The Interfold 백서

The Interfold

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n-making applications. This establishes a robust framework to safeguard decision-making processes against both external and internal threats, not only removing the need for trust among participants, but also preserving the confidentiality and integrity essential for democratic decision-making environments. Structure of CRISP Secret Ballots This section details the components built atop Interfold’s general-purpose core in order to enable modern, coercion-resistant ballots. This includes smart contracts that mediate Requester and Data Provider interactions with Interfold, along with a vote-tallying computation to be run via Interfold. The CRISP implementation includes a Zodiac 18 -compatible module that can be used to control any contract account that conforms to the Zodiac IAvatar interface; a Safe 19 , for example. Setup To enable a compatible account for control by CRISP secret ballots, one must deploy a CRISP module and activate it on the account to be controlled. This process involves specifying the following: The account to be controlled by the module. The ID of the designated vote-tallying computation. The designated execution environment, along with any additional parameters. The required number and threshold of Ciphernodes. The duration for each poll. The address of a voter registry contract. The specific steps for enabling a module on a smart contract account may differ between implementations and are not detailed in this document. Once the CRISP module is enabled on the account, it can be utilised to create polls that can ultimately trigger the account to make any arbitrary call. Poll Creation Anyone can propose a transaction to be executed by a smart contract account with a CRISP module enabled. To do so, one must call a function on the CRISP module and provide the following: the hash of the proposal description, the hash of the transaction payload, and the bond for the computation required by the CRISP network. This will register the proposal in the CRISP module and request the computation from the CRISP network using the threshold and duration parameters defined in the CRISP module’s setup. Voter Registration In each poll, every voter must have a cryptographic keypair to cast their vote, which must be registered in a Voter Registry smart contract. This contract is responsible for: Specifying the necessary proof for validating messages in the FHE computation. Enforcing any voter eligibility criteria mandated by the poll. Determining the vote weight for each registered voter. For example, a Voter Registry may require that voters hold a minimum amount of a token or be provably a member on a predefined list of eligible voters. Importantly, voting keys are distinct from the keypairs a voter might use to otherwise interact onchain; voting keys are single-use keys specific to the current poll, disposable once the poll concludes, and should not be reused for other polls or contexts. Voting Votes are submitted directly to the CRISP smart contract as ciphertext encrypted to the shared key provided by the selected Ciphernodes, along with a zero-knowledge proof that the encrypted message represents a valid vote format was signed by a registered voter and cannot be reused in any other proposal. This setup allows any account to submit a vote message on behalf of any user. Voters have the option to change their vote at any time prior to the Input Deadline by submitting an encrypted message to the CRISP smart contract. Only the latest message will be counted in the tallied results. Key Switching Voters have the option to change their voting keys at any time prior to the Input Deadline by submitting a correctly formatted key change message to the CRISP smart contract, encrypted to the private key provided by the selected Ciphernodes. Only messages signed by a voter’s most recent valid key will be counted in the tallied results. Computing and Publishing Results Once the Input Deadline has passed, the selected Compute Provider will compute the tally ciphertext, and the selected Ciphernodes will both decrypt the output and post the hash of plaintext results onchain. Triggering Onchain Actions Once the selected Ciphernodes post the hash of the plaintext results onchain, anyone can call a function to execute the attached transaction payloads. This execution requires providing proof of the results supplied by the selected Ciphernodes. Mitigation of Common Attacks Our voting system built on CRISP is designed to be resilient against a host of practical and theoretical attacks. This section details several of these attack vectors, along with the corresponding mitigations in our voting implementation. In each scenario, Alice and Bob are both registered voters. Alice and Bob are both outspoken supporters of the Banana Party. Chuck runs the web service through which voters submit their votes in polls and supports the Durian Party. Other characters may also be introduced. Censorship Knowing that Alice and Bob will each likely vote for the Banana Party, Chuck chooses to ignore Alice’s and Bob’s votes when they are submitted to his web service via the voting application, neglecting to post the votes on chain. As Chuck was unable to provide a valid transaction receipt to Alice and Bob, showing that their votes had been submitted onchain, Alice and Bob can choose to post their votes directly to the CRISP contract without permission or censorship from any intermediaries, like Chuck. By submitting their votes directly or via an alternate relaying service, Alice and Bob can circumvent Chuck’s attempt to censor their votes. Chuck could also attempt to mount a similar attack attempting to deny voter registration for any given poll, but the mitigation would be similar. Receipt Sharing Knowing that Alice and Bob will each likely vote for the Banana Party, Chuck decides to offer Alice a bribe to vote for the Durian Party, rather than her original preference. Alice’s optimal behavior is to accept the bribe from Chuck, vote in the same way they would have without the bribe, and simply supply Chuck with a fake proof that is indistinguishable from a legitimate vote. To do this, Alice could vote for the Durian party, then submit a keychange message to change their voting key, invalidating their previous vote, and then finally cast a vote for the Banana party with the new key. Alice can share the receipt of the first vote with Chuck. However, Chuck has no way of guaranteeing whether the key used to cast the vote was Alice’s valid voting key. So Chuck must simply take Alice’s word for it. Proxy Voting Knowing that Alice and Bob will each likely vote for the Banana Party, Chuck decides to offer Alice a bribe to vote for the Durian Party, rather than her original preference. Chuck offers to pay the bribe to Alice on the condition that Chuck is granted permission to cast Alice’s vote. To comply, Alice must submit a key change message switching her voting key to one supplied by Chuck. As with the case of receipt sharing, Alice’s optimal behaviour is to accept Chuck’s bribe and to share the receipt of a corresponding key change message with Chuck, after having already switched voting keys to another key unknown to Chuck. Unfortunately for Chuck, there is no way to ensure that Alice has not previously registered or switched to a different voting key, and no way to determine if the message to change keys to Chuck’s voting key is in fact invalid. Forced Abstention Knowing that Alice and Bob will each likely vote for the Banana Party, Chuck decides to force both Alice and Bob to abstain from voting (either by bribery or more coercive forms of collusion). To comply with Chuck’s demand, Alice and Bob must not be caught registering for or casting a vote in the poll. Alice and Bob’s optimal behaviour is to vote as normal, while taking care to not leave any identifiable traces. When registering and submitting votes onchain, Alice and Bob can submit messages through a relayer other than the one controlled by Chuck or from a fresh address which cannot be linked to their identity. Registration involves providing a proof that the voter is on the registry, but does not require the voter to identify themselves in plaintext or submit the registration message from a specific account. Similarly, when casting a vote, nothing identifiable is published in plaintext, and no ciphertext aside from the result will ever be decrypted by the Ciphernodes. Limitations Corrupt Registry Like any other voting implementation, CRISP is dependent on a functioning voter registry. If the voter registration process is compromised, allowing an attacker to either deny registration or take control of a voter’s account before they select their voter keys, then the attacker can successfully corrupt the system. The latter type of attack could be mitigated in a variety of ways, depending on the scope and trust assumptions appropriate for a given poll. However, a general rule of thumb is to ensure enough other value is associated with each voter's account that they would be unwilling to share the credentials with a third party. At the very least, this makes such attacks more costly and less scalable. Comparison to MACI CRISP’s design is heavily inspired by MACI 20 , a protocol initially proposed by Vitalik Buterin 21 for coercion-resistant voting leveraging zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). CRISP differs from MACI primarily by employing fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and threshold cryptography. This approach allows CRISP to establish an arbitrarily large network of nodes for trust distribution, contrasting with MACI's reliance on a single trusted coordinator. While MACI relies on an honest coordinator assumption for privacy, meaning the coordinator has unrestricted access to all of the inputs and intermediate states and is trusted not to divulge them, CRISP provides strong economic guarantees around privacy, as Ciphernodes are subject to slashing if anyone can prove that they have attempted to decrypt any input or intermediate ciphertext in a computation. Exploration of Potential Use Cases The following list is an exploration of potential use cases for Interfold. Sealed-Bid Auctions An auction type where all participants submit bids without knowing the bids of the other participants. The highest bid wins, but the amount of the winning bid is only revealed after all bids are submitted. Benefits: ensures fairness and confidentiality, prevents coercion and bid manipulation Receipt-Free Delegation A voting system where voters can delegate their votes without revealing their choice(s). Benefits: protects voter privacy and encourages people to participate in democratic processes Research on Private Medical Data A method of analysing sensitive medical records and health data from multiple sources for research purposes. Benefits: advances medical research securely, compliant with regulations, and preserves patient privacy Training AI Models on Multiple Private Datasets A system that allows training AI models using sensitive datasets from multiple sources without exposing the raw data. Benefits: enhances AI capabilities and ensures privacy and regulatory compliance Collaborative Data Analysis A method of jointly analysing datasets from multiple organisations without sharing proprietary, sensitive, or private data. Benefits: enables new collaborative possibilities between private/public institutions, maintains competitive advantage, preserves data privacy Privacy-Preserving Surveys A way to conduct surveys that ensures the anonymity of respondents and the confidentiality of their responses. Benefits: increases participation by guaranteeing privacy, encourage honesty without fear of retaliation Collective Climate Modelling A method for organisations, NGOs, and governments to collaborate on climate models, especially in cases where sensitive internal datasets — such as proprietary models or competitive data — need to be kept private for whatever reason. Benefits: enables cross-border collaborations, protects proprietary models and competitive information, maintains integrity and accuracy of climate modelling. Score Aggregation Systems A system for aggregating scores or ratings in contexts like credit scores, product reviews, Michelin stars, or web-of-trust networks, without relying on a central operator or exposing individual inputs. Benefits: ensures privacy, prevents coercion and manipulation, and increases the legitimacy of outcomes in scoring and rating systems. Federated Learning Across Multiple Servers A method of training AI models across decentralised devices or servers with local data samples ensures the computation process is encrypted and decentralised. Benefits: leads to more comprehensive models, addresses remaining privacy/security concerns for Federated Learning, maintains data privacy Contributors A special thank you to the following people for their early contributions to and reviews of the Interfold whitepaper: Alex Espinosa, Anthony Leutenegger, Casey Gardiner, Daniel Ospina, Disruption Joe, Gabriel Shapiro, Giacomo Corrias, Koh Wei Jie, Mike Chan, Pandy Marino, Vitalik Buterin, Yuet Loo Wong Footnotes RISC Zero is a general-purpose, zero-knowledge virtual machine. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ SP1 is Succinct's zero-knowledge virtual machine. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ Jolt is an extensible zero-knowledge virtual machine by a16z. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ Nexus is a modular, extensible, open-source, highly-parallelized, prover-optimized zkVM. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ Reality.eth is a crowd-sourced on-chain smart contract oracle system by Reality Keys. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ Kleros Oracle is a product that combines Kleros's dispute resolution system with Reality.eth's cryptoeconomic mechanism for verifying real world events on-chain. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ API3 creates decentralized APIs for web3. Learn more (opens in a new tab) ↩ Staking deposit amounts are set by Interfold governance. ↩ Registration delay period is set by Interfold governance. ↩ Decommission delay period is set by Interfold governance. ↩ Ciphernode cliff and vesting schedule is set by Interfold governance. ↩ Inactive Node penalty amounts are set by Interfold governance. ↩ Time required to provide the ciphertext output is constrained by the complexity of the computation, the way the computation scales, and the number of inputs. ↩ Failure to Report percentage is set by Interfold governance. ↩ Ciphernodes must provide the decrypted output within a fixed window of time after the output ciphertext has been posted by the selected Coordinator Nodes. ↩ The same inputs must always produce the same outputs. ↩ The intermediate slashing penalty, along with its burn ratio, is set by Interfold governance. ↩ Zodiac is a standard for modular and composable smart contract accounts, specified in ERC-5005 (opens in a new tab) . A library and implementation can be found on GitHub (opens in a new tab) . ↩ Safe is the most widely used smart contract account implementation, the code for which can be found on GitHub (opens in a new tab) . ↩ Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure (opens in a new tab) ↩ https://ethresear.ch/t/minimal-anti-collusion-infrastructure/5413 (opens in a new tab) ↩ FOLD Transferability ## / Encrypted Execution Environments Shared results from private inputs private inputs private inputs . The Interfold is an open-source protocol for confidential coordination. Independent parties encrypt their inputs, a committee of ciphernodes runs the computation, and only the verified output is decrypted. Start building Run a ciphernode Learn the protocol Key generation. The committee runs DKG and makes one shared public key. Choose a path What do you want to do? Each path starts with a short overview and continues to step-by-step procedures. Learn What an E3 is, how the architecture fits together, and the cryptography that protects the inputs. Concepts Build Install the CLI, make a project from the template, and write an E3 program with its contracts and client. Developers Run a ciphernode Set up a node, bond FOLD, get tickets, and serve on committees. Upgrade, migrate, and exit safely. Operators Reference CLI commands, node configuration, contract addresses, and a glossary of protocol terms. Lookup How it works One E3, from request to result The Interfold contract records each E3 as it moves through its stages. Ciphernodes act at each stage and publish proofs on-chain. Requested A requester pays the fee and asks for an E3. CommitteeFinalized Sortition selects a committee of ciphernodes. KeyPublished The committee runs DKG and publishes one public key. CiphertextReady The program runs over the encrypted inputs. The encrypted output goes on-chain. Complete T + 1 key shares decrypt the output, and a proof confirms it. Committees Security comes from the committee No single ciphernode can decrypt. The protocol supports three committee sizes. Decryption needs T + 1 key shares. 3 minimum N = 3, T = 1. The smallest committee. 9 micro N = 9, T = 4. 19 small N = 19, T = 9. Higher assurance. Quick start A working E3 in four commands The template starts a local chain, local ciphernodes, the servers, and a web client. See the Quick Start for prerequisites. ~/code Copy # Install interfoldup, then the interfold CLI $ curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/theinterfold/interfold/main/install | bash $ interfoldup install # Make a project from the default template and start everything $ interfold init my-first-e3 $ cd my-first-e3 && pnpm dev:all # The client is at http://localhost:3000 Go deeper Inside the protocol E3 lifecycle Each stage, the events it emits, and what happens when a stage times out. Cryptography Threshold BFV, zero-knowledge proofs, and the circuits that tie them together. Sortition How the protocol selects a committee from ticket balances. CRISP A complete E3 application for private voting. ## /learn Learn Overview What is the Interfold? The Interfold is an open-source protocol for Encrypted Execution Environments (E3s). Independent parties use it to get one shared, verifiable result from their private inputs. This page is for readers who are new to the protocol. It explains the problem, what the protocol does, the guarantees and what backs each one, and the roles. At the end, you know which part of the docs to read next. The problem Many applications need one result from inputs that belong to different parties. A vote tally, a sealed-bid auction, and a shared statistic are examples. Usually, one party collects the plaintext inputs and computes the result. That party then has custody of sensitive data, and every other party must trust it. Trusted hardware is another approach, but it moves the trust to a hardware vendor. The Interfold needs neither a custodian nor trusted hardware. No single party holds the plaintext inputs or the full decryption key. Integrity and privacy come from cryptography and from economic incentives. What the protocol does The Interfold contract ( Interfold.sol ) coordinates each E3 on-chain. A committee of ciphernodes does the cryptographic work off-chain and publishes proofs on-chain. One E3 has these steps: A requester pays a fee and requests an E3 for a registered E3 program. Sortition selects a committee of ciphernodes. A Chainlink VRF v2.5 random value seeds the selection. The committee runs distributed key generation (DKG) and publishes one public key. No member holds the matching secret key. Data providers encrypt their inputs under that public key and submit them to the E3 program. A compute provider runs the program computation over the ciphertexts. It publishes an encrypted output and a proof that the computation is correct. At least T + 1 committee members publish decry
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