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r stored in any centralized database.
• Recovery. Enable the legitimate owner to reclaim their PoH following theft or sale.
2.2.2.3. Design Requirements for Authentication
• Unlinkable Pseudonymity. It should not be possible to identify who someone is or to
track someone across different contexts.
• Illicit Transfer Prevention. The system needs to ensure that the person using the
PoH credential is the one it was issued to, via a person-bound second factor for periodic
reauthentication.
2.3. Ideal Root of Trust for PoH
2.3.1. Overview
When evaluated against the design requirements outlined above, most candidate PoH mecha -
nisms fail for structural reasons. Below, we evaluate several approaches.
2.3.1.1. Online Accounts
The simplest attempt to establish PoH at scale uses existing accounts such as email, phone
numbers, and social media. This method fails because one person can have multiple accounts.
Further, accounts are not person-bound—they can be easily transferred—and CAPTCHAs
are ineffective because AI agents are now capable of bypassing them. Current methods for
preventing duplicate accounts, such as analyzing activity patterns, tend to fail when users have
strong incentives to create multiple identities or commit fraud, as demonstrated by large-scale
attacks targeting well-established financial services.
2.3.1.2. Credit Cards
Credit cards have been used in several contexts as a proxy for PoH. Although this method can
increase friction for fraudsters, it is far from effective. Beyond not being private, credit cards
allow fraudsters to create many duplicates—the simplest method is to pay for many accounts,
and fraudsters can acquire large numbers of credit cards either through virtual credit cards
or on the dark web. Advances in generative AI let automated agents mass-produce plausible
credit identities. Furthermore, many people lack access to financial services. Even in the U.S.,
6% of adults don’t have a bank account, and credit card ownership is not universal even among
those with accounts. In less developed countries, the share without access is significantly higher.
Therefore, credit cards are not an inclusive solution for PoH.
2.3.1.3. Official ID Verification (Know Your Customer)
Online services often request proof of ID to comply with KYC requirements. In theory, a similar
mechanism could be used to issue a PoH based on government documents, but this faces multiple
challenges (discussed in depth in Section X). More than 50% of the global population does
not have an ID that can be verified digitally, and building KYC verification while preserving
anonymity is inherently contradictory. Zero-knowledge proofs and digitally signed IDs can
partially address the privacy concern, but NFC-readable IDs are far less prevalent and people
can hold multiple government IDs, so perfect uniqueness cannot be achieved.
2.3.1.4. Web of Trust
The underlying idea is to verify identity claims in a decentralized manner—for example, PGP
key-signing parties or projects like Proof of Humanity that use face photos and video calls.
However, these systems heavily rely on individuals and are susceptible to human error and Sybil
attacks. Staking assets can increase security but decreases inclusivity, and these systems carry
privacy concerns (e.g., publishing face images) and susceptibility to fraud using deepfakes.
One could also use information about relationships between people to infer which users are real.
Projects like EigenTrust, BrightID and soulbound tokens (SBTs) propose more sophisticated
rules based on the observation that social relations can constitute a unique identifier.1 However,
the required relationships are slow to build on a global scale, and it seems inevitable that AI,
possibly assisted by humans acquiring multiple "real world" credentials, will be able to create
such profiles at scale. Ultimately, these approaches require giving up the notion of a unique
human entirely.
2.3.1.5. Biometrics
Approaches based on online accounts, social graphs, webs of trust, or financial credentials can
be mimicked by AI systems and ultimately require accepting multiple identities per person.
Biometric verification is the only class of mechanisms that can simultaneously satisfy all design
requirements at global scale when implemented correctly. Biometrics are universal, enabling
access irrespective of nationality, race, age, gender, or economic means. They provide a natural
recovery mechanism and can be used for authentication, making the PoH credential person-
bound. Among biometric modalities, iris recognition uniquely satisfies the accuracy, scalability,
and privacy requirements, as shown in Fig. 2.
1SBTs are not designed to be a PoH mechanism. Rather, they complement applications where proving relationships rather
than unique humanness is needed. However, they are sometimes mentioned in this context and are therefore relevant to
discuss.
Figure 8: An overview of candidate PoH mechanisms evaluated against the core design requirements established
in the previous whitepaper. Only biometrics satisfy all five requirements when implemented correctly.
2.3.2. Deep Dive: Why a Document-based Root of Trust is Not Ideal for Individual Empow-
erment
In a future shaped by highly capable machine intelligence, the foundations of economic and
social power shift. As automation increases, control over bots as well as the ability to determine
who counts as a unique human will become an increasing source of power. Any entity that
controls PoH gains significant influence over access to platforms, economic participation, and
collective decision-making. Therefore, any incentive misalignment between issuer and partic -
ipants can lead to catastrophic failures. The inherent nature of how documents are issued
suggests that any PoH system based on them will result in long-term incentive misalignment.
Despite benefits—such as legal incentives against hacking and the fact that one billion people
already have a verifiable document—the structural limitations of document-based PoH make it
unviable on a global scale.
Figure 9: Properties of document-based PoH evaluated against core design requirements. Five of eight
requirements (red) cannot be met by document-based approaches.
Evaluating against design requirements:
2.3.2.1. Universal Accuracy
Establishing uniqueness using government documents is challenging. Names are insufficient for
deduplication due to high collision rates (e.g., nearly 40,000 James Smiths in the US), and
the birthday problem further complicates uniqueness checks. A document's numerical identifier
is the only viable uniqueness signal, but this creates a vulnerability where individuals could
acquire multiple PoH simply by reporting their document "lost" and obtaining a new one. If
1% of the US population participated, this could easily lead to tens of millions of "authentic
human" bot accounts.
2.3.2.2. Universal Eligibility
Only about one in eight people possess documents that can be cryptographically verified. Basing
PoH on documents would exclude many billions of people.
2.3.2.3. Fake Human Resistance
Some documents are cryptographically verifiable, making them relatively fraud resistant.
However, document-based PoH incentivizes the theft of physical documents like passports.
Stolen documents can be used to generate PoH or, in some implementations, be cloned without
the owner's knowledge. As AI capabilities grow, the issuing infrastructure will need increasingly
advanced capabilities—securing the root of trust, anomaly detection, cross-issuer verification,
revocation mechanisms, and dynamic expiration dates. Developing these capabilities is likely
better suited to publicly auditable and mutually verifiable companies rather than governments.
2.3.2.4. Borderless & Interoperable
Interoperability is relatively straightforward since verifiable documents are already standards-
based. However, the fact that governments could create fake documents and inject fake PoH
credentials makes it hard to trust foreign credentials. This leads to a replication of geographical
borders on the internet and may lead to exclusion of free exchange between people from different
countries.
2.3.2.5. Proof of Country
Documents include the issuing country, which makes proof of location straightforward.
Multi-issuer. Wherever PoH becomes a prerequisite for interaction, the issuer gains leverage.
Loss of PoH will eventually imply exclusion from large parts of the internet, including significant
limits on freedom of speech. This can be mitigated if no single entity has a monopoly over
issuance, which is not possible for government documents.
Checks & Balances. The ability to issue PoH credentials directly translates to power. For
government documents, no second issuer exists for cross-checking and validation. For biometric-
based PoH, there can be a diverse set of hardware devices from different manufacturers that
can be cross-checked against each other.
No Upload of Sensitive Information. It is possible to verify the integrity of cryptographi-
cally verifiable documents without uploading sensitive information.
2.3.3. Deep Dive: Why Iris-based Root of Trust Maximizes Individual Empowerment
To our knowledge, a set of secure hardware devices from different companies (based in different
countries) that issue a root of trust based on the entropy of the iris is the root of trust
that maximizes individual empowerment and is the only root of trust that fulfills all design
requirements. Note: this is not where World ID is today, but it should get there eventually.
Iris-based hardware—while able to fulfill all requirements—also comes at the cost of being very
capital intensive and operationally complex to scale.
Figure 10: Unlike document-based approaches (Fig. 3), an iris-based root of trust satisfies all core design
requirements for PoH that maximizes individual empowerment.
2.3.3.1. Why Iris Biometrics Specifically
Among biometric modalities, iris recognition uniquely satisfies the accuracy, scalability, and
privacy requirements of global uniqueness verification. There are two modes to consider: 1:1
authentication (comparing a user's template to a single enrolled template, like Face ID) and
1:N verification (comparing against a large set of templates to prevent duplicates). Global
PoH requires the latter—comparing biometrics against eventually billions of previously verified
humans. If the mechanism is not accurate enough, an increasing number of users will be
incorrectly rejected. Face biometrics are not accurate enough and billions of people would be
falsely denied a Proof of Human.
Figure 11: There are two different modes for biometrics. The simpler mode is 1:1 authentication, which
involves comparing a user's template against a single previously enrolled template. This is commonly used
in technologies such as Face ID, which compares an individual against a single facial template. However, for
global Proof of Human, 1:N verification is required. This mode involves comparing a user's template against
a large set of templates to ensure that there are no duplicate registrations.
Iris biometrics can achieve false match rates beyond 2.5×10-14 (one false match in 40 trillion),
which is several orders of magnitude more accurate than the current state of the art in face
recognition, while maintaining a suitable false non-match rate. The structure of the iris is
remarkably stable over time, difficult to alter, and essentially unique to each individual. The
iris texture is formed by random morphogenesis during gestation—an epigenetic development
independent of personal factors—so even genetically identical individuals (identical twins or a
person's two irises) have completely uncorrelated iris patterns.
Other biometric modalities exhibit fundamental limitations:
• Fingerprints can be unreliable since cuts or wear alter ridge patterns, and capturing
high-quality images becomes difficult as fingerprints degrade over time. Using all ten
fingerprints or combining modalities is vulnerable to combinatorial attacks.
• Facial recognition offers better liveness detection than DNA, but its accuracy is far
below that of iris biometrics. At global scale with billions of people, the error rates would
lead to double-digit percentage false rejection rates, falsely rejecting billions.
• DNA sequencing could in theory be highly accurate, but reveals extensive private
information, collection is intrusive, difficult to scale, and there is no practical way to
ensure liveness.
Figure 12: Overview of how different biometric modalities impact key considerations such as privacy, accuracy,
scalability, and integrity (red indicates insufficient or problematic). Iris biometrics is the only modality that
enables all of them.
2.3.3.2. Why Purpose-Built Hardware Is Needed
Meeting the design requirements necessitates guarantees that cannot be achieved through
software or general-purpose hardware alone. Reliable verification depends on:
• Compute integrity: Image capture and processing must occur within a tamper-resis -
tant environment and cannot be emulated, replayed, or modified. This requires hardware-
backed signing, secure execution, and protections against compromised enrollment flows.
• Multispectral imaging and active liveness detection: Single-sensor consumer
devices lack the signal diversity to reliably distinguish genuine presentations from high-
quality spoofs in adversarial settings.
• High-resolution infrared imaging: Required to capture sufficient iris entropy across
eye colors. Visible-spectrum cameras suffer from reflections and low contrast, particularly
for darker irises.
While smartphones provide the most straightforward and scalable option, the correlation
between image quality and biometric accuracy is well established. Both smartphones and
existing imaging devices lack sufficient resolution to accurately capture iris biometrics, resulting
in unacceptably high error rates. Furthermore, phones and existing iris cameras lack multi-
angle and multispectral cameras as well as active illumination to detect presentation attacks
with high confidence. A widely viewed video demonstrates an effective method for spoofing
Samsung's iris recognition and underscores how easily such attacks succeed without sufficiently
advanced hardware.
Additionally, an on-device trusted execution environment (TEE) is needed to guarantee that
verifications originate from fully compliant devices rather than emulators. While some smart -
phones include specialized hardware (Apple's Secure Enclave, Google's Titan M), many do
not or can only be accessed by the device manufacturer. Without such protections, attackers
could spoof both image capture and enrollment requests, creating unlimited fraudulent PoH
credentials.
2.3.4. Walking Through the Design Requirements
2.3.4.1. Universal Accuracy
Global uniqueness requires false match rates on the order of 10-20 to ensure no single person
on Earth would mistakenly be excluded. Iris-based algorithms achieve error rates on the order
of 10-14 today. Those can be further improved. If improvements aren't sufficient, they can be
combined with face-based entropy which would already today achieve error rates below 10-20.
2.3.4.2. Universal Eligibility
Iris biometrics far surpass the inclusivity of alternatives like verifiable documents by many
orders of magnitude. Many health conditions, like cataracts to a degree, do not impede iris
biometrics. Specialized verification centers could facilitate alternative verification for individuals
with severe eye conditions, via e.g., facial biometrics.
2.3.4.3. Fake Human Resistance
A purpose-build biometric camera can include multispectral cameras, a TEE, verifiable software,
and multiple secure elements to make spoofing very expensive. Any root of trust issued by
a particular hardware device can be revoked through a governance mechanism. Implementing
incentive mechanisms for decentralized audits can raise the bar far beyond what hardware
security alone could achieve.
2.3.4.4. Borderless & Interoperable
Biometrics and hardware are inherently borderless and it is straightforward to build interop -
erable infrastructure.
2.3.4.5. Proof of Country
Hardware devices can verify location via celltower and GPS connectivity plus continuous audits.
With ongoing reauthentication, continuous travel to spoof PoH country credentials becomes
expensive.
2.3.4.6. Multi-Issuer
Multiple companies across different jurisdictions can build auditable and verifiable hardware
devices to the same specifications. This prevents censorship.
2.3.4.7. Checks & Balances
Hardware devices from different companies can issue iris-based roots of trust to the same speci-
fications, enabling cross-checks. With staked security deposits and periodic reauthentication
across different devices, it can become game-theoretically uneconomical for a manufacturer to
inject fake identities.
2.3.4.8. No Upload of Sensitive Information
It is possible to issue an iris-based root of trust without uploading sensitive information.
Therefore, we conclude that an iris-based root of trust fulfills all design requirements.
2.4. The Orb
Based on the conclusion that iris biometrics via purpose-built hardware is the ideal root of trust,
Tools for Humanity (TFH) built the Orb: a high-security, open-source camera that anonymously
issues an AI-safe PoH credential. The Orb is purpose-built to verify humanness and ensure
uniqueness in a fraud resistant and inclusive way. The humanness check is performed locally on
the device, without requiring any images to be stored or uploaded. World Foundation's vision
is for device development, production, and operation to be decentralized over time so that no
single entity will be in sole control of World ID issuance.
2.4.1. Top Level Requirements
The Orb's primary use case of verifying unique humanness led to the following requirements:
• Privacy: The Orb must process images locally on-device and then securely transfer them
to the user's custody. This eliminates any requirement for storing images on the Orb or
uploading them to a central backend.
• Security: The Orb must only verify World IDs of genuine humans, meaning it must be
highly resistant to spoofing and tampering, even in adversarial environments.
• Transparency and Verifiability: The Orb must require minimal trust in its manu -
facturers and operators. There must be a way for the public to audit Orbs, including
transparency into its design, and the state of software and cryptographic keys (see the
Decentralization whitepaper).
• Scalability: The Orb must generate iris codes consistently and accurately enough to
allow for 8+ billion unique World IDs without significant false matches or false non-
matches.
The Orb was designed to maximize trust, user experience, and scalability, with minimal
compromises on imaging quality and security. The device’s key imaging components include a
wide-angle RGB/Infrared (IR) imaging for capturing high-quality face images, a telephoto IR
camera with a steerable focus using custom lenses that can capture high-quality iris images, 2-D
Time of Flight (2D-ToF) for face depth mapping, high-resolution thermal imaging for liveness
detection, and imaging at orders of magnitude higher resolution than the industry standard.
Additional software and hardware components to highlight include secure on-device biometrics
image processing that ensures the images are authentic and generates a signed iris code, fraud
and presentation attack detection (PAD) measures to ensure liveness and humanness (see more
below), and, lastly, images are only analyzed in local memory, and are deleted after verification.
2.4.2. Hardware Design
The Orb's design is open sourced so others can trust, learn from, and improve the design. The
work is intended to serve as an in프로젝트로 돌아가기