 3) Cross-chain access expansion:The functions of ZBT will extend to multiple compatible chains to support cross- chain computation tasks, bandwidth verification, and resource coordination mechanisms. 4) Protocol revenue reallocation mechanism:The commu- nity may vote to determine how protocol revenue is rein- vested—such as module maintenance, ecosystem grants, or public goods. ZBT can be used to vote to express preferences; it does not directly grant any rights to income or equity. VII. ROADMAP The ZEROBASE roadmap is shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 5: ZEROBASE Roadmap VIII. CONCLUSION In a landscape where transparency and privacy conflict, where off-chain execution struggles to align with on-chain verification, and where latent resources remain untapped, ZEROBASE offers a structural remedy: embedding trust into the architecture and restoring validation authority to users and protocols. Leveraging trusted execution, zero-knowledge proofs, and composable liquidity structures, ZEROBASE delivers a sys- tem that requires no human interpretation. Strategies remain undisclosed but risks can be audited; resources need neither custodial intermediaries nor opaque contracts; capital need not rely on platform guarantees, but can be orchestrated via structural rules. This is the essence of structural transparency and trust-minimized collaboration. ZEROBASE is not designed to supplant existing systems or to predefine a fixed end-product class. 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