PHALA 백서

PHALA

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Phala Network: A Secure Decentralized Cloud Computing Network Based on Polkadot Hang Yin Shunfan Zhou Jun Jiang March 7, 2022 1 Introduction Nowadays the security of the permissionless blockchain is typically guaranteed by state replication over consensus algorithms. Though this approach works well for blockchain, it also means that everything on the blockchain is public, which brings a problem: confidential information cannot be handled by the blockchain. The lack of confidentiality greatly limits the usage of blockchain in processing sensitive business and user data. For example, stock traders usually do not want to reveal their positions or order history. What’s more, all of the privacy-related DApps on the Ethereum cannot comply with the General Data Protection Regulation and thus will be prevented in European Union. Several methodologies have been proposed to address the privacy problem. Monero and Zcash implemented private transaction by ring signature [13] and zk-SNARK [11] technology, but their methods can only provide privacy for cryp- tocurrencies and are hard to be extended to general-purpose smart contracts. MPC (Multi-Party Computing) can theoretically run arbitrary programs with- out revealing intermediate states to the participants, with the expense of a per- formance overhead of 10 6 times [9], which makes it impractical for real world use cases. A new approach is to utilize special hardware, i.e., Trusted Execution En- vironment (TEE) [8]. TEE is a special area in some processors that provides a higher level of security including isolated execution, code integration, and state confidentiality. Naive TEE as a computing platform has several shortages, such as the lack of a reliable time source and availability guarantee. Ekiden [9] fixed these problems by introducing a TEE-blockchain hybrid architecture and implemented a high performance confidential smart contract platform. However, contracts in Ekiden are isolated, which means the contracts cannot interoperate with each other, let alone external blockchains. Interoper- ability is a keystone of modern smart contracts. For example, 8 of the top 10 contracts in Ethereum, the largest smart contract platform in the world, rely on functions invocations or money transferring to at least one other contract. Without interoperability, contracts cannot read information or call functions from other smart contracts. What’s more, the use of self-defined tokens, one 1 SGX Enclave Code Users RA Quote RA Quote signed by Intel TLS Figure 1: Intel SGX remote attestation procedure. of the most common cases in smart contract usages, is unachievable if all the contracts cannot access the token contract. In this paper, we present Phala Network, a novel cross-chain interoperable confidential smart contract network as a Polkadot parachain [10]. We intro- duce an Event Sourcing / Command Query Responsibility Segregation[4, 3] architecture into a TEE-blockchain hybrid system to achieve cross-contract and cross-chain interoperability for confidential smart contracts. We further de- signed a Libra-Polkadot bridge to implement a privacy-preserving Libra Coin by confidential contract. 2 Background 2.1 Intel SGX: A TEE Implementation Intel SGX [6] is a popular implementation of TEE. It runs code inside a special “Enclave” so that the execution of the code is deterministic, i.e., not affected by other processes or underlying operating system, and the intermediate states is not leaked. In a properly set up system, Intel SGX can defend the attacks from the OS layer and hardware layer. To ensure the execution is finished as expected inside an enclave, a proof can be generated according to a protocol called Remote Attestation . The hardware can generate an attestation quote based on the details of hardware, firmware, the code being executed inside the enclave, and other user-defined data produced by the code. The quote is signed by the trusted hardware with credentials embedded during the production process. Next, the generated attestation quote is sent to the Intel Remote Attestation Service. Intel will sign the quote iff the signing credentials are valid. As each credential is uniquely bound to an Intel CPU unit, fake attestation quotes will 2 never pass the Remote Attestation Service check. Finally, the attestation quote signed by Intel serves as the proof of a success- ful execution. It proves that specific code has been run inside an SGX enclave and produces certain output, which implies the confidentiality and the correct- ness of the execution. The proof can be published and validated by anyone with generic hardware. Intel SGX and the Remote Attestation protocol is the foundation of confiden- tial contract. Except for Intel SGX, there are also alternative implementation choices like AMD SEV [1] and ARM TrustZone [2]. 2.2 Event Sourcing and CQRS Event Sourcing is a software design pattern. Instead of storing the latest state of the data, the events causing state transition are recorded in an append-only log. The events are timestamped and can be replayed to reconstruct the state of any time. Since the events are timestamped, the state of the system is deterministic. Command Query Responsibility Segregation (CQRS) is a design pattern by which the read operations and write operations are handled separately. In a CQRS and Event Sourcing combined system, the write operations are recorded as the events and the read operations can be served by the current view of the state. This pattern make a system easy to scale up and avoid conflicts. For native CPU performance and better security, each confidential contract is bound to only a single or a small set of TEEs as the executor. By this design, the contract state is isolated from each other without consistency guarantee. It becomes a trouble for cross-contract and even cross-chain interoperability. While it’s hard to keep a strong consistency over the states, contracts can still communicate by passing messages to each other on the premise that state transition is still deterministic. In an Event Sourcing / CQRS design, the com- mands can be initiated from users or contracts and are timestamped on the blockchain strictly. It guarantees the global state is deterministic and therefore enables message passing between contracts. Message passing is a primitive to implement higher level interoperability like contract invocation and token trans- ferring. The read-only operations are not timestamped for better performance. 3 Confidential Contract Phala Network aims to build a platform for general-purpose privacy-preserving Turing-Complete smart contracts. The basic requirements for such a platform could be as follows. • Confidentiality .Unlike the existing blockchains for smart contracts, Phala Network avoids the leakage of any input, output, or intermediate state of con- fidential contract. Only authorized queries to the contract will be answered. • Code Integrity .Anyone can verify that an output is produced by a specific smart contract published on the blockchain. 3 • State Consistency . Anyone can verify that an execution happened at a certain blockchain height, which implies the output of the execution is subject to a certain chain state. • Availability .There must not be a single point of failure such as disconnec- tion of the miner. • Interoperability .Contracts can interoperate with each other and external blockchains. The existing TEE solutions, e.g., Intel SGX, can only prevent the leakage of sensitive information during the execution of isolated programs, and provide no guarantee on availability or verification of input data. Thus it requires a carefully-designed infrastructure to integrate TEE into blockchain to meet the requirements above. We are going to introduce the design of Phala Network and how it fulfills the above requirements in the following sections. 3.1 Abstraction of Confidential Contract A typical smart contract can be regarded as a state machine of a current state sn and a state transition function f , which takes input event en and last state sn−1 to produce the latest state sn: sn = f (sn−1, en) Since the state transition process happens inside the enclave, any of its intermediate states remains invisible to outside. We can further encrypt the reached state and input event to prevent the attackers from inferring the internal state of contract with event replay. Let csn be the cipher of sn and cen be the cipher of en, the state transition function of a confidential contract p can be represented as: csn = p(csn−1, cen) (1) p(csn−1, cen) = Enc  f Dec(csn−1), Dec(cen)  (2) where Enc and Dec can be carefully-chosen symmetric encryption and de- cryption functions subject to the contract. Unlike the existing smart contract, a confidential contract doesn’t expose any information outside the enclave by default. To answer authorized queries, we introduce a query function q which takes the current encrypted state csn, query parameters paras and user’s identity I (usually a pubkey) as input and returns the response r: r = q(csn, paras, I) The confidential contract must first validate the identity of the user and then respond to her query. Apart from the queries from users, the contract may 4 Phala Network Blockchain Polkadot Gatekeepers Miners Figure 2: Roles in the protocol. also accept a special query producing side effects. The side effects include the egressing data that can be posted back to the blockchain by miners. 4 The Protocol There are a few roles involved in the protocol as shown in Figure 2. • Users. Users invoke, query and deploy smart contracts. Users interact with smart contracts via Blockchain and W orker Nodes. They can verify the blockchain as well as the cryptographic evidence on the blockchain indepen- dently by running a light client or full node. No special hardware, i.e., TEE, is needed for users to use the confidential contracts. • W orker Nodes.Worker Nodes run confidential contracts in TEE-compatible hardwares. Worker Nodes are off-chain. In each node, a special program called pRuntime is deployed to the enclave. The runtime has a builtin VM to run contracts. It also cooperates with the blockchain to support the contracts in full life cycle. Worker Nodes can be further divided into three roles: • Genesis Node. Genesis Node helps bootstrap the network and set up the cryptographic configuration. There’s only one Genesis Node and it’s destroyed after the launch of Phala Network. • Gatekeepers. Gatekeepers manage the secrets to ensure the availability and security of the network. Gatekeepers are dynamically elected on the blockchain and they stake a large amount of Phala token. They are re- warded for being online and slashed in case of misbehavior because there 5 must be a certain number of functional Gatekeepers running at any time. • Miners. Miners execute the confidential contracts. They get paid by providing their computing resources to the users. Unlike Gatekeepers, Miners only need to stake a small amount of the Phala token and can join and exit the network as they want. • Remote Attestation Service. Remote Attestation Service is a public ser- vice to validate if a Worker Node has deployed pRuntime correctly. The cryptographic evidence produced by the service can prove a certain output is produced by pRuntime running inside a TEE. IAS [5] is Intel SGX’s remote attestation service implementation. • Blockchain. Blockchain is the backbone of Phala Network. It stores the identities of the Worker Nodes, the published confidential contracts, the en- crypted contract state, and the invocation transactions from users and other blockchains. When plugged into a Polkadot parachain slot, it’s capable to interoperate with other blockchains through the Polkadot relay chain. 4.1 System Design We first propose an important property which works as the basis of the following system design. All worker nodes are non-Byzantine nodes. As illustrated above, each worker node runs a special program pRuntime in its TEE. The pRuntime, as the name suggests, works as the runtime environment for confidential contracts. It exports a set of APIs for contracts to access the state resources, manages the connections to the blockchain and answers user queries securely. pRuntime implements the Phala Network protocol described in this paper. Since the integrity of pRuntime is guaranteed by the remote attestation service, this iso- lation promises that no Byzantine fault can happen unless both the TEE and pRuntime are compromised, and an adversarial worker node can only launch a Denial-of-Service attack, which can be further detected by our responsiveness monitoring protocol. In our system, the executors, i.e., miners, are stateless, which means the latest state of a confidential contract has to be got by sequentially executing all the input events on the blockchain or from a cached contract state and the events after that. All the inputs have to be first published to the blockchain and in this way, the blockchain works as the canonical source of contract inputs, which implies Event Sourcing design pattern. We further utilized the idea of CQRS in the design of the protocol to accelerate the users’ queries to the contracts. pRuntime maintains a set of secrets durning its life cycle. Contract states are encrypted and checkpointed on the blockchain with a symmetric key. Each pRuntime registers its identity on the blockchain and establishes secure connec- tions to users with an asymmetric key pair. Since each pRuntime registers itself on the blockchain, any user can validate its identity. These secrets never go outside the pRuntime. 6 Blockchain Contract Code Deploy Registry Encrypted State pRuntime Contract Users TLS pRuntime Identity RA Quotes Intel Root Cert Hardware Firmware Code Custom data: commit to the Enclave Identity Signed RA Quote Figure 3: RA and communication. 4.2 Node Registration All the Worker Nodes are required to be registered on the blockchain before participating in mining or Gatekeeper election. Remote attestation provides a building block to verify the execution as well as its output of a certain code inside the enclave. However, running such attes- tation on each execution is time inefficient. In Phala Network we adopt a better protocol. The attestation measures the pRuntime instance and the generated unique identity during the registration, instead of each execution. In this way, a single attestation is sufficient to ensure the future behavior of the pRuntime. 1. The host program of the worker node n (i.e. Miner or Gatekeeper) calls pRuntime.GetIdentity to generate a key pair as an identityIn(pkn, skn). skn is kept inside the enclave and pkn is revealed to the host. 2. The host calls pRuntime.GetRAQuote to generate a remote attestation quote q with the commitment to pkn and other necessary metadata. 3. The host submits q to Remote Attestation Service and get the signed quotes qsigned. 4. The host submits ( qsigned, pkn) to the blockchain. The blockchain then accepts and stores the information after validation. The registered pRuntime instances are non-Byzantine. The pRuntime in- stance and the generated identity is measured by the attestation. It implies pRuntime runs in a TEE and the identity is generated securely. Since the privkey is unknown to any party expect the instance, nobody can pretend to be a registered pRuntime. With the identity registered, a TLS-like channel between the requester and the target pRuntime can be established. The identities published on the blockchain serve as the PKI to avoid MitM attack. As the pRuntime is non-Byzantine in 7 such a communication channel, the pRuntime can be trusted without further need of remote attestation. This trick improves the efficiency and flexibility of code execution in the runtime. The metadata contains other necessary information, for example, the net- work endpoint of the node like libp2p multiaddrs. The registration has an ex- piration date to prevent vulnerabilities discovered in the future. Worker nodes can renew it by redo the registration process including generating a new identity and do the remote attestation. 4.3 State Encryption Confidential contract runs on pRuntime and the states are persisted on the blockchain to ensure the availability. As the information on the blockchain are public, the saved states have to be encrypted. In Phala Network, each contract (ci) is associated with a symmetric key called Contract Key (kci ). Contract keys are generated by Gatekeepers inside pRuntime. To run a contract, a registered miner should get the corresponding contract key from Gatekeepers. The miner reads the latest contract states and decrypt it with the contract key during initialization. Then the updated states are encrypted and saved to the blockchain in the future. Gatekeepers hold the contract keys as a part of their states. Gatekeepers share a symmetric key called Root Key (kr). The Gatekeeper states are also encrypted and saved to the blockchain like miners. All the keys are used by and kept in pRuntime. The details of key management are discussed in below subsections. We fur- ther propose a few improvements including key rotation (in “Key Rotation” subsection) and a distributed key generation (DKG) scheme in “Open Ques- tions” section. 4.4 Blockchain Launch In the blockchain launch phase, the blockchain will load the initial distribution of the native token and start the election of Gatekeepers. A Genesis Node assists the launch of the blockchain. 1. Before the genesis block, the Genesis Node runs pRuntime.Bootstrap to generate a key pair as the identity of the node, and a symmetric key, namely Genesis Identity Ig(pkg, skg) and the genesis Root Key k(0)r . The runtime reveals pkg but keeps skg and k(0)r privately. 2. Start the blockchain with pkg. In this stage pkg is published in the genesis block and is used for other worker nodes to establish secure channels to the Genesis Node. k(0)r is kept inside the Genesis Node and is used to store secrets necessary to run the network on the blockchain. The initial native token distribution is loaded in the genesis block. 8 3. The blockchain is at pre-launch phase after the genesis block. Governance module is enabled but other modules including confidential contract are still disabled until the Gatekeepers are elected. 4. Worker Nodes who want to participate in Gatekeeper election can fol- low the Node Registration scheme to register their identities on the blockchain. Then ngatekeepers (a chain parameter between tens to hun- dreds) Gatekeepers will be elected during the pre-launch phase. This can be done on-chain via an Polkadot-style NPoS validator election (see Ap- pendix II for details). 5. When the election is finished, the Gatekeepers send a request to the Gen- esis Node for k(0)r through a TLS connection. The Genesis Node only answers the requests from the selected Gatekeeper. Gatekeepers confirms their readiness the on the blockchain. 6. The Genesis Node retires and self destroys when it sees the confirmations of the Gatekeepers from the blockchain. In case there are unresponsive Gatekeepers, the election will expire and restart after the deadline. So far Gatekeepers have their identity registered on the blockchain and k(0)r has been distributed to all the Gatekeepers’ runtime. Then k(0)r will be used to deploy nodes and contracts in the future. Periodical key rotation is necessary for forward secrecy. The root key at era n is denoted by k(n)r . We will discuss the details in “Key Rotation” subsection. 4.5 Deploy Worker Nodes Both miners and Gatekeepers have to follow the “Node Registration” scheme to join the network. The protocol ensures the nodes are non-Byzantine. So we only consider responsiveness failures. To ensure the service quality, all the worker nodes must stake a certain amount of the Phala token and could be slashed once it fails to meet the responsive requirements. We will discu
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