Steem 백서

Steem

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s to re- spond to any issues that come up. Mitigating Timing Attacks Market participants have access to information faster than the blockchain’s three-and-a-half day moving median conversion price can react. This information could be used to the benefit of traders at the expense of the community. If there is a sudden increase in the value of STEEM, traders could request conversion of their SBD at the old, lower price, and then sell the STEEM they receive at the new, higher price with minimal risk. Steem levels the playing field by requiring all conversion requests to be delayed for three-and-a-half days. This means that neither the traders nor the blockchain has any information advantage regarding the price at the time the conversion is executed. Minimizing Abuse of Conversions If people could freely convert in both directions, then traders could take advantage of the blockchains conversion rates by trading large volumes without changing the price. Traders who see a massive run-up in price would convert to SBD at the high price (when it is most risky) and then convert back after the correction. The Steem protocol protects the community from this kind of abuse by only allowing people to convert from SBD to STEEM and not the other way around. The blockchain decides how and when to create SBD and who should get it. This keeps the rate of SBD creation stable and removes most avenues of abuse. Sustainable Debt-to-Ownership Ratios If a token is viewed as ownership in the whole supply of tokens, then a token-convertible dollar can be viewed as debt. If the debt-to-ownership ratio gets too high, the entire currency can become unstable. Debt conversions can dramatically increase the token supply, which in turn is sold on the market, suppressing the price. Subsequent conversions require the issuance of even more tokens. Left unchecked the system can collapse, leaving worthless ownership backing a mountain of debt. The higher the debt-to-ownership ratio becomes, the less willing new investors are to bring capital to the table. A rapid change in the value of STEEM can dramatically change the debt-to-ownership ratio. The blockchain prevents the debt-to-ownership ratio from getting too high by reducing the amount of STEEM awarded through SBD conversions if the debt level were to exceed 10%. If the amount of SBD debt ever exceeds 10% of the total STEEM market cap, the blockchain will automatically reduce the amount of STEEM generated through conversions to a maximum of 10% of the market cap. This ensures that the blockchain will never have higher than a 10% debt-to-ownership ratio. The percentage floors used to compute STEEM creation are based on the supply, including the STEEM value of all outstanding SBD and SP (as determined by the current rate / feed). Risk, Leverage, and Dilution All debt carries risk to the lender. Someone who holds SBD without redeeming it is effectively lending the community the value of a dollar. They are trusting that at some point in the future someone will be willing 9 to buy the SBD from them for a dollar or that there will be speculators and investors willing to buy the STEEM they convert it into. STEEM and SP holders gain leverage when members of the community are willing to hold SBD. This leverage amplifies the gains from growth while also contributing to growth. STEEM holders do suffer from increased dilution if the price falls. Cryptocurrency projects have shown that the gains from increasing the user base willing to trust the network with capital ultimately add more value to the network than any dilution that may occur during a downturn. Setting Price Feeds The primary concern of Steem feed producers is to maintain a stable one-to-one conversion between SBD and the US dollar (USD). In a market where debt still demands a premium, it is safe to say the market is willing to extend more credit than the debt the community is willing to take on. If this happens a SBD will be valued at more than $1.00 and there is little the community can do. If SBD trades for less than $1.00 USD and the debt-to-ownership ratio is high, then the feeds should be adjusted upward to give more STEEM per SBD. This will increase demand for SBD while also reducing the debt-to-ownership ratio and returning SBD to parity with USD. In effect, feed producers are entrusted with the responsibility of setting monetary policy for the purpose of maintaining a stable peg to the USD. Abuse of this power can harm the value of STEEM so SP holders are wise to vote for witnesses who can be counted on to adjust the price feed according to the rules outlined above. If the debt-to-ownership ratio gets dangerously high and market participants choose to avoid conversion requests, then the feed should be adjusted to increase the rate at which STEEM is paid for converting SBD. Changes to any premiums/discounts on the STEEM/SBD conversion rate should be a slow and measured response to long-term average deviations rather than an attempt to respond to short-term market conditions. It is our belief that these rules will give market participants confidence that they are unlikely lose money by holding SBD purchased at a price of $1.00. Subjective Contributions Subjective Proof of Work presents an alternative approach to distributing a currency that improves upon fully objective Proof of Work systems, such as mining. The applications of a currency implementing subjective proof of work are far wider than any objective proof of work system, because they can be applied to build a community around any concept that has a sufficiently defined purpose. When individuals join a community they buy into a particular set of beliefs and can vote to reinforce the community values or purpose. In effect, the criteria by which work are evaluated is completely subjective and their definition lives outside the source code itself. One community may wish to reward artists, another poets, and another comedians. Other communities may choose to reward charitable causes or help advance political agendas. The value each currency achieves depends upon the demand for influence within a particular community and how large the market believes each community can get. Unlike prior systems, subjective proof of work enables a community to collectively fund the development of whatever it finds valuable and enables the monetization of previously nonmonetizable time. 10 Distributing Currency There are two ways people can get involved with a crypto-currency community: they can buy in , or they can work in. In both cases users are adding value to the currency, however, the vast majority of people have more free time than they do spare cash. Imagine the goal of bootstrapping a currency in a poor community with no actual cash but plenty of time. If people can earn money by working for one another then they will bootstrap value through mutual exchange facilitated by a fair accounting/currency system. Distributing a currency to as many people as possible in a manner that is generally perceived as fair is a challenging task. The tasks that can be entirely evaluated by an objective computer algorithm are limited in nature and generally speaking have limited positive external benefits. In the case of Bitcoin-style mining, it can result in the production of specialized hardware and cause people to invest time developing more efficient algorithms. It may even help find prime numbers, but none of these things provide meaningful value to society or the currency-holding community at large. More importantly, economies of scale and market forces will end up excluding everyone but experts from participating in this kind of distribution. Ultimately, computation-based mining is just another way of buying in because it requires money to pay the electric bill or the development of hardware necessary to do the work. In order to give everyone an equal opportunity to get involved and earn the currency, people must be given an opportunity to work. The challenge is how to judge the relative quality and quantity of work that individuals provide and to do so in a way that efficiently allocates rewards to millions of users. This requires the introduction of a scalable voting process. In particular, authority to allocate funds must be as distributed and decentralized as possible. The first step in rewarding millions of users is to commit to distributing a fixed amount of currency regardless of how much work is actually done or how users vote. This changes the question from being “Should we pay?” to “Whom should we pay?” and signals to the market that money is being distributed and is being auctioned off to whoever “bids” the most work. This is similar to Bitcoin committing to award 50 BTC to whoever finds the most difficult hashes. Like Bitcoin, all work must be done prior to payout and nothing should be paid speculatively on the promise to do work in the future. The next step is to reward everyone who does anything even remotely positive with something. This is accomplished by ranking all work done and distributing proportionally to its value. The more competitive the market becomes, the more difficult (higher quality or quantity) it becomes to earn the same payout. Voting on Distribution of Currency Assume there is a fixed amount of money to distribute, and that those who have a long-term vested interest in the future value and utility of the currency are the ones who must decide how to allocate it. Every vesting user casts votes on who did the best work; at the end of the day the available money for that day is divided proportional to the votes, such that everyone with even one net positive vote gets something. The naive voting process creates a N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma 4 whereby each individual voter has the incentive to vote for themselves at the expense of the larger community goal. If every voter defects by voting for themselves, then no currency will end up distributed and the currency as a whole will fail to gain network effect. On the other hand, if only one voter defects then that voter would win undeserved profits while having minimal effect on the overall value of the currency. Voting Abuse 4 N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/npd.html 11 Regardless of how much money any one individual has, there are always many other individuals with similar wealth. Even the wealthiest individual rarely has much more than the next wealthiest two combined. Furthermore, those who have a large investment in a community also have the most to lose by attempting to game the voting system for themselves. It would be like the CEO of a company deciding to stop paying salaries so he could pocket all of the profits. Everyone would leave to work for other companies and the company would become worthless, leaving the CEO bankrupt rather than wealthy. Fortunately, any work that is getting a large concentration of votes is also gaining the most scrutiny (publicity). Through the addition of negative voting it is possible for many smaller stakeholders to nullify the voting power of collusive groups or large, defecting stakeholders. Furthermore, large stakeholders have more to lose if the currency falls in value due to abuse than they might gain by voting for themselves. In fact, honest large stakeholders are likely to be more effective by policing abuse and using negative voting than they would be by voting for smaller contributions. The use of negative voting to keep people from abusing the system leverages the crab mentality that many people have when it is perceived that one individual is profiting at the expense of everyone else. While crab mentality normally refers to short-sighted people keeping good people down, it is also what allows good people to keep bad people down. The only “problem” with crab mentality is when people wrongly believe someone is profiting at everyone else’s expense. The Story of the Crab Bucket 5 A man was walking along the beach and saw another man fishing in the surf with a bait bucket beside him. As he drew closer, he saw that the bait bucket had no lid and had live crabs inside. “Why don’t you cover your bait bucket so the crabs won’t escape?” he asked. “You don’t understand,” the fisherman replied, “If there is one crab in the bucket it would surely crawl out very quickly. However, when there are many crabs in the bucket, if one tries to crawl up the side, the others grab hold of it and pull it back down so that it will share the same fate as the rest of them. ” So it is with people. If one tries to do something different, get better grades, improve herself, escape her environment, or dream big dreams, other people will try to drag her back down to share their fate. Eliminating “abuse” is not possible and shouldn’t be the goal. Even those who are attempting to “abuse” the system are still doing work. Any compensation they get for their successful attempts at abuse or collusion is at least as valuable for the purpose of distributing the currency as the make-work system employed by traditional Bitcoin mining or the collusive mining done via mining pools. All that is necessary is to ensure that abuse isn’t so rampant that it undermines the incentive to do real work in support of the community and its currency. The goal of building a community currency is to get more “crabs in the bucket. ” Going to extreme measures to eliminate all abuse is like attempting to put a lid on the bucket to prevent a few crabs from escaping and comes at the expense of making it harder to add new crabs to the bucket. It is sufficient to make the walls slippery and give the other crabs sufficient power to prevent others from escaping. Rate Limited Voting A major part of minimizing abuse is the rate-limiting of voting. Individual users can only read and evaluate so many work items per day. Any attempt to vote more frequently than this is a sign of automation and potential abuse. Through rate limiting, the votes of stakeholders who vote more frequently count for less 5 Guidezone, “The Story of the Crab Bucket. ” http://guidezone.e-guiding.com/jmstory_crabs.htm 12 than the votes of stakeholders who vote less frequently. Attempts to divide tokens among multiple accounts also divides influence and therefore does not result in a net increase in influence, nor does it bypass the rate limit imposed on voting. Users are allotted a fixed amount of voting power. Voting power is multiplied by a user’s vesting tokens to determine how much share in the reward pool should be allocated to a given work item. Every vote that is cast uses a percentage of their remaining voting power. Users can vote for more posts, but each vote will be worth less, and it will take longer to reach full voting power again. Voting power recharges at a fixed linear rate of 20% per day. Payout Distribution One of the primary goals of Steem’s reward system is to produce the best discussions on the internet. Each year, 75% of the yearly inflation is distributed to users submitting, voting on, and discussing content. At the size of Bitcoin this could be several million dollars per day being distributed among the top contributors. The actual distribution will depend upon the voting patterns of users, but we suspect that the vast majority of the rewards will be distributed to the most popular content. Zipf’s Law 6 is one of those empirical rules that characterize a surprising range of real-world phenomena remarkably well. It says that if we order some large collection by size or popularity, the second element in the collection will be about half the measure of the first one, the third one will be about one-third the measure of the first one, and so on. In general, the k th ranked item will measure about 1/k of the first one. Taking popularity as a rough measure of value, then the value of each individual item is given by Zipf’s Law. That is, if we have a million items, then the most popular 100 will contribute a third of the total value, the next 10,000 another third, and the remain- ing 989,900 the final third. The value of the collection of n items is proportional to log(n). The impact of this voting and payout distribution is to offer large bounties for good content while still rewarding smaller players for their long-tail contribu- tion. The economic effect of this is similar to a lottery where people overestimate their probability of getting votes and thus do more work than the expected value of their reward, thereby maximizing the total amount of work performed in service of the community. The fact that “everyone wins something” plays on the same psychology that casinos use to keep people gambling. In other words, small rewards help reinforce the idea that it is possible to earn bigger rewards. Payouts When a post receives a payout, it takes the form of 50% SBD and 50% SP. The Steem Power gives the user increased voting and transaction power, while the SBD gives the user an immediate benefit in a stable 6 Wikipedia, “Zipf’s Law. ” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zipf%27s_law 13 currency. As we’ve already discussed at length, SP is designed to encourage long-term holding rather than short-term selling. This encourages more users to have a vested interest in the long-term success of the platform. Users also have the option to be paid in 100% SP, as well as to decline payout on posts. When a user declines payout on a post, the money that would have been paid to them remains in the rewards pool, to be distributed to other users. Consensus Algorithm Consensus is the process by which a community comes to a universally recognized, unambiguous agreement on a piece of information. Society has developed many algorithms for reaching consensus about who owns what. Every government on Earth is a primitive consensus algorithm whereby the population agrees to abide by a certain set of rules enshrined in a constitution. Governments establish courts, judges, and juries to interpret the subjective facts and render a final decision. Most of the time people abide by the decision, even if it was wrong. The algorithms used by cryptocurrencies provide a better way to reach consensus. Cryptographically signed testimony from individuals is recorded in a public ledger that establishes the absolute global order of events. A deterministic computer algorithm can then process this ledger to derive a universally accepted conclusion. So long as the members of a community agree on the processing algorithm, the result of the algorithm is authoritative. The primary consideration is determining what testimony is allowed to enter the public record. Systems should be designed to minimize the potential for censorship. Censorship on the public ledger is similar to preventing someone from voting in an election. In both cases an individual is prevented from affecting the global consensus. Consensus in Steem Conceptually, the consensus algorithm adopted by Steem is similar to the consensus algorithm adopted by companies throughout the world. People with a vested interest in the future value of Steem vote to select individuals responsible for including testimony in the public record. Voting is weighted proportional to each individual’s vested interest. In the world of cryptocurrencies, the public record is commonly referred to as a blockchain. A block is a group of signed transactions. With Steem, block production is done in rounds. For each round, 21 witnesses are selected to create and sign blocks of transactions. Twenty (20) of these witnesses are selected by approval voting and one is timeshared by every witness that didn’t make it into the top 20 proportional to their total votes. The 21 active witnesses are shuffled every round to prevent any one witness from constantly ignoring blocks produced by the same witness placed before. Any witness who misses a block and hasn’t produced in the last 24 hours will be disabled until they upda
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