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spond to any issues that come up.
Mitigating Timing Attacks
Market participants have access to information faster than the blockchain’s three-and-a-half day moving
median conversion price can react. This information could be used to the benefit of traders at the expense
of the community. If there is a sudden increase in the value of STEEM, traders could request conversion
of their SBD at the old, lower price, and then sell the STEEM they receive at the new, higher price with
minimal risk.
Steem levels the playing field by requiring all conversion requests to be delayed for three-and-a-half days.
This means that neither the traders nor the blockchain has any information advantage regarding the price
at the time the conversion is executed.
Minimizing Abuse of Conversions
If people could freely convert in both directions, then traders could take advantage of the blockchains
conversion rates by trading large volumes without changing the price. Traders who see a massive run-up
in price would convert to SBD at the high price (when it is most risky) and then convert back after the
correction. The Steem protocol protects the community from this kind of abuse by only allowing people to
convert from SBD to STEEM and not the other way around.
The blockchain decides how and when to create SBD and who should get it. This keeps the rate of SBD
creation stable and removes most avenues of abuse.
Sustainable Debt-to-Ownership Ratios
If a token is viewed as ownership in the whole supply of tokens, then a token-convertible dollar can be
viewed as debt. If the debt-to-ownership ratio gets too high, the entire currency can become unstable. Debt
conversions can dramatically increase the token supply, which in turn is sold on the market, suppressing
the price. Subsequent conversions require the issuance of even more tokens. Left unchecked the system
can collapse, leaving worthless ownership backing a mountain of debt. The higher the debt-to-ownership
ratio becomes, the less willing new investors are to bring capital to the table.
A rapid change in the value of STEEM can dramatically change the debt-to-ownership ratio. The blockchain
prevents the debt-to-ownership ratio from getting too high by reducing the amount of STEEM awarded
through SBD conversions if the debt level were to exceed 10%. If the amount of SBD debt ever exceeds
10% of the total STEEM market cap, the blockchain will automatically reduce the amount of STEEM
generated through conversions to a maximum of 10% of the market cap. This ensures that the blockchain
will never have higher than a 10% debt-to-ownership ratio.
The percentage floors used to compute STEEM creation are based on the supply, including the STEEM
value of all outstanding SBD and SP (as determined by the current rate / feed).
Risk, Leverage, and Dilution
All debt carries risk to the lender. Someone who holds SBD without redeeming it is effectively lending the
community the value of a dollar. They are trusting that at some point in the future someone will be willing
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to buy the SBD from them for a dollar or that there will be speculators and investors willing to buy the
STEEM they convert it into.
STEEM and SP holders gain leverage when members of the community are willing to hold SBD. This
leverage amplifies the gains from growth while also contributing to growth. STEEM holders do suffer from
increased dilution if the price falls. Cryptocurrency projects have shown that the gains from increasing
the user base willing to trust the network with capital ultimately add more value to the network than any
dilution that may occur during a downturn.
Setting Price Feeds
The primary concern of Steem feed producers is to maintain a stable one-to-one conversion between SBD
and the US dollar (USD). In a market where debt still demands a premium, it is safe to say the market is
willing to extend more credit than the debt the community is willing to take on. If this happens a SBD will
be valued at more than $1.00 and there is little the community can do.
If SBD trades for less than $1.00 USD and the debt-to-ownership ratio is high, then the feeds should be
adjusted upward to give more STEEM per SBD. This will increase demand for SBD while also reducing
the debt-to-ownership ratio and returning SBD to parity with USD.
In effect, feed producers are entrusted with the responsibility of setting monetary policy for the purpose of
maintaining a stable peg to the USD. Abuse of this power can harm the value of STEEM so SP holders are
wise to vote for witnesses who can be counted on to adjust the price feed according to the rules outlined
above.
If the debt-to-ownership ratio gets dangerously high and market participants choose to avoid conversion
requests, then the feed should be adjusted to increase the rate at which STEEM is paid for converting
SBD.
Changes to any premiums/discounts on the STEEM/SBD conversion rate should be a slow and measured
response to long-term average deviations rather than an attempt to respond to short-term market conditions.
It is our belief that these rules will give market participants confidence that they are unlikely lose money
by holding SBD purchased at a price of $1.00.
Subjective Contributions
Subjective Proof of Work presents an alternative approach to distributing a currency that improves upon
fully objective Proof of Work systems, such as mining. The applications of a currency implementing
subjective proof of work are far wider than any objective proof of work system, because they can be applied
to build a community around any concept that has a sufficiently defined purpose. When individuals join
a community they buy into a particular set of beliefs and can vote to reinforce the community values or
purpose.
In effect, the criteria by which work are evaluated is completely subjective and their definition lives outside
the source code itself. One community may wish to reward artists, another poets, and another comedians.
Other communities may choose to reward charitable causes or help advance political agendas.
The value each currency achieves depends upon the demand for influence within a particular community
and how large the market believes each community can get. Unlike prior systems, subjective proof of work
enables a community to collectively fund the development of whatever it finds valuable and enables the
monetization of previously nonmonetizable time.
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Distributing Currency
There are two ways people can get involved with a crypto-currency community: they can buy in , or they
can work in. In both cases users are adding value to the currency, however, the vast majority of people have
more free time than they do spare cash. Imagine the goal of bootstrapping a currency in a poor community
with no actual cash but plenty of time. If people can earn money by working for one another then they will
bootstrap value through mutual exchange facilitated by a fair accounting/currency system.
Distributing a currency to as many people as possible in a manner that is generally perceived as fair is a
challenging task. The tasks that can be entirely evaluated by an objective computer algorithm are limited
in nature and generally speaking have limited positive external benefits. In the case of Bitcoin-style mining,
it can result in the production of specialized hardware and cause people to invest time developing more
efficient algorithms. It may even help find prime numbers, but none of these things provide meaningful
value to society or the currency-holding community at large. More importantly, economies of scale and
market forces will end up excluding everyone but experts from participating in this kind of distribution.
Ultimately, computation-based mining is just another way of buying in because it requires money to pay
the electric bill or the development of hardware necessary to do the work.
In order to give everyone an equal opportunity to get involved and earn the currency, people must be
given an opportunity to work. The challenge is how to judge the relative quality and quantity of work
that individuals provide and to do so in a way that efficiently allocates rewards to millions of users. This
requires the introduction of a scalable voting process. In particular, authority to allocate funds must be as
distributed and decentralized as possible.
The first step in rewarding millions of users is to commit to distributing a fixed amount of currency regardless
of how much work is actually done or how users vote. This changes the question from being “Should we
pay?” to “Whom should we pay?” and signals to the market that money is being distributed and is being
auctioned off to whoever “bids” the most work. This is similar to Bitcoin committing to award 50 BTC to
whoever finds the most difficult hashes. Like Bitcoin, all work must be done prior to payout and nothing
should be paid speculatively on the promise to do work in the future.
The next step is to reward everyone who does anything even remotely positive with something. This is
accomplished by ranking all work done and distributing proportionally to its value. The more competitive
the market becomes, the more difficult (higher quality or quantity) it becomes to earn the same payout.
Voting on Distribution of Currency
Assume there is a fixed amount of money to distribute, and that those who have a long-term vested interest
in the future value and utility of the currency are the ones who must decide how to allocate it. Every vesting
user casts votes on who did the best work; at the end of the day the available money for that day is divided
proportional to the votes, such that everyone with even one net positive vote gets something.
The naive voting process creates a N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma 4 whereby each individual voter has the
incentive to vote for themselves at the expense of the larger community goal. If every voter defects by
voting for themselves, then no currency will end up distributed and the currency as a whole will fail to gain
network effect. On the other hand, if only one voter defects then that voter would win undeserved profits
while having minimal effect on the overall value of the currency.
Voting Abuse
4 N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma.
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/npd.html
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Regardless of how much money any one individual has, there are always many other individuals with
similar wealth. Even the wealthiest individual rarely has much more than the next wealthiest two combined.
Furthermore, those who have a large investment in a community also have the most to lose by attempting
to game the voting system for themselves. It would be like the CEO of a company deciding to stop paying
salaries so he could pocket all of the profits. Everyone would leave to work for other companies and the
company would become worthless, leaving the CEO bankrupt rather than wealthy.
Fortunately, any work that is getting a large concentration of votes is also gaining the most scrutiny
(publicity). Through the addition of negative voting it is possible for many smaller stakeholders to nullify
the voting power of collusive groups or large, defecting stakeholders. Furthermore, large stakeholders have
more to lose if the currency falls in value due to abuse than they might gain by voting for themselves. In
fact, honest large stakeholders are likely to be more effective by policing abuse and using negative voting
than they would be by voting for smaller contributions.
The use of negative voting to keep people from abusing the system leverages the crab mentality that many
people have when it is perceived that one individual is profiting at the expense of everyone else. While crab
mentality normally refers to short-sighted people keeping good people down, it is also what allows good
people to keep bad people down. The only “problem” with crab mentality is when people wrongly believe
someone is profiting at everyone else’s expense.
The Story of the Crab Bucket 5
A man was walking along the beach and saw another man fishing in the surf with a bait bucket beside him.
As he drew closer, he saw that the bait bucket had no lid and had live crabs inside.
“Why don’t you cover your bait bucket so the crabs won’t escape?” he asked.
“You don’t understand,” the fisherman replied, “If there is one crab in the bucket it would surely crawl
out very quickly. However, when there are many crabs in the bucket, if one tries to crawl up the side, the
others grab hold of it and pull it back down so that it will share the same fate as the rest of them. ”
So it is with people. If one tries to do something different, get better grades, improve herself, escape her
environment, or dream big dreams, other people will try to drag her back down to share their fate.
Eliminating “abuse” is not possible and shouldn’t be the goal. Even those who are attempting to “abuse”
the system are still doing work. Any compensation they get for their successful attempts at abuse or
collusion is at least as valuable for the purpose of distributing the currency as the make-work system
employed by traditional Bitcoin mining or the collusive mining done via mining pools. All that is necessary
is to ensure that abuse isn’t so rampant that it undermines the incentive to do real work in support of the
community and its currency.
The goal of building a community currency is to get more “crabs in the bucket. ” Going to extreme measures
to eliminate all abuse is like attempting to put a lid on the bucket to prevent a few crabs from escaping
and comes at the expense of making it harder to add new crabs to the bucket. It is sufficient to make the
walls slippery and give the other crabs sufficient power to prevent others from escaping.
Rate Limited Voting
A major part of minimizing abuse is the rate-limiting of voting. Individual users can only read and evaluate
so many work items per day. Any attempt to vote more frequently than this is a sign of automation and
potential abuse. Through rate limiting, the votes of stakeholders who vote more frequently count for less
5 Guidezone, “The Story of the Crab Bucket. ”
http://guidezone.e-guiding.com/jmstory_crabs.htm
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than the votes of stakeholders who vote less frequently. Attempts to divide tokens among multiple accounts
also divides influence and therefore does not result in a net increase in influence, nor does it bypass the
rate limit imposed on voting.
Users are allotted a fixed amount of voting power. Voting power is multiplied by a user’s vesting tokens to
determine how much share in the reward pool should be allocated to a given work item. Every vote that is
cast uses a percentage of their remaining voting power. Users can vote for more posts, but each vote will
be worth less, and it will take longer to reach full voting power again. Voting power recharges at a fixed
linear rate of 20% per day.
Payout Distribution
One of the primary goals of Steem’s reward system is to produce the best discussions on the internet. Each
year, 75% of the yearly inflation is distributed to users submitting, voting on, and discussing content. At
the size of Bitcoin this could be several million dollars per day being distributed among the top contributors.
The actual distribution will depend upon the voting patterns of users, but we suspect that the vast majority
of the rewards will be distributed to the most popular content.
Zipf’s Law 6 is one of those empirical rules that characterize a surprising range of real-world phenomena
remarkably well. It says that if we order some large collection by size or popularity, the second element
in the collection will be about half the measure of the first one, the third one will be about one-third the
measure of the first one, and so on. In general, the k th ranked item will measure about 1/k of the first one.
Taking popularity as a rough measure of value, then
the value of each individual item is given by Zipf’s
Law. That is, if we have a million items, then the
most popular 100 will contribute a third of the total
value, the next 10,000 another third, and the remain-
ing 989,900 the final third. The value of the collection
of n items is proportional to log(n).
The impact of this voting and payout distribution is
to offer large bounties for good content while still
rewarding smaller players for their long-tail contribu-
tion.
The economic effect of this is similar to a lottery
where people overestimate their probability of getting
votes and thus do more work than the expected value
of their reward, thereby maximizing the total amount
of work performed in service of the community. The fact that “everyone wins something” plays on the
same psychology that casinos use to keep people gambling. In other words, small rewards help reinforce
the idea that it is possible to earn bigger rewards.
Payouts
When a post receives a payout, it takes the form of 50% SBD and 50% SP. The Steem Power gives the
user increased voting and transaction power, while the SBD gives the user an immediate benefit in a stable
6 Wikipedia, “Zipf’s Law. ”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zipf%27s_law
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currency. As we’ve already discussed at length, SP is designed to encourage long-term holding rather than
short-term selling. This encourages more users to have a vested interest in the long-term success of the
platform.
Users also have the option to be paid in 100% SP, as well as to decline payout on posts. When a user
declines payout on a post, the money that would have been paid to them remains in the rewards pool, to
be distributed to other users.
Consensus Algorithm
Consensus is the process by which a community comes to a universally recognized, unambiguous agreement
on a piece of information. Society has developed many algorithms for reaching consensus about who owns
what. Every government on Earth is a primitive consensus algorithm whereby the population agrees to
abide by a certain set of rules enshrined in a constitution. Governments establish courts, judges, and juries
to interpret the subjective facts and render a final decision. Most of the time people abide by the decision,
even if it was wrong.
The algorithms used by cryptocurrencies provide a better way to reach consensus. Cryptographically signed
testimony from individuals is recorded in a public ledger that establishes the absolute global order of events.
A deterministic computer algorithm can then process this ledger to derive a universally accepted conclusion.
So long as the members of a community agree on the processing algorithm, the result of the algorithm is
authoritative.
The primary consideration is determining what testimony is allowed to enter the public record. Systems
should be designed to minimize the potential for censorship. Censorship on the public ledger is similar to
preventing someone from voting in an election. In both cases an individual is prevented from affecting the
global consensus.
Consensus in Steem
Conceptually, the consensus algorithm adopted by Steem is similar to the consensus algorithm adopted by
companies throughout the world. People with a vested interest in the future value of Steem vote to select
individuals responsible for including testimony in the public record. Voting is weighted proportional to each
individual’s vested interest.
In the world of cryptocurrencies, the public record is commonly referred to as a blockchain. A block is a
group of signed transactions.
With Steem, block production is done in rounds. For each round, 21 witnesses are selected to create and
sign blocks of transactions. Twenty (20) of these witnesses are selected by approval voting and one is
timeshared by every witness that didn’t make it into the top 20 proportional to their total votes. The
21 active witnesses are shuffled every round to prevent any one witness from constantly ignoring blocks
produced by the same witness placed before. Any witness who misses a block and hasn’t produced in the
last 24 hours will be disabled until they upda프로젝트로 돌아가기