Tellor Tributes 백서

Tellor Tributes

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and used for staking, tipping, dispute fee and voting. All tokenomics will remain the same (as it is hardcoded and cannot be changed). Four thousand tokens will continue to be the dev share to the team each month and an equivalent amount of tokens will be distributed to reporters and validators as inflationary rewards. Seventy-five percent of time based rewards go to reporters with the other twenty-five percent are given to validators. Gas fees go to the block proposing validator (selected randomly by validator weight), while tips and inflationary rewards to reporters are distributed proportionally to the reports submissions based on weighted validator support. As an example, if a query is submitted for and gets 50% of the stake contributing to the aggregated value, this report gets some inflationary rewards, however if a more supported query gets submitted for with 100% of total stakes reporting for it, this gets 2x the rewards as the first value. There is no benefit being the only reporter for a query, unless of course there are tips that support that query over others. Additionally, to prevent tips on queries that only a handful of reporters support, time based rewards are only available on cycle list queries. The goal is to get broad support among as many queries as possible without either incentivizing parties to report things that no one needs (e.g. report an obscure query that only one reporter supports) or disincentivizing reports of new queries. Tips are still, and should, be used as the primary incentive mechanism used to garner support for a given query. Bridging Updating the Validator Set The bridge was initialized with a starting validator set. Whenever the Tellor validator set changes by 5%, all validators sign this new validator set checkpoint. This 5% threshold helps limit bridging costs as updating the validator set in the bridge contract costs gas. These signatures are used to update the bridge’s record of the validator set, and any new data proofs do not pass the bridge’s checks until the new validator set is relayed. Like data proofs, the bridge accepts a validator set update if at least ⅔ of the last known validator set signed oE on it. Tellor Token Bridge The Tellor token is interchangeable between the current ERC20 TRB contract on Ethereum and the base token TRB on Tellor. It is secured by a two way bridge, operated by Tellor itself via a light client bridge. Bridging TRB from Ethereum to Tellor takes 13 hours. Once the deposit is made, Tellor reporters can report this information to Tellor for an hour (to allow for a high level of finality on Ethereum). Once that one hour window is closed, the deposit can be claimed 12 hours later on Tellor. A party bridging TRB to Tellor for the first time will not have TRB available on Tellor to pay the required gas fee to claim the deposit so deposits are automatically claimed after the waiting period (12 hours). In order to prevent attacks, withdrawals from Tellor can only be done if unstaked from being a validator on Tellor (which requires 21 days). Once a withdrawal is initiated and attested to by validators, it can be retrieved on Ethereum 12 hours later. As an additional security measure, the bridge contract does not allow more than 20% of the bridge balance to be bridged to Tellor and 5% from Tellor to Ethereum within a 12 hour period (the function is locked). We have prioritized security over speed on the token bridge. Staking is still growing on Tellor chain and the cost of capture increases as staking grows. To allow safe growth, anyone in the community that suspects Tellor chain has been compromised can propose a bridge pause by paying 10,000 TRB which will be burned if the pause is approved by the team’s multisig(this permission can be removed). Once the chain is forked, the community can slash the malicious actor and compensate the pause proposer. The bridge can be unpaused after 21 days by anyone. It’s worth noting that even if the token bridge is paused, data can still be produced by the chain as consensus and rewards happen on the chain. Data Bridge Tellor can be used as a push or pull oracle and both implementations require validation of Tellor ’s validator set via light client bridge contract. A light client bridge is needed on each chain and parties relay the requested data and signatures as well as information related to validator set updates and chain upgrades. Anyone can deploy a light client bridge contract and relaying is a trustless and permissionless role, meaning that anyone can push validator signatures from Tellor to validate data on the data bridge contract. However, additional, access controls can be put in place at the chain or user contract level by the user. Signing Prices Once a value is aggregated (finalized in a given block), all validators sign the information. The resulting signatures allow users to access the value, timestamp, aggregate power (amount of reporter stake used in aggregation), previous report timestamp, and next report timestamp of a given query. The previous report timestamp and next report timestamp by queryID are included for proving various properties of a given report. Where: data = value, timestamp, aggregatePower, previousReportTimestamp, nextReportTimestamp Validators will: sign( queryId, data, validatorCheckpoint, attestationTimestamp ) Parties using Tellor can then grab the signatures and relay it to their chain. Users can also request new signatures for data from previous blocks, (e.g. request(queryId, timestamp)) and the chain will return signatures on the older data, but with a newer attestationTimestamp. This is so parties can use values optimistically, by checking that the data has stayed on Tellor for a certain amount of time without disputes, as data that has been disputed will not be signed again. Relayer The relayer (pushing signed data from Tellor to user chains) can be done by anyone. We provide software for relaying values and tipper scripts for setting up recurring feeds. Many keeper services also could fill this role (Keepr, Gelato, etc.). Relay fallback If there are no updates to a given light client bridge for >21 days (the unbonding period on Tellor), then the bridge is considered stale, a situation where it needs a manual update of the validator set. To address this, the light client bridge includes a function for a guardian to be able to update the validator set manually after 21 days. Anyone can deploy the light client bridge and set themselves as the guardian or remove that capability. There can be multiple light client bridge contracts on a chain. For most use cases, missing data for more than 21 days would be a severe failure condition and should trigger the users to relay themselves (unless the users or the chain are dead or some other extreme event has occurred, in which case, the guardian becomes immaterial). The Tellor team will deploy light client bridges with the team’s address as a fallback that can update the validator set but users are not required to use these (these will act as a public good). If parties do not want it to fallback to the team, they can simply update the validator set before the 21days or deploy a light client bridge where it falls back to a diEerent address (or remove that functionality). Other cross-chain methods We know that some parties already have existing bridge solutions that they prefer. Tellor data can be used via any of these solutions and we look forward to building and working with the teams to deliver the fastest and most secure solution for users. Some potential usage solutions include IBC, Hyperlane, Succinct and many more. In the future, it is likely that native or zero-knowledge bridges will be used to verify signatures, consensus, as well as inclusion of values. Tellor will be leaning on other teams currently specializing in cryptography research, but we fully expect that all bridges will be cheaper and faster using this method and should be operational within the next cycle. Figure C: Tellor process of aggregation, attestation, and relaying data to other chains. Note: Staked reporters, staked validators, users and relayers, and data monitors are all permissionless roles. Data Usage Reporters are not required to provide data for all queries. This creates two types of data on-chain, robust data and edge data. Robust data is data that reaches consensus or support from ⅔ of the reporters and validators, while edge data can be any data that did not. While confidence on both types of data increases as time goes by (no disputes or forks in the case of robust data), they have to be used diEerently. Robust Data Usage (aka Consensus data) If ⅔ of Tellor reporters sign oE on a value, it can be consumed faster. A relayer will grab the desired data and signatures and push it to the consumer chain. Parties can then use the information in their protocol. There is no need to validate it any further, however waiting could be helpful, if only in extreme cases (e.g. large price moves), to check for forks, or widespread dispute conditions (e.g. a protocol or exchange failure/hack where api information may not properly reflect desired data specifications). In most cases however, this method will allow for updates as fast as the chain itself. Robust data can be consumed instantly only if it is assumed that the Tellor validator set is not compromised (signed oE on bad data to the bridge or in the chain). However unlikely it is that the validator set would be compromised we advise implementing some precautions when using the data immediately. Users can run or whitelist relayers on their contracts and/or run monitoring tools, not allow immediate withdrawals, system freezes, etc. as necessary. See the Additional Self- Driven Security and Fallbacks section for more information. Edge Data Usage (aka Optimistic data) Similar to robust data usage, parties request signatures and relay data from Tellor. However, edge data should be handled optimistically, meaning that the user should allow time for a dispute to be raised and before using the data validate that the timestamp returned is within the needed period of relevance (old enough to allow for disputes but fresh enough to use). They can either use an older value (similar to current Tellor), and/or verify that X% of validators signed oE on it. Additional data security Dispute Monitoring Dispute monitoring is beneficial for both robust and edge data. However, this is especially important when parties are using edge data; they must be cognizant that the system is only as secure as the monitoring for disputes. If, for instance, a party requests an obscure piece of data that only one validator reports for, and their stake is low, there will likely be few parties checking this query for disputes. This is why if using an edge value, adding extra security is essential9. Running your own dispute monitor, educating more reporters to support it, or even more secure measures such as using only if the median is within x% of a given (e.g. their own team’s) reporter. Successful disputes earn the majority of the slashed amount of the disputed party so there is also an economic incentive for anyone to run a monitor10. Optimistic as Fallback If consensus fails on certain values that are typically robust, parties have two choices: wait for consensus to return or handle the edge value, optimistically as specified above. This could be a great option for some parties using data where quality can quickly change. A price feed for example might not come to consensus in times of api failures or exchange manipulations (e.g. feeds go down). In this case, it might be best to pause the system, but they could also go with the optimistic approach if their protocol needs a faster (albeit still slower than consensus) price. Note that in most cases, an uncertain value would NOT be pushed to your protocol. Tellor is unique in that 9 More information on Tellor’s security can be found here: https://tellor.io/blog/layer-security-201/ 10 An open-source disputable values monitor is available rather than forcing reporters/validators to sign oE on an api or price feed, the addition of their value is optional. This means that if a reporter is not certain it’s a valid value, they will likely just sit out that round(not risk their stake or part of it) and the value will not reach consensus; something that should be seen as a good thing in cases where ambiguity still exists (e.g. two exchanges diEer wildly on price). Additional Self-Driven Security and Fallbacks Although security is at the center of Tellor’s design, consumers of Tellor data can add custom additional security. Manipulation attacks should always be considered by users. There are many examples where using the oracle value immediately has led to exploits or unintended consequences.11 Data manipulation attacks are oracle agnostic and have occurred even when the oracle was centralized. But users can implement user level controls to mitigate losses and even dissuade attackers. One of the bigger players12 in the crypto space includes pauses, delays throughout their system, a one hour delay before using the oracle value, debt ceilings and other governance delays. They are proof that you can become a big player and be responsible. Monitors, delays and pauses are useful because if the oracle is compromised in any way it allows users to react: overwrite, update the databank address, get a governance vote in, etc... However unlikely the scenario, users can implement controls to protect themselves and their users if the data is manipulated directly or by compromising the data provider/node, validator or reporter set. One way is to simply limit who can push prices/ state updates on the consumer chain. By adding validation at this level, chains could use either their own validators or stakers to push over the prices after validating them. This would be an excellent option for users with this level of ownership over their protocol. An option for non-chains via the low latency model would be to add validation before a trusted party (e.g. the app’s dao) pushes the data. It gives the trusted party an option to censor, but they would be unable to change what the price is, something that would work similarly to a multisig having pause authority/control over a protocol. Users can also do OEV limits this way (relayer is a known party or even auction oE the right for OEV13 each day/month). Another option to increase security is consumer side pauses and delays. Pausing the system could be similar to the Maker design, where token holders of their own system can freeze the system in the case of a bad value14 or trust a curator or committee (multisig) to do it for them. For delays, parties could just design a system where the oracle value is used after X amount of time or it costs 11 Take for example Elixir protocol, now defunct, in 2025 jaredfromsubway.eth made a trade in a Curve pool on Ethereum of 210K USDT for deUSD, the oracle was providing a VWAP and this trade caused a change and the new value was reported to Euler on Avalanche where it caused a $532K liquidation. Unfortunatley neither the user or the oracle had any data checks or variance thresholds check in place. This was a reminder that when data that is collected and attested o=- chain in subseconds without visibility or dispute mechanism will still end up in the mempool subject to MEV or OEV and the user has no ability to stop it. That was the tradeo= made, speed over risk mitigation. This was the beginning of the end for Elixir. More information https://rekt.news/house-of-cards and https://x.com/omeragoldberg/status/1928149178862952604 12 Sky (formerly MakerDAO) is one of the longest running DeFi apps and they still employ a one hour delay on their oracle updates. https://developers.skyeco.com/security/security-measures/security-mechanisms/#oracle-price-delay 13 Oracle extractable value 14 Depending on the type of data, this is a best practice for any system using an oracle X dollars (a large amount) to delay the use of a reported value. While delayed, they could initiate a dispute on the Tellor system to remove a reporter or evaluate the situation. This would work well for systems that can handle delays (e.g. a prediction market delaying payouts). Just note that this would be on a per-user basis and custom as the cost to dispute/pause is also the cost to censor if it freezes the system for certain protocols. Users can also add disputes directly in their protocol similar to Tellor ’s disputing system, but can be handled by their governance. This would work well if coupled with custom staking requirements for reporters and could also be added as the “trusted” party that the Tellor value must match. A user side based dispute mechanism could also allow falling back to a more robust data feed such as going from a VWAP to TWAP before a governance vote. This works well if the protocol allows a grace period for their users to challenge data and they have a payout delay, since disputes are only useful before settlement. For numeric data, implementing caps or thresholds on changes between the previous value and the incoming value can also help limit losses in an attack scenario or help trigger a payout delay or data challenge period. This types of volatility caps are on per user and data feed basis. Users can use multiple oracle feeds and use the median of these similar to how Ampleforth architecture uses Tellor or as fallback similar to how Liquity V1uses a primary and Tello as a fallback oracle. Multiple oracles, oracle fallbacks, data feed fallbacks, pauses, payout delays, oracle use delay, thresholds caps for changes, overwriting the oracle value15 or updating the oracle address are options that provide a high level of control and can be modularly implemented at the users’ discretion. Many of these options are used and/or have been used by protocols. Determining what level of control is right for your protocol, if these should be controlled via governance, a curator, or mutlisig is up to you, the user (and always provide proper disclosures of these levels of controls to your users). These options require a higher level of control and are optional. They add layers of security that is user driven based on their desired or required level of control and level of ownership over their protocol. Some of these controls are preventive while others allow users to be proactive in the event of a hack or manipulation event. Most of the blue chip crypto we see today was made possible because they grew in proportion with the industry. Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s market caps were very low when they first launched and could have been easily captured and manipulated too. However, incentives to capture or hack a protocol will always exist when the cost of attack is lower than the gain. Newer protocols need an environment in which they can thrive and grow securely. They need to be treated diEerently than blue chip crypto assets. Blue chips are harder to manipulate and capture than low liquidity and emerging assets/protocols. Additionally, the user can choose to implement these guardrails temporarily or not(for most of these, removing the control could be as easy as throwing the controlling address or removing it automatically if a market cap, liquidity, stake amount threshold or a combination of these is surpassed). 15 Hyperliquid validators overwrote and delisted $JELLY when attacked last year. This works well for protocols with this level of ownership and fair disclosure to their users https://rekt.news/hyperliquidate2 Fork Choice Upgrades and forks to Tellor will likely happen. Upgrades in the form of better data aggregat
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