XDC Network 백서

XDC Network

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eportMalicious method. With the reportMalicious method only Validators can call, pass a message and a block-number. If more than 2/3 of the validators agree on the reportMalicious , a slashing will be executed. The process can slash a portion of the entire 100% stake of a Validator Node. C. XinFin Network Consensus Protocol Motivation for XinFin’s Double Validation On the XDPoS, Double Validation is motivated by the need for an additional trust-less validation layer that enhances security via a provable uniform distribution. The trust-less validation layer is achieved through decentralized randomization. To clarify, once a masternode creates a block, and before it’s added to XinFin’s blockchain, it’s mandatory that such a masternode is verified by a randomly selected set of masternodes. Leveraging Double Validation, XinFin’s hybrid protocol strengthens the network, improves XDPoS security, reduces possibilities for nothing-at-stake and fork attacks, and makes the hybrid blockchain unique among Delegated Proof-of-Stake-based blockchains. Double Validation Process Within the XinFin Network, masternodes have equal responsibility in running the network and keeping it stable. The network’s Full nodes (in this case masternodes) run on powerful hardware configurations and high-speed network connectivity, ensuring the required block time (estimated to be two seconds). Moreover, only masternodes can produce and seal blocks. For blocks to be produced and sealed, the XinFin Network consensus relies on the concept of Double Validation to improve the reliability of existing consensus mechanisms, namely Single Validation. In the next section, we will cover XinFin’s Double Validation process, then analyse the differences and improvements of Double Validation compared to Single Validation. XinFin’s Double Validation (DV) is similar to some existing PoS-based blockchains such as Cardano. In the process, each block is created by a block producer. A block producer is primarily a masternode that takes its block creation permission turn following a pre-determined and circular sequence of masternodes in each epoch. 5 However, the DV process in the XinFin Network differs from the process in other blockchains. It’s worth noting that DV in the XinFin Network requires the signatures of two masternodes on a block for the block to be published on its blockchain. The block creator (first masternode) provides the first signature. The second masternode, which is the block verifier, is randomly selected among a set of voted masternodes to verify and sign a new block. In subsequent sections—for a more convenient read—the terms ‘block creator’ and ‘block verifier’ are used interchangeably for masternode 1 (block producer) and the randomly selected masternode 2, respectively. The process of randomly selecting the block verifiers is detailed in the next paragraphs. Additionally, there is no mining in the block creation as demonstrated in Proof-of-Work-based blockchains (e.g., Ethereum and Bitcoin). This means that a created block is valid if, and only if, it is sealed by two signatures from a block creator and a corresponding block verifier that confirms its accuracy. At XinFin, there is a strong belief that the unique DV technique enhances the stability of the blockchain by diminishing the probability of producing ‘garbage’ blocks, while simultaneously maintaining the system security and consistency. Randomization of block verifiers in DV is a key factor in reducing risks associated with paired masternodes trying to commit malicious blocks. Additionally, comparing XinFin’s blockchain architecture with other blockchain setups indicates that there are significant advantages to the unique DV technique. Specifically, DV introduces improvements in block time by only requiring two signatures per block. In the interest of demonstrating how the XinFin Network has undergone enhancements, compared 5 Hoskinson, Charles. “Why We Are Building Cardano --a Subjective Approach.” to existing PoS-based blockchains, the following figures analyze the differences between Double Validation and Single Validation mechanisms. The limitations in some existing blockchains serve to highlight the improvement introduced by Double Validation over Single Validation. In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 below, benefits introduced by DV as compared to SV are compared by analyzing some attack scenarios. Fig. 2. Single Validation (SV): (a) SV with block creation masternode as an attacker and (b) SV with two consecutive block creation masternodes as attackers ● Single Validation In Single Validation and in an epoch, each masternode (e.g., M1 in figure 2.), sequentially takes its turn to create a block (e.g., block100). The next masternode (e.g., M2) in the sequence then validates the new block100. In the event that block100 is invalid (implying that M1 is potentially an attacker) and that the new block contains a transaction that invalidly benefits M1, an honest M2 rejects block 100 and creates a valid block 100 next to block 99 (see Fig. 2 [a].) However, if M2 is also an attacker (see Fig. 2 [b]) that cooperates with M1, M2 ignores the invalidation of block100, signs it, and creates the next block, namely block101 that is valid. Subsequently, if masternode M3 verifies the validity of block101, M3 signs block101 and creates a block102. This way, Single Validation potentially leaves the blockchain with ‘garbage’ or invalid blocks which require a ‘rebase’ to restore the validity of the blockchain. ● Double Validation (DV) With XinFin's DV technique, the likelihood of having garbage blocks in the blockchain is significantly reduced. In this case let’s assume that M1 and M2 are the block creator and block verifier of block100, respectively. If block100 is invalid and M2 is honest (see Fig. 3 [a]), the next block creator M3, when creating block101, notes that block100 doesn't have the required number of signatures (two signatures in XinFin’s case), and thus, rejects block100 and creates another block100 next to block99. In the event that M2 is also an attacker pairing/handshaking with M1 (see Fig. 3 [b]), M2 signs block100 despite its invalidity. Worth noting is that XinFin’s block verifiers or M2 are randomly selected, therefore there is little chance of successfully pairing M1 and M2. This limits the possibility of invalid blocks being added to the blockchain. Next, even after M3 verifies that block100 has two valid signatures, M3 still rejects it because block100 is invalidated by M3 that will create another valid block100. To break the stability and consistency of XinFin’s blockchain, in this case, M3 should be an attacker together with M1 and M2. This scenario has a low probability of occurring since block verifiers are randomly selected. That said, DV strengthens the consistency of the blockchain and makes it hard to disrupt. Fig. 3. Double Validation (DV): (a) DV with block creator as an attacker and (b) DV with both block creator and block verifiers as attackers Randomization for Block Verifiers for Double Validation The First masternode or Block Creator: Within a given epoch, the first masternode/block creator( v1 ) is selected by a round-turn game and it can be formally defined as an array. 6 The array’s formula is as follows: (equation: 1) Random Matrix and Smart Contract To select random verifiers for a subsequent epoch ( e+1 ), 3 (three) steps are followed. To understand the three steps explained below, let m be the number of masternodes, n be the number of slots in an epoch. 6 EMPTY Step 1: Random Numbers Generation and Commitment Phase First, at the beginning of epoch e , each masternode Vi creates an array of n + 1 special random numbers Recommendi = [ri.1, ri.2, ..., ri. n, θ i] , where ri. k ∈ [1, ..., m] indicates the recommendation of an ordered list of block verifiers for the next epoch of Vi , and θ i ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is used for increasing the unpredictability of the random numbers. Second, each masternode Vi has to encrypt the array Recommendi using a secret key SKi, say Secreti = Encrypt ( Recommendi , SKi) as the encrypted array. Next, each masternode forms a “lock” message that contains encrypted array Secreti, signs off this message with its blockchain’s private key through the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme that’s currently used in Ethereum and Bitcoin along with the corresponding epoch index and its public key generated from its private key. After forming a “lock” message and signing off the message via the ECDSA verifiable key, every masternode can check who created this lock message through ECDSA verification scheme and which epoch it relates to. Thereafter, each node Vi sends their lock message with its signature and public key to a Smart Contract stored in the blockchain. The process enables each masternode to collect and know the locks from all other masternodes. 7 Step 2: Recovery Phase The recovery phase is for every node to reveal its previous lock message so other nodes can get to know the secret array it has sent before. A masternode only starts revealing its lock message if all masternodes have sent their lock messages to the smart contract or a certain timeout event occurs. Each masternode then opens its lock message by sending an “unlock” message to the smart contract for other masternodes to open the corresponding lock. Let’s imagine a commitment-like scheme, in this case, where a lock message is a commitment message locking its contained recommendation array Recommendi so that no one can open or guess the contained array, and the unlock message gives the key for other masternodes to decrypt the box and retrieve the values of Recommendi . Eventually, a masternode has both locks and unlocks to other masternodes. If some elector is an adversary which might publish its lock but not intend to send the corresponding unlock, other masternodes can ignore the adversary’s lock and set all its random values be 1, by default. The idea is simple: the network can keep working successfully even if some masternodes are adversaries. Step 3: Assembled Matrix and Computation Phase At the point of the slot n th of the epoch e , the secret arrays Secreti in the smart contract will be decrypted by each masternode and return the plain version of Recommendi. Each tuple of the first n numbers of each Vi will be assembled as the i th column of an n × m matrix. All the last number θ i forms a m × 1 matrix. Then each node will compute the block verifiers ordered list by some mathematical operations as explained below. The resulting output is a matrix n × 1 indicating the order of block verifiers for the next epoch e + 1 . For the second masternode or block verifier, each node computes the common array ν2 for the order of the block verifiers by the following steps as in Equation 1. 7 ( equation: 2 ) ( equation: 3 ) Then, ν2 is obtained by modulo operation of element values of ν 0 2 as in Equation 2: Finality Analysis A standard definition of “total economic finality”: A phenomenon occurring when ¾ (three quarters) of all masternodes make maximum-odds bets that a given block or state will be finalized. This condition offers very strong incentives for masternodes to never attempt colluding to revert a block. When masternodes make such a maximum odds bet, in any blockchain where that block or state is not present, the masternodes lose their entire deposit. 8 XinFin Network maintains this standardization in the design so that one block is considered as irreversible if it collects up to three-quarters of the signatures of all members in the masternodes committee. The time-line of the blockchain creation process, checking finality, and marking the block as immutable are described in Figure 4 below. 8 Fig. 4. Timeline of Blockchain Making Process D. Consensus Protocol: Formalization Basic Concepts & Protocol Description To provide a solid educational foundation and to prove that the XinFin Network can achieve its claims, in the following section, we will present a preliminary examination of the concepts discussed in our yellow paper and an overview of XinFin Delegated Proof of Stake (XDPoS). To start, we will provide a presentation of XinFin’s proof of stake consensus algorithm. The formalization follows that of notable tokens, such as Cardano and Thunder, in recent literature. More specifically, XinFin places emphasis on the following concepts and definitions that were presented in literature for Cardano and Thunder tokens and adapts them to the context of XinFin Network. Time, Slots, Epoch Ideally, each epoch is divided into 900 block times. Each of these block times is referred to as a block slot. Only one block can be created in a slot. The main assumption is that there is a roughly synchronized clock that allows for masternodes to learn the current slot. This simplification effectively permits masternodes to execute the signing and validation process of the XDPoS consensus, where each masternode must collectively create a block to the current slot. Simplified further, each slot SLR is accessed by an integer r ∈ {1, 2, ...} , and is supposed that the real-time window that corresponds to each slot has the following properties, which are similar to what is specified in Cardano. 6 A. Every masternode can determine the index of the current slot based on the current time. And, any discrepancies between parties’ local time are insignificant in comparison with the length of time represented by a slot. B. The amount of a slot time is sufficient to guarantee that any message transmitted by an honest party at the beginning of the time window will be received by any other honest party by the end of that time window. While similar to Cardono’s assumption, the XinFin Network adopts the assumption to ensure that block creators seamlessly propagate their created blocks to the corresponding block verifiers. This guarantees a block is signed by both the masternodes before the next block creator builds another block on top of it. As mentioned in Section II-A, in XinFin’s setting, it's assumed that the fixed set of m (150) masternodes V1, V2, ...., Vm interacts throughout the protocol to reach the consensus. For each Vi , a public/private key pair (PKI, ski) for a prescribed signature scheme, ideally ECDSA, is generated. Additionally, XinFin’s protocol adopts the assumption that the public keys pk1 , ..., pkm of the masternodes are distributed and known by all masternodes in the protocol (that means a masternode knows all public keys of all other nodes). Some notable definitions of the blockchain concepts are defined following the notation. Definition 1 (State): A state is an encoded string st ∈ {0, 1} Definition 2 (Block): A block B generated at a slot sli contains the current state st ∈ {0, 1} λ, data d ∈ {0, 1} ∗ , the slot number i and a signature Σ = Signski (st, d, sli) computed under ski corresponding to the masternode Vi generating the block Algorithm 1: The algorithm illustrated the consensus protocol Input: m - Number of masternodes, n number of slots in an epoch Output: The complete ledger of the blockchain C To create the complete ledger for block C, several steps must be completed. These are as follows: (a) Creating the empty blockchain (stack) C (b) Commencing an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) to raise funds to support the provision of cryptocurrencies and blockchain-related products and services (c) Issuance of tokens/coins to holders. These tokens do not provide equity stake, rather they deliver their owners some stake in a product or service created by the company and (d) Voting for the masternode committee (masternodes) VC ← {V1; V2; ..., Vm} . Thereafter, (e) Initiate the first epoch e1 ← {sl1 , sl2 , ..., sln }; (f) Randomly generate the array of second masternodes for the first epoch SV1 ← [v 1 2.1 , v1 2.2 , ..., v1 2. n ] ; (g) Create the genesis block B0 ; (h ) Update the blockchain C ← C. push(B0 ) ; while true do while j is less than n to create block Bj by the first masternode; Update the blockchain C ← C. push (Bj ) ; Then, step (i) validate the block Bj by the second masternode; (j) broadcast and validate the block Bj by VCi; if Bj has more than 3/4 masternode committee members’ signature then FINALITY(Bj .ID) = true; if j = n then j ← 1; else j++; if len(C) mod n = 0 then doCheckpoint(); Voting for the masternode committee for the next epoch VC ← {V1; V2; ..., Vm} ; Random generate the array of verifier masternodes for the next epoch (i + 1)th; SVi+1 ← [v i+1 2.1 , vi+1 2.2 , ..., vi+1 2.n ]; ei+1 ← i ∗ n ∗ 2 + e1; i++ ; Here’s a pictorial summary of the process: Definition 3 (Blockchain): A blockchain C is a sequence of blocks B1 , ..., Bn associated with a strictly increasing sequence of slots for which the state sti of Bi is equal to H(Bi−1), where H is a collision-resistant cryptography hash function. To add, a blockchain has a number of properties, including the length of a chain len(C) = n, which is its number of blocks, and the block Bn is the head of the chain, denoted head(C). As mentioned earlier, in the XinFin Network model, each time slot sli is set as 2 seconds and an epoch is a set as R of 900 slots {sl1 , sl2 , ..., sl900 }. The duration of an epoch equals 1800 seconds. In summary, the consensus protocol of XinFin Network consensus can be formalized in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 is simulated and explained as a process shown in Fig. 5 Fig. 5. Randomization of Block Verifiers, Creating and Validating Blocks in Each Epoch III. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. Nothing-at-stake Nothing-at-stake is a well-known problem in PoS-based blockchain, just like the 51% attack in PoW algorithms. For PoW-based miners, it’s mandatory to have CapEx (capital expenditures) for buying mining equipment such as ASICs. Similarly, there's a need for OpEx (operation expenditures) such as electricity to solve mathematical puzzles securing the network. That means, there is always an intrinsic cost for miners in mining regardless of its success. In case of a fork, miners therefore always allocate their resource (equipment) to the chain that they believe is correct in order to get incentives for compensating the intrinsic costs in mining. On the contrary, PoS-based systems don't rely on mining. During an ideal execution creating a fork, the only costs incurred relate to block validation and signing. That is because masternodes do not incur intrinsic costs. In this case, there’s an inherent problem of the masternode having no downside to staking both forks. Therefore, there are actually two issues in the original design of PoS. On one hand, for any masternode, the optimal strategy is to validate every chain/fork, so that the masternode receives its rewards no matter which fork wins. On the other hand, for attackers/malicious masternodes, they can easily create a fork for double spending. The XinFin Network handles these two problems exceptionally. (Note: Through the XinFin Network consensus protocol, the XinFin Network maintains a certain order of masternodes in creating and sealing blocks during each epoch). For the first issue, random/arbitrary forks never happen because block creation by the masternodes is predetermined in each epoch. For the second issue, the Double Validation mechanism ensures that only one block can be validated by the second randomly selected masternode. That’s even when one malicious masternode creates two blocks at its turn. B. Long-range attack Within the XinFin Network, a block is valid only if it collects Double Validation and is finalized once 3/4 of masternodes verify. Therefore, as long as the number of attackers or malicious nodes and/or fail-stop nodes is less than or equal to 1/4 the number of masternodes, the number of masternodes signing a block is at least 3/4 the total number of masternodes, which makes the block finalized. Thus, there is no chance for one malicious masternode to create a longer valid chain on the XinFin Ne
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