bitpro가 원문에서 글자만 모은 내용이에요. 표·그림·수식은 빠지거나 깨질 수 있어요. 전체 7쪽 중 3쪽
uration
status; this way a failed attempt to post a transaction
to a stalled destination may be reported synchronously.
(Though since no return path exists, if a secondary trans-
action failed for that reason, it could not be reported back
to the original caller and some other means of recovery
would have to take place.)
5.5. Polkadot and Ethereum. Due to Ethereum’s Tur-
ing completeness, we expect there is ample opportu-
nity for Polkadot and Ethereum to be interoperable with
each other, at least within some easily deducible secu-
rity bounds. In short, we envision that transactions from
Polkadot can be signed by validators and then fed into
5Such a task might be shared between validators or could become the designate task of a set of heavily bonded validators known as
availability guarantors .
POLKADOT: VISION FOR A HETEROGENEOUS MUL TI-CHAIN FRAMEWORK DRAFT 1 8
Ethereum where they can be interpreted and enacted by
a transaction-forwarding contract. In the other direction,
we foresee the usage of specially formatted logs (events)
coming from a “break-out contract” to allow a swift veri-
fication that a particular message should be forwarded.
5.5.1. Polkadot to Ethereum. Through the choice of a
BFT consensus mechanism with validators formed from a
set of stakeholders determined through an approval voting
mechanism, we are able to get a secure consensus with an
infrequently changing and modest number of validators.
In a system with a total of 144 validators, a block time of
4 seconds and a 900-block finality (allowing for malicious
behaviour such as double-votes to be reported, punished
and repaired), the validity of a block can reasonably be
considered proven through as little as 97 signatures (two-
thirds of 144 plus one) and a following 60-minute verifica-
tion period where no challenges are deposited.
Ethereum is able to host a “break-in contract” which
can maintain the 144 signatories and be controlled by
them. Since elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA) re-
covery takes only 3,000 gas under the EVM, and since
we would likely only want the validation to happen on a
super-majority of validators (rather than full unanimity),
the base cost of Ethereum confirming that an instruction
was properly validated as coming from the Polkadot net-
work would be no more than 300,000 gas—a mere 6% of
the total block gas limit at 5.5M. Increasing the num-
ber of validators (as would be necessary for dealing with
dozens of chains) inevitably increases this cost, however
it is broadly expected for Ethereum’s transaction band-
width to grow over time as the technology matures and
infrastructure improves. Together with the fact that not
all validators need to be involved (e.g. only the highest
staked validators may be called upon for such a task) the
limits of this mechanism extend reasonably well.
Assuming a daily rotation of such validators (which is
fairly conservative—weekly or even monthly may be ac-
ceptable), then the cost to the network of maintaining
this Ethereum-forwarding bridge would be around 540,000
gas per day or, at present gas prices, $ 45 per year. A ba-
sic transaction forwarded alone over the bridge would cost
around $ 0.11; additional contract computation would cost
more, of course. By buffering and bundling transactions
together, the break-in authorisation costs can easily be
shared, reducing the cost per transaction substantially;
if 20 transactions were required before forwarding, then
the cost for forwarding a basic transaction would fall to
around $ 0.01.
One interesting, and cheaper, alternative to this multi-
signature contract model would be to use threshold sig-
natures in order to achieve the multi-lateral ownership se-
mantics. While threshold signature schemes for ECDSA
are computationally expensive, those for other schemes
such as Schnorr signatures are very reasonable. Ethereum
plans to introduce primitives which would make such
schemes cheap to use in the upcoming Metropolis hard-
fork. If such a means were able to be utilised, the gas costs
for forwarding a Polkadot transaction into the Ethereum
network would be dramatically reduced to a near zero
overhead over and above the basic costs for validating the
signature and executing the underlying transaction.
In this model, Polkadot’s validator nodes would have
to do little other than sign messages. To get the trans-
actions actually routed onto the Ethereum network, we
assume either validators themselves would also reside on
the Ethereum network or, more likely, that small bounties
be offered to the first actor who forwards the message on
to the network (the bounty could trivially be paid to the
transaction originator).
5.5.2. Ethereum to Polkadot. Getting transactions to be
forwarded from Ethereum to Polkadot uses the simple no-
tion of logs. When an Ethereum contract wishes to dis-
patch a transaction to a particular parachain of Polkadot,
it need simply call into a special “break-out contract”.
The break-out contract would take any payment that may
be required and issue a logging instruction so that its ex-
istence may be proven through a Merkle proof and an as-
sertion that the corresponding block’s header is valid and
canonical.
Of the latter two conditions, validity is perhaps the
most straightforward to prove. In principle, the only re-
quirement is for each Polkadot node needing the proof
(i.e. appointed validator nodes) to be running a fully syn-
chronised instance of a standard Ethereum node. Unfor-
tunately, this is itself a rather heavy dependency. A more
lightweight method would be to use a simple proof that the
header was evaluated correctly through supplying only the
part of Ethereum’s state trie needed to properly execute
the transactions in the block and check that the logs (con-
tained in the block receipt) are valid. Such “SPV-like” 6
proofs may yet require a substantial amount of informa-
tion; conveniently, they would typically not be needed at
all: a bond system inside Polkadot would allow bonded
third-parties to submit headers at the risk of losing their
bond should some other third-party (such as a “fisher-
man”, see 6.2.3) provide a proof that the header is invalid
(specifically that the state root or receipt roots were im-
postors).
On a non-finalising PoW network like Ethereum, the
canonicality is impossible to proof conclusively. To ad-
dress this, applications that attempt to rely on any kind
of chain-dependent cause-effect wait for a number of “con-
firmations”, or until the dependent transaction is at some
particular depth within the chain. On Ethereum, this
depth varies from 1 block for the least valuable transac-
tions with no known network issues to 1200 blocks as was
the case during the initial Frontier release for exchanges.
On the stable “Homestead” network, this figure sits at
120 blocks for most exchanges, and we would likely take
a similar parameter.
So we can imagine our Polkadot-side Ethereum-
interface to have some simple functions: to be able to
accept a new header from the Ethereum network and val-
idate the PoW, to be able to accept some proof that a
particular log was emitted by the Ethereum-side break-
out contract for a header of sufficient depth (and forward
the corresponding message within Polkadot) and finally
to be able to accept proofs that a previously accepted but
not-yet-enacted header contains an invalid receipt root.
To actually get the Ethereum header data itself (and
any SPV proofs or validity/canonicality refutations) into
the Polkadot network, an incentivisation for forwarding
6SPV refers to Simplified Payment Verification in Bitcoin and describes a method for clients to verify transactions while keeping only
a copy of all blocks headers of the longest PoW chain.
POLKADOT: VISION FOR A HETEROGENEOUS MUL TI-CHAIN FRAMEWORK DRAFT 1 9
data is needed. This could be as simple as a payment
(funded from fees collected on the Ethereum side) paid
to anyone able to forward a useful block whose header is
valid. Validators would be called upon to retain informa-
tion relating to the last few thousand blocks in order to
be able to manage forks, either through some protocol-
intrinsic means or through a contract maintained on the
relay chain.
5.6. Polkadot and Bitcoin. Bitcoin interoperation
presents an interesting challenge for Polkadot: a so-called
“two-way peg” would be a useful piece of infrastructure
to have on the side of both networks. However, due to
the limitations of Bitcoin, providing such a peg securely is
a non-trivial undertaking. Delivering a transaction from
Bitcoin to Polkadot can in principle be done with a pro-
cess similar to that for Ethereum; a “break-out address”
controlled in some way by the Polkadot validators could
receive transferred tokens (and data sent alongside them).
SPV proofs could be provided by incentivised oracles and,
together with a confirmation period, a bounty given for
identifying non-canonical blocks implying the transaction
has been “double-spent”. Any tokens then owned in the
“break-out address” would then, in principle, be con-
trolled by those same validators for later dispersal.
The problem however is how the deposits can be se-
curely controlled from a rotating validator set. Unlike
Ethereum which is able to make arbitrary decisions based
upon combinations of signatures, Bitcoin is substantially
more limited, with most clients accepting only multi-
signature transactions with a maximum of 3 parties. Ex-
tending this to 36, or indeed thousands as might ulti-
mately be desired, is impossible under the current proto-
col. One option is to alter the Bitcoin protocol to enable
such functionality, however so-called “hard forks” in the
Bitcoin world are difficult to arrange judging by recent at-
tempts. One possibility is the use of threshold signatures,
cryptographic schemes to allow a singly identifiable public
key to be effectively controlled by multiple secret “parts”,
some or all of which must be utilised to create a valid sig-
nature. Unfortunately, threshold signatures compatible
with Bitcoin’s ECDSA are computationally expensive to
create and of polynomial complexity. Other schemes such
a Schnorr signatures provide far lower costs, however the
timeline on which they may be introduced into the Bitcoin
protocol is uncertain.
Since the ultimate security of the deposits rests with
a number of bonded validators, one other option is to
reduce the multi-signature key-holders to only a heavily
bonded subset of the total validators such that threshold
signatures become feasible (or, at worst, Bitcoin’s native
multi-signature is possible). This of course reduces the
total amount of bonds that could be deducted in repara-
tions should the validators behave illegally, however this
is a graceful degradation, simply setting an upper limit of
the amount of funds that can securely run between the
two networks (or indeed, on the % losses should an attack
from the validators succeed).
As such we believe it not unrealistic to place a reason-
ably secure Bitcoin interoperability “virtual parachain”
between the two networks, though nonetheless a substan-
tial effort with an uncertain timeline and quite possibly
requiring the cooperation of the stakeholders within that
network.
6. Protocol in Depth
The protocol can be roughly broken down into three
parts: the consensus mechanism, the parachain interface
and interchain transaction routing.
6.1. Relay-chain Operation. The relay-chain will
likely be a chain broadly similar to Ethereum in that it
is state-based with the state mapping address to account
information, mainly balances and (to prevent replays) a
transaction counter. Placing accounts here fulfils one pur-
pose: to provide accounting for which identity possesses
what amount of stake in the system. 7 There will be no-
table differences, though:
• Contracts cannot be deployed through transac-
tions; following from the desire to avoid applica-
tion functionality on the relay-chain, it will not
support public deployment of contracts.
• Compute resource usage (“gas”) is not accounted;
since the only functions available for public usage
will be fixed, the rationale behind gas accounting
no longer holds. As such, a flat fee will apply in
all cases, allowing for more performance from any
dynamic code execution that may need to be done
and a simpler transaction format.
• Special functionality is supported for listed con-
tracts that allows for auto-execution and network-
message outputs.
In the event that the relay-chain has a VM and it be
based around the EVM, it would have a number of mod-
ifications to ensure maximal simplicity. It would likely
have a number of built-in contracts (similar to those at
addresses 1-4 in Ethereum) to allow for platform-specific
duties to be managed including a consensus contract, a
validator contract and a parachain contract.
If not the EVM, then a WebAssembly [2] (wasm) back-
end is the most likely alternative; in this case the overall
structure would be similar, but there would be no need
for the built-in contracts with Wasm being a viable target
for general purpose languages rather than the immature
and limited languages for the EVM.
Other likely deviations from the present Ethereum pro-
tocol are quite possible, for example a simplification of the
transaction-receipt format allowing for the parallel execu-
tion of non-conflicting transactions within the same block,
as proposed for the Serenity series of changes.
It is possible, though unlikely, that a Serenity-like
“pure” chain be deployed as the relay-chain, allowing for a
particular contract to manage things like the staking token
balances rather than making that a fundamental part of
the chain’s protocol. At present, we feel it is unlikely this
will offer a sufficiently great protocol simplification to be
worth the additional complexity and uncertainty involved
in developing it.
7As a means of representing the amount a given holder is responsible for the overall security of the system, these stake accounts will
inevitably encode some economic value. However, it should be understood that since there is no intention that such values be used in
any way for the purpose of exchanging for real-world goods and services, it should be accordingly noted that the tokens not be likened to
currency and as such the relay-chain retain its nihilistic philosophy regarding applications.
POLKADOT: VISION FOR A HETEROGENEOUS MUL TI-CHAIN FRAMEWORK DRAFT 1 10
There are a number of small pieces of functionality re-
quired for administrating the consensus mechanism, val-
idator set, validation mechanism and parachains. These
could be implemented together under a monolithic proto-
col. However, for reasons of auguring modularity, we de-
scribe these as “contracts” of the relay-chain. This should
be taken to mean that they are objects (in the sense of
object-orientated programming) managed by the relay-
chain’s consensus mechanism, but not necessarily that
they are defined as programs in EVM-like opcodes, nor
even that they be individually addressable through the
account-system.
6.2. Staking Contract. This contract maintains the val-
idator set. It manages:
• which accounts are currently validators;
• which are available to become validators at short
notice;
• which accounts have placed stake nominating to
a validator;
• properties of each including staking volume, ac-
ceptable payout-rates and addresses and short-
term (session) identities.
It allows an account to register a desire to become a
bonded validator (along with its requirements), to nom-
inate to some identity, and for preexisting bonded val-
idators to register their desire to exit this status. It also
includes the machinery itself for the validation and canon-
icalisation mechanism.
6.2.1. Stake-token Liquidity. It is generally desirable to
have as much of the total staking tokens as possible to be
staked within the network maintenance operations since
this directly ties the network security to the overall “mar-
ket capitalisation” of the staking token. This can easily
be incentivised through inflating the currency and hand-
ing out the proceeds to those who participate as valida-
tors. However, to do so presents a problem: if the token
is locked in the Staking Contract under punishment of re-
duction, how can a substantial portion remain sufficiently
liquid in order to allow price discovery?
One answer to this is allowing a straight-forward de-
rivative contract, securing fungible tokens on an underly-
ing staked token. This is difficult to arrange in a trust-
free manner. Furthermore, these derivative tokens can-
not be treated equally for the same reason that differ-
ent Eurozone government’s bonds are not fungible: there
is a chance of the underlying asset failing and becoming
worthless. With Eurozone governments, there could be a
default. With validator-staked tokens, the validator may
act maliciously and be punished.
Keeping with our tenets, we elect for the simplest so-
lution: not all tokens be staked. This would mean that
some proportion (perhaps 20%) of tokens will forcibly re-
main liquid. Though this is imperfect from a security per-
spective, it is unlikely to make a fundamental difference in
the security of the network; 80% of the reparations possi-
ble from bond-confiscations would still be able to be made
compared to the “perfect case” of 100% staking.
The ratio between staked and liquid tokens can be tar-
geted fairly simply through a reverse auction mechanism.
Essentially, token holders interested in being a validator
would each post an offer to the staking contract stating
the minimum payout-rate that they would require to take
part. At the beginning of each session (sessions would
happen regularly, perhaps as often as once per hour) the
validator slots would be filled according to each would-be
validator’s stake and payout rate. One possible algorithm
for this would be to take those with the lowest offers who
represent a stake no higher than the total stake targeted
divided by the number of slots and no lower than a lower-
bound of half that amount. If the slots cannot be filled,
the lower bound could be repeatedly reduced by some fac-
tor in order to satisfy.
6.2.2. Nominating. It is possible to trustlessly nominate
ones staking tokens to an active validator, giving them
the responsibility of validators duties. Nominating works
through an approval-voting system. Each would-be nomi-
nator is able to post an instruction to the staking contract
expressing one or more validator identities under whose
responsibility they are prepared to entrust their bond.
Each session, nominators’ bonds are dispersed to be
represented by one or more validators. The dispersal al-
gorithm optimises for a set of validators of equivalent total
bonds. Nominators’ bonds become under the effective re-
sponsibility of the validator and gain interest or suffer a
punishment-reduction accordingly.
6.2.3. Bond Confiscation/Burning. Certain validator be-
haviour results in a punitive reduction of their bond. If
the bond is reduced below the allowable minimum, the
session is prematurely ended and another started. A non-
exhaustive list of punishable validator misbehaviour in-
cludes:
• Being part of a parachain group unable to provide
consensus over the validity of a parachain block;
• actively signing for the validity of an invalid
parachain block;
• inability to supply egress payloads previously
voted as available;
• inactivity during the consensus process;
• validating relay-chain blocks on competing forks.
Some cases of misbehaviour threaten the network’s in-
tegrity (such as signing invalid parachain blocks and val-
idating multiple sides of a fork) and as such result in ef-
fective exile through the total reduction of the bond. In
other, less serious cases (e.g. inactivity in the consensus
process) or cases where blame cannot be precisely allot-
ted (being part of an ineffective group), a small portion
of the bond may instead be fined. In the latter case, this
works well with sub-group churn to ensur프로젝트로 돌아가기