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oosing between the two, decide based on your target environments, verification requirements, and long-term governance constraints.
</details>
***
## TokenTable and EthSign
<details>
<summary>What is TokenTable?</summary>
TokenTable is a product for capital allocation and distribution workflows. It is typically used where eligibility, allocation rules, controlled distribution, and reporting requirements must be implemented as an auditable system.
See [TokenTable](/products-sign-ecosystem/tokentable).
</details>
<details>
<summary>What is EthSign?</summary>
EthSign is a product for agreements and signatures, designed to support institutional workflows where execution, authorization, and evidence must be captured reliably.
See [EthSign](/products-sign-ecosystem/ethsign).
</details>
<details>
<summary>Do TokenTable and EthSign require Sign Protocol?</summary>
Not strictly. They can be used as standalone products, depending on deployment architecture.
In sovereign or regulated deployments, the common pattern is that agreements, allocations, and program operations benefit from a shared evidence layer so that verification and audit do not have to be rebuilt per application.
</details>
***
## Contributions and community
<details>
<summary>Do you accept public contributions?</summary>
Yes. Contributions are welcome where they improve correctness, security posture, developer experience, and integration quality.
Typical contribution paths include:
* Documentation fixes and clarifications
* Bug reports and reproducible test cases
* Pull requests to relevant repositories, where applicable
Follow the repository contribution guidelines for coding standards and review expectations.
</details>
<details>
<summary>How do I report a security issue?</summary>
Do not disclose sensitive vulnerabilities in public issue trackers.
Use the security reporting process defined by the project. If a dedicated security contact is not listed in the repository, start with the organization contact method provided in the documentation site or the repository metadata, and request secure disclosure instructions.
Also review:
* [Security & Privacy](/s.i.g.n./security-privacy)
</details>
<details>
<summary>Where should I ask questions or send feedback?</summary>
Use the most appropriate channel for the type of request:
* Documentation issues: open an issue or pull request in the relevant repository
* Developer support: use the community or developer channels referenced by the project
* Product and deployment discussions: use the contact paths intended for institutional engagements
When possible, include environment details, expected behavior, actual behavior, and minimal reproduction steps.
</details>
# Overview
Sovereign-grade digital infrastructure for national systems of money, identity, and capital.
S.I.G.N. (Sovereign Infrastructure for Global Nations) is sovereign-grade digital infrastructure that governments and regulated institutions can reuse across **three national systems**:
* **New Money System** — CBDC + regulated stablecoins on one national rail (public + private modes), with policy-grade controls and supervisory visibility.
* **New ID System** — national identity + verifiable credentials (VC/DID) with selective disclosure, offline verification, and strong issuer governance.
* **New Capital System** — programmable distribution + regulated real-world asset (RWA) tokenization with compliance controls and inspection-ready reporting.
## Why this documentation exists
Most national digital programs fail at scale due to fragmented foundations:
* identity and eligibility checks are duplicated across agencies and vendors,
* payments rails are opaque and hard to audit,
* distribution programs lack end-to-end evidence,
* on-chain and off-chain systems cannot be reconciled cleanly over time.
S.I.G.N. is designed as a **thin but critical** infrastructure layer where:
* GovTech execution,
* FinTech rails, and
* cryptographic verification\
meet in a way that keeps **policy + oversight under sovereign control**.
## Who this is for
### Governments, central banks, regulators
You want a system that is:
* private to the public but auditable to lawful authorities,
* operable at national concurrency (millions of users, multi-operator),
* standards-aware (ISO 20022, W3C VC/DID),
* and deployable without vendor lock-in.
Start here:
* [Reference Architecture](/s.i.g.n./reference-architecture)
* [Security & Privacy](/s.i.g.n./security-privacy)
* [Governance & Operations](/s.i.g.n./governance-ops)
* [Use Cases](/national-systems/new-money-system)
### Builders and integrators
You want to integrate identity proofs, program rules, distribution, and audit evidence into real systems.
Start here:
* [Builder Getting Started](/for-builders/getting-started)
* [Writing Data (Sign Protocol)](/for-builders/index-1)
* [Querying Data (SignScan / APIs)](/for-builders/index)
## How the docs are organized
* **S.I.G.N.** (this section): system-level architecture, governance, security/privacy.
* **Use Cases**: New Money / New ID / New Capital.
* **Products**: EthSign, TokenTable, Sign Protocol (evidence layer).
* **For Builders**: deep developer docs (primarily Sign Protocol contracts/SDK/APIs).
## Core concepts (minimal glossary)
This repo already contains a full glossary; this is the “minimum set” to read the S.I.G.N. pages:
* **Credential (VC)**: cryptographically signed claim issued to a holder (citizen/business).
* **DID**: a decentralized identifier used to represent issuers, holders, and verifiers.
* **Attestation**: structured, verifiable data record anchored and queryable (the evidence layer).
* **Schema**: a template defining the structure of attestations/claims.
* **Trust Registry**: registry of authorized issuers + keys + schemas + revocation/status.
* **Evidence artifact**: a durable, inspectable record of critical actions (who verified what, when, under what authority).
See full definitions: [Glossary](/reference/index)
## The “stack at a glance”
A simplified mental model:
1. **Settlement / Ledger substrate**
* public chain mode (transparent)
* private chain mode (confidential)
2. **Trust & Evidence layer**
* identity credentials, attestations, revocation/status, audit hashes
3. **Program execution**
* payments, distribution, registries, approvals, reporting
S.I.G.N. is the system that makes these layers interoperable and operable at national scale.
# Reference Architecture
Reference architecture for S.I.G.N. (Money, ID, Capital) and how Sign Protocol + TokenTable compose across public/private rails.
## Purpose
This page defines a **reference architecture** for S.I.G.N. deployments. It is written to be:
* **implementation-neutral** (works with different sovereign constraints),
* **operator-friendly** (clear roles and trust boundaries),
* **audit-ready** (explicit evidence artifacts),
* **integration-ready** (legacy rails + standards).
## Audience
* Sovereign operators (central bank infra, GovTech platform teams)
* System integrators (banks/PSPs/telcos, identity vendors)
* Builders (wallets, program operators, auditors)
## Architectural invariants
S.I.G.N. is designed around five invariants:
1. **Controllable privacy**
* private to the public,
* auditable to lawful authorities,
* minimal disclosure by default.
2. **National performance**
* built for millions of users, multi-operator workflows, strict SLAs.
3. **Sovereign control**
* key custody, upgrades, emergency controls, and oversight remain under sovereign governance.
4. **Interoperability**
* standards-aligned identity (VC/DID),
* standards-aware payments (ISO 20022),
* compatibility with public + private rails.
5. **Inspection-ready evidence**
* every critical action emits durable evidence:
* who authorized what
* under which authority
* when
* based on which identity/eligibility proof
* with what rule version
***
## High-level component diagram
A reference decomposition (logical, not vendor-specific):
* **Public Rail (Transparent Mode)**
* L2 sovereign chain or L1 smart contracts
* suitable for public finance transparency, open verification, global access
* **Private Rail (Confidential Mode)**
* permissioned CBDC infrastructure (e.g., Fabric-based)
* suitable for privacy-sensitive retail flows and regulated confidentiality
* **Identity Stack**
* issuers (government agencies / authorized institutions)
* holder wallets (non-custodial)
* verifiers (banks, agencies, service providers)
* trust registry + revocation/status
* **Trust & Evidence Layer (Sign Protocol)**
* schema registry (structured templates)
* attestations (verifiable records)
* privacy modes (on-chain / off-chain / hybrid / ZK)
* indexing + query (SignScan / REST / GraphQL)
* **Program Engine (TokenTable / Distribution + Asset Engine)**
* eligibility rules
* batch distribution
* scheduling
* conditional logic
* asset tokenization + registry integration
* audit trail + reconciliation
***
## Trust model and roles
A typical sovereign trust model uses explicit roles:
* **Sovereign Authority**
* defines policy rules, signs governance approvals
* owns root governance keys or approval process
* **Operators**
* run infrastructure components (indexers, APIs, chain nodes, bridges)
* do not unilaterally control policy
* **Issuers**
* issue credentials (VCs) and/or attestations
* must be registered in a trust registry
* **Holders**
* citizens, residents, businesses
* hold credentials in non-custodial wallets
* **Verifiers / Relying Parties**
* service providers verifying credentials/attestations
* **Auditors / Supervisors**
* authorized parties that can inspect evidence and reconcile programs
> Design rule: **Separate duties** between (i) policy definition, (ii) issuance, (iii) operations, and (iv) audit.
***
## Data placement model
S.I.G.N. deployments must explicitly define where data lives.
### 1) What should be off-chain (typical)
* PII (name, address, biometric templates, passport scans)
* sensitive program enrollment payloads
* internal case files
### 2) What should be on-chain (typical)
* commitments/hashes of records
* attestations and schema IDs (when safe)
* revocation/status registries
* audit hashes + rule version hashes
* transaction settlement references
### 3) Hybrid patterns (recommended)
* keep sensitive payloads off-chain (encrypted),
* store references + integrity anchors on-chain,
* index only what is needed for verification.
***
## Reference technical specifications (summary)
This section is meant to guide planning and procurement, not constrain implementations.
### Public rail (Layer 2 reference)
* Runtime: EVM-based
* Block time: < 1 second
* TPS: up to \~4000 (reference)
* Consensus: PoA / PBFT variants
* Finality: 1–5 blocks (reference)
### Private rail (CBDC reference)
* Consensus: Arma BFT
* Throughput: 100,000+ TPS (reference)
* Finality: immediate on commitment
* Privacy: namespaces + configurable ZK privacy
* Token model: UTXO via Fabric Token SDK
* Identity: X.509 certificates (MSP)
* Standards: ISO 20022 compatible
* Namespaces: wCBDC, rCBDC, Regulatory
* wCBDC: RTGS-like transparency
* rCBDC: high privacy (ZK)
### National Digital Identity stack (reference)
* VC model: W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0
* DID: W3C DIDs
* Formats: VC-JWT, SD-JWT VC, JSON-LD with BBS+
* Signatures: ECDSA, EdDSA, RSA
* ZK: Groth16 / Plonk / BBS+ (unlinkability)
* Issuance: OIDC4VCI
* Presentation: OIDC4VP
* Revocation: W3C Bitstring Status List
* Offline: QR + NFC presentation
* mDL compatibility: ISO/IEC 18013-5/7
### TokenTable (reference)
* Distribution size: unlimited
* Throughput: max chain TPS
* Scheduling: second-level granularity + calendar months
* Audit trail: on-chain
***
## End-to-end flows (canonical)
### Flow A: Eligibility → Distribution → Audit (most common)
1. Issuer issues VC (eligibility credential) to holder wallet
2. Holder proves eligibility to a program engine (selective disclosure)
3. Program engine generates a distribution batch
4. Settlement occurs on:
* private rail (CBDC) for confidentiality, or
* public rail (stablecoin) for transparency
5. Evidence is produced:
* eligibility proof reference
* rule version hash
* distribution manifest hash
* settlement references
### Flow B: Cross-rail conversion (CBDC ↔ Stablecoin bridge)
1. User requests conversion
2. Compliance checks run (identity, limits, AML)
3. Atomic mint/burn or lock/release occurs
4. Evidence: signed approval + conversion record + settlement references
### Flow C: Registry update (RWA tokenization)
1. Registry authority validates a property/asset record
2. TokenTable tokenizes ownership/transfer rules
3. Transfers are permitted only for eligible parties (whitelists, jurisdiction rules)
4. Evidence: registry sync logs + transfer approvals + ownership chain
***
## Where to go next
* Governance and operational control: [Governance & Operations](/s.i.g.n./governance-ops)
* Privacy and threat model: [Security & Privacy](/s.i.g.n./security-privacy)
* Use cases:
* [New Money System](/national-systems/new-money-system)
* [New ID System](/national-systems/new-id-system)
* [New Capital System](/national-systems/new-capital-system)
* Deep developer docs (protocol layer): [For Builders](/for-builders/getting-started)
# Security & Privacy
Security and privacy model for S.I.G.N. including data placement, selective disclosure, audit access controls, and operational security practices.
## Purpose
This page defines the security and privacy posture expected for S.I.G.N. deployments:
* what goes on-chain vs off-chain,
* how privacy is preserved while keeping lawful auditability,
* the baseline security controls operators should implement.
This is not legal advice; each jurisdiction should adapt controls to local law and procurement rules.
***
## Security goals
S.I.G.N. deployments should satisfy:
1. **Integrity**
* evidence and records cannot be forged without detection
* state transitions are verifiable over time
2. **Confidentiality**
* sensitive citizen data is not exposed broadly
* privacy-sensitive payments remain confidential to the public
3. **Availability**
* systems continue operating under national concurrency and adversarial conditions
4. **Non-repudiation**
* actions (issuance, approvals, distributions) are cryptographically attributable
5. **Auditability**
* authorized parties can reconstruct “who did what, when, and why”
* evidence is inspection-ready and consistent across systems
***
## The privacy principle: “private to the public, auditable to lawful authorities”
This means:
* **The public** should not be able to trivially enumerate:
* citizen identities,
* balances,
* private benefit distributions,
* sensitive eligibility data.
* **Authorized oversight** can verify:
* that rules were followed,
* that recipients were eligible at time of distribution,
* that budgets reconcile to outcomes,
* that approvals exist for exceptional actions.
The mechanism is a combination of:
* **data minimization** (do not publish sensitive payloads),
* **cryptographic proofs** (prove without revealing),
* **segmented rails** (public vs private settlement),
* **access-controlled audit systems** (lawful inspection).
***
## Data classification and placement
### Recommended classification
* **Public**
* program rulesets (high-level)
* aggregate statistics
* public benefit distributions (when transparency is desired)
* **Restricted**
* issuer keys, operator runbooks, monitoring endpoints
* **Confidential**
* PII
* private payment details
* eligibility payloads
* internal case files and investigations
* **Sensitive (lawful access only)**
* audit reconstruction maps linking pseudonyms to identities
* regulatory investigation artifacts
### Placement rules of thumb
* **PII should be off-chain** by default.
* **On-chain artifacts should be proofs/anchors**, such as:
* schema IDs
* attestation IDs (or commitment hashes)
* revocation/status registry references
* rule version hashes
* audit manifest hashes
* settlement references (tx hashes / commit IDs)
* **Hybrid** is preferred when:
* verifiers need open verification,
* but payload confidentiality must be maintained.
***
## Cryptography and standards (reference)
### Credential + identity stack
* VC model: W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0
* DID standard: W3C DIDs
* Formats: VC-JWT, SD-JWT VC, JSON-LD with BBS+
* Issuance protocol: OIDC4VCI
* Presentation protocol: OIDC4VP
* Revocation: W3C Bitstring Status List
* Offline presentation: QR and NFC
* mDL compatibility: ISO/IEC 18013-5/7
### Signature schemes (reference)
* ECDSA (secp256k1, P‑256)
* EdDSA (Ed25519)
* RSA
### Privacy / ZK (reference)
* Groth16, Plonk
* BBS+ (unlinkable credentials / selective disclosure)
### ePassport integration (reference)
* ICAO 9303 compatible proofs/verification
***
## Privacy mechanisms in practice
### Selective disclosure
A holder can prove a predicate (e.g., “age ≥ 18”) without revealing the underlying value (exact DOB).
### Unlinkability
When supported, presentations should prevent third parties from linking:
* the same citizen across different service contexts,
* or the same credential presentation across time.
### Minimal disclosure
A verifier should request only what is necessary:
* a “yes/no” eligibility proof instead of full identity payload,
* an attribute proof instead of a complete credential.
***
## Payment privacy (New Money System alignment)
A common pattern is dual-rail support:
* **Public rail** for transparency-first use cases\
Example: public spending programs where the state wants public accountability.
* **Private rail (CBDC)** for confidentiality-first use cases\
Example: sensitive assistance programs requiring strong privacy protections.
Within a private CBDC rail, privacy tiers may exist:
* **wCBDC** (wholesale): RTGS-like transparency for institutions
* **rCBDC** (retail): stronger privacy protections (potentially ZK-based)
***
## Access control and lawful audit
### Role-based access control (RBAC)
Deployments should define:
* who can issue credentials,
* who can approve distributions,
* who can operate bridges,
* who can run indexers,
* who can perform audits.
### Audit access
Audit access should be:
* logged,
* time-bounded,
* least-privilege,
* and require multi-party approval when appropriate.
### Evidence export
Audits should be able to export:
* signed approvals,
* rule versions and hashes,
* batch manifests and reconciliation outputs,
* settlement references,
* revocation/status proof checks.
***
## Operational security baseline
### Key management
* Root governance keys should be protected by **HSM** and/or **multisig**.
* Issuer keys (credential/attestation signing) should be separated by agency/domain.
* Operator keys (infrastructure) should not be issuer keys.
* Rotation and recovery must be documented and tested.
### Monitoring and incident response
Minimum recommended:
* service health dashboards (indexers, APIs, bridge)
* tamper-evident logs
* alerting for abnormal issuance/distribution rates
* rollback / pause procedures for emergency controls
### Supply chain and SDLC security
* dependency scanning + SBOM generation
* reproducible builds where possible
* staging environments mirroring production
* third-party audits for critical components
* bug bounty program / coordinated disclosure
***
## Threat model (high-level)
Threats to plan for:
* **Credential forgery / issuer compromise**
* mitigations: trust registry, issuer governance, key custody, revocation
* **Sybil or duplicate claims**
* mitigations: identity-linked targeting, duplicate prevention rules, attestation checks
* **Bridge abuse**
* mitigations: atomicity, limits, approvals, monitoring, emergency pause
* **Indexer/API tampering**
* mitigations: integrity anchors, replayable verification 프로젝트로 돌아가기