NEAR Protocol 백서

NEAR Protocol

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rd transaction), but never distributed the block, honest validators have no way to craft a challenge. We will cover three complementary approaches to address this problem. 2.6.1 Proofs of Custody The most immediate problem to be solved is whether a block is available once it is published. One proposed idea is to have so-called Notaries that rotate between shards more often than validators whose only job is to download a block and attest to the fact that they were able to download it. They can be rotated more frequently because they don’t need to download the entire state of the shard — unlike validators, who cannot be rotated as frequently, since they must download the entire state of the shard each time they rotate (as shown in figure 13).8 Figure 13: Validators need to download state and thus cannot be rotated frequently The problem with this naive approach is that it is impossible to prove later whether the Notary was or was not able to download the block, so a Notary can choose to always attest that they were able to download the block without even attempting to retrieve it. One solution to this is for Notaries to provide 8Here we assume stateless validation is not used, so validators all have to download the state of a shard. 20 some evidence or to stake some amount of tokens attesting that the block was downloaded. One such solution is discussed here: https://ethresear.ch/t/ 1-bit-aggregation-friendly-custody-bonds/2236 . 2.6.2 Erasure Codes When a particular light node receives a hash of a block, in order to increase the node’s confidence that the block is available, it can attempt to download a few random pieces of the block. This is not a complete solution, because unless the light nodes collectively download the entire block, the malicious block producers can choose to withhold the parts of the block that were not downloaded by any light node, thus still making the block unavailable. One solution is to use a construction called Erasure Codes to make it possible to recover the full block even if only some part of the block is available, as shown in figure 14. Figure 14: Merkle tree built on top of erasure coded data Both Polkadot and Ethereum Serenity have designs around this idea that provide a way for light nodes to be reasonably confident that blocks are available. The Ethereum Serenity approach has a detailed description in [2]. 2.6.3 Polkadot’s approach to data availability In Polkadot, like in most sharded solutions, each shard (called a parachain) sends snapshots of its blocks to the beacon chain (called a relay chain). Say there are 2f + 1 validators on the relay chain. The block producers of the parachain blocks (called collators) compute an erasure coded version of the block that consists of 2 f + 1 parts, once the parachain block is produced, such that any f parts are sufficient to reconstruct the block. They then distribute one part to each validator on the relay chain. A particular relay chain validator would only 21 sign a relay chain block if they have their part of each parachain block that is snapshotted to the relay chain block. Thus, if a relay chain block has signatures from 2 f + 1 validators, and as long as no more than f of them have violated the protocol, each parachain block can be reconstructed by fetching the relevant parts from the validators that followed the protocol. See figure 15. Figure 15: Polkadot’s data availability 2.6.4 Long term data availability Note that all the approaches discussed above only attest to the fact that a block was published at all, and is available now. Blocks can become unavailable later for a variety of reasons: nodes going offline, nodes intentionally erasing historical data, etc. A whitepaper worth mentioning that addresses this issue is Polyshard’s [3], which uses erasure codes to make blocks available across shards even if several shards completely lose their data. Unfortunately their specific approach requires that all the shards download blocks from all other shards, which is prohibitively expensive. Long-term availability is not as pressing an issue; since no participant in the system is expected to be capable of validating all the chains in all the shards, the security of a sharded protocol needs to be designed in such a way that the system is secure even if some of the old blocks in some shards become completely unavailable. 22 3 Nightshade 3.1 From shard chains to shard chunks The sharding model with shard chains and a beacon chain is very powerful but comes with certain complexities. In particular, the fork choice rule needs to be executed separately in each chain, so therefore the fork choice rule in the shard chains and the beacon chain must be built differently and tested separately. In Nightshade we model the system as a single blockchain, in which each block logically contains all the transactions for all the shards, and changes the whole state of all the shards. Physically, however, no participant downloads the full state or the full logical block. Instead, each participant of the network either maintains the state that corresponds to the shards that they validate transac- tions for, or relies on others to provide them with state to validate transactions. The list of all the transactions in the block is split into physical chunks (one chunk per shard). Under ideal conditions each block contains exactly one chunk per shard per block, which roughly corresponds to the model with shard chains in which the shard chains produce blocks with the same speed as the beacon chain. However, some chunks might be missing due to network delays, so in practice each block contains either one or zero chunks per shard. See section 3.3 for details on how blocks are produced. Figure 16: A model with shard chains on the left and with one chain with blocks split into chunks on the right 3.2 Consensus The two dominant approaches to consensus in blockchains today are longest (or heaviest) chain, in which the chain that has the most work or stake used to 23 build it is considered canonical, and BFT, in which some set of validators reach BFT consensus for each block. In the recently proposed protocols, the latter is the dominant approach, since it provides immediate finality. In the longest chain approach, more blocks need to be built on top of a given block to ensure finality. For meaningful security, the time it takes for a sufficient number of blocks to be built is often on the order of hours. Using BFT consensus on each block also has disadvantages, such as: 1. BFT consensus involves a considerable amount of communication. While recent advances allow consensus to be reached in an interval of time that is linear to number of participants (see e.g. [4]), it still adds noticeable overhead per block; 2. It is not feasible for all network participants to participate in BFT con- sensus for each block; thus, usually only a randomly sampled subset of participants reaches consensus. A randomly sampled set can, in princi- ple, be adaptively corrupted, and in theory a fork can be created. The system either needs to be modelled to be ready for such an event, and thus still have a fork-choice rule in addition to BFT consensus, or should be designed to shut down in such an event. It is worth mentioning that some designs, such as Algorand [5], significantly reduce the probability of adaptive corruption. 3. Most importantly, the system stalls if 13 or more of all the participants are offline. Thus, a temporary network glitch or a network split can com- pletely stall the system. The system ideally should be able to continue to operate, as long as at least half of the participants are online (heaviest chain-based protocols continue operating even if fewer than half of the participants are online, but the desirability of this property is debated within the blockchain community). A hybrid model, in which the consensus used is some sort of heaviest chain approach, but some blocks are periodically finalized using a BFT finality gadget, maintains the advantages of both models. Such BFT finality gadgets are Casper FFG [6], used in Ethereum 2.09, Casper CBC, and GRANDPA used in Polkadot. Nightshade uses heaviest-chain consensus. Specifically, when a block pro- ducer produces a block (see section 3.3), they can collect signatures from other block producers and validators, attesting to the previous block. The weight of a block is then the cumulative stake of all the signers whose signatures are included in the block. The weight of a chain is the sum of the block weights. On top of heaviest-chain consensus, Nightshade uses a finality gadget that uses attestations to finalize the blocks. To reduce the complexity of the system, we use a finality gadget that doesn’t influence the fork-choice rule in any way. Instead the gadget only introduces extra slashing conditions such that once a 9Also see the whiteboard session with Justin Drake for an in-depth overview of Casper FFG, and how it is integrated with GHOST heaviest-chain consensus. 24 block is finalized by the finality gadget, a fork is impossible, unless a very large percentage of the total stake is slashed. The full details of NEAR’s consensus algorithm can be found in the Doomslug paper. 3.3 Block production In Nightshade there are two roles: block producers and validators. At any point the system contains w block producers, w = 100 in our models, and wv validators, in our model v = 100, wv = 10, 000. The system is Proof-of-Stake, meaning that both block producers and validators have some number of internal currency (referred to as ”tokens”) locked for a duration of time far exceeding the time they spend performing their duties of building and validating the chain. As with all the Proof-of-Stake systems, not all the w block producers and not all the wv validators are different entities, since that cannot be enforced. Each of the w block producers and the wv validators, however, does have a separate stake. The system contains n shards, where n = 100 in our model. As mentioned in section 3.1, in Nightshade there are no shard chains; instead all the block producers and validators are building a single blockchain, which we refer to as the main chain. The state of the main chain is split into n shards, and each block producer has at any moment only downloaded locally a subset of the state that corresponds to some subset of the shards, and only processes and validates transactions that affect those parts of the state. Validators do not maintain the state of any shard locally, but they do download and verify all the block headers. They validate chunks using state witness created by chunk producers. The details of this mechanism will be discussed in section 3.5. To become a block producer, a participant of the network locks some large amount of tokens (a stake). The maintenance of the network is done in epochs, where an epoch is roughly 16 hours. The participants with the w largest stakes at the beginning of a particular epoch are the block producers for that epoch. Each block producer is assigned to sw shards, (say sw = 4, which would make sww/n = 4 block producers per shard). The block producer downloads the state of the shard they are assigned to before the epoch starts, and throughout the epoch collects transactions that affect that shard, and applies them to the state. For each block b on the main chain, and for every shards, one of the assigned block producers to s is responsible to produce the part of b related to the shard. The part of b related to shard s is called a chunk, and contains the list of the transactions for the shard to be included in b, as well as the Merkle root of the resulting state. b will ultimately only contain a very small header of the chunk, namely the Merkle root of all the applied transactions, and the Merkle root of the final state. When a block producer produces a chunk, they also produce an associated state witness required to execute the chunk. Throughout the rest of this document we refer to the block producer that is responsible for producing a chunk at a particular time for a particular shard as a chunk producer. A chunk producer is always a block producer and vice versa, 25 this distinction is made to help provide more accurate context when we discuss block production or chunk production. Within an epoch, the block and chunk production schedule is determined by a randomness seed generated at the beginning of the epoch and for each block height, there is an assigned block producer. Similarly, for each height, there is an assigned chunk producer for each shard. Since chunk production, unlike block production, requires maintaining the state, and for each shard only sww/n block producers maintain the state per shard, correspondingly only those sww/n block producers are responsible for producing chunks and associated state witnesses. 3.4 Ensuring data availability To ensure data availability, Nightshade uses an approach similar to that of Polkadot described in section 2.6.3. Once a block producer produces a chunk, they create an erasure coded version of it with an optimal ( w, ⌊w/6 + 1⌋) block code of the chunk. They then send one piece of the erasure coded chunk (we call such pieces chunk parts, or just parts) to each block producer. We compute a Merkle tree that contains all the parts as the leaves, and the header of each chunk contains the Merkle root of such tree. The parts are sent to the validators viaonepart messages. Each such message contains the chunk header, the ordinal of the part, and the part contents. The message also contains the signature of the block producer who produced the chunk and the Merkle path to prove that the part corresponds to the header and is produced by the proper block producer. Once a block producer receives a main chain block, they first check if they have onepart messages for each chunk included in the block. If not, the block is not processed until the missing onepart messages are retrieved. Once all the onepart messages are received, the block producer fetches the remaining parts from the peers and reconstructs the chunks for which they hold the state. The block producer doesn’t process a main chain block if, for at least one chunk included in the block, they don’t have the corresponding onepart mes- sage, or if for at least one shard for which they maintain the state they cannot reconstruct the entire chunk. For a particular chunk to be available, it is enough that⌊w/6⌋+1 of the block producers have their parts and serve them. Thus, for as long as the number of malicious actors doesn’t exceed ⌊w/3⌋ no chain that has more than half of the block producers building it can have unavailable chunks. 3.4.1 Dealing with lazy block producers If a block producer has a block for which a onepart message is missing, they might choose to still sign on it, because if the block ends up being on-chain, it will maximize the reward for the block producer. There’s no risk for the block 26 Figure 17: Each block contains one or zero chunks per shard, and each chunk is erasure coded. Each part of the erasure coded chunk is sent to a designated block producer via a special onepart message producer since it is impossible to prove later that the block producer didn’t have the onepart message. To address the lazy block producer problem, each chunk producer when creating a chunk must choose a color (red or blue) for each part of the future encoded chunk, as well as store the bitmask of assigned color in the chunk before it is encoded. Each onepart message then contains the color assigned to the part, and the color is used when computing the Merkle root of the encoded parts. If the chunk producer deviates from the protocol, it can be easily, since either the Merkle root will not correspond to onepart messages, or the colors in the onepart messages that correspond to the Merkle root will not match the mask in the chunk. When a block producer signs on a block, they include a bitmask of all the red parts they received for the chunks included in the block. Publishing an incorrect bitmask is a slashable behavior. If a block producer hasn’t received a onepart message, they have no way of knowing the color of the message, and thus have a 50% chance of being slashed if they attempt to blindly sign the block. 3.5 State transition application A chunk producer chooses transactions to include in a chunk, applies the state transition, and generates state witness along the way when they produce a chunk. More specifically, when a chunk producer applies a chunk they produces, they record all the trie nodes visited during the execution. This set of trie nodes is the state witness for this chunk. The chunk header contains a Merkle root 27 of the Merkleized state after the chunk is applied. 10 The state witness is then shared with validators assigned to this shard for the next block so that they could validate the chunk. A validator only processes a block if: 1. The previous block was received and processed; 2. For each chunk, it receives the onepart message if it is not assigned to the corresponding shard. 3. For each chunk, it receives the full chunk if it is assigned to the corre- sponding shard Once the block is being processed, a validator applies the state transition of the shard they are assigned to and checks whether the resulting state root matches what is posted in the chunk header. If they match, the validator sends an chunk endorsement to the next block producer. Block producers would only include a chunk in a block if they have more than 2/3 endorsements from validators assigned to the corresponding shard. 3.5.1 State Representation In section 2.4, we define state witness as the state touched during the execution of a chunk, along with a proof that the recorded state pieces indeed belong to the state as specified by a state root. An important question left unanswered is how the state is represented. In blockchains where state proofs are required, their state is usually represented as a Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT). However, even for MPTs, the branching factor matters for the size of state witness — a critical component of the stateless validation design. A branching factor of 16 11 means that when the state is full, each branch node will have an overhead of 15 hashes, which is 480 bytes. In comparison, a branching factor of 2, or binary Merkle trees, only have an overhead of 1 hash, which is 32 bytes, at each branch node. An analysis shows that based on Ethereum data, the state witness size can be reduced 40% by switching the state representation to a binary MPT. Recent research on Verkle Trees shows even more promising results. Verkle trees only require one 48-byte KZG commitment [7] per level. Therefore Verkle trees can have a large branching factor (256 - 1024), which results in much shallower trees and smaller witness sizes. Verkle tree is currently considered to be the best state representation for stateless validation. 10This is not exactly what is implemented. To allow for an easier upgrade from the pre- vious version where the previous state root instead of the post state root is stored in the chunk headers, the implementation is changed to accommodate that. We describe the design conceptually here to make it easier for readers to understand. 11This is what Ethereum and many other blockchains use as of this writing. 28 3.6 Cross-shard transactions and receipts If a transaction needs to affect more than one shard, it needs to be consecutively executed in each shard separately. The full transaction is sent to the first shard affected, and once the transaction is included in the chunk for such shard and is applied after the chunk is included in a block, it generates a so-called receipt transaction, which is routed to the next shard in which the transaction need to be executed. If more steps are required, the execution of the receipt transaction generates a new receipt transaction, and so on. 3
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