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ations.
Morpho Blue opted for a static liquidation incentive factor (LIF) per market
because borrowers can reduce their exposure to the liquidation penalty — for
example, by setting up an additional liquidation systems on top of Morpho Blue
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that are more favorable to them — while lenders can’t do anything to improve
on their guarantees. Its value depends on the LLTV of the market, according
to the following formula:
LIF = min(maxLIF, 11 − cursor × (1 − LLT V) )
Where maxLIF = 1 .15 and cursor = 0 .3. This formula strikes a balance
between providing enough incentive to the liquidator and ensuring there is a
sufficient margin to liquidate the borrower without accruing any bad debt.
With the same rationale, Morpho Blue favors lenders by having no close
factor: when an account is liquidatable, its position can be fully repaid.
3.4 Minimal Codebase
Morpho Blue is an actual protocol. Hence, its contract is not upgradable, and
the code is immutable. It allows anyone to anticipate and understand all of the
smart contract’s behaviors in advance. In addition, it makes the protocol truly
trustless as you do not have to worry that the Morpho Governance can become
malicious. It is crucial to notice that Governance cannot manage any funds,
alter any market beyond setting a protocol fee, or create new types of markets
by enabling new LLTVs or IRMs (see section 1.2).
The code is intentionally minimalist, designed for auditability while staying
flexible enough to allow expanding features on top of Morpho Blue. The imple-
mentation is of around 650 source lines of code. Additionally, Morpho Blue’s
simplicity implies that it has less logic and a smaller storage footprint. This
results in lower gas fees for interacting with Morpho Blue.
4 Enhanced Expressiveness
Morpho Blue implements several convenient smart contract patterns and at-
tributes, aiming to enhance the capabilities of developers and power users.
4.1 Singleton
Morpho Blue’s contract is a singleton, meaning all markets of a given chain
live in one smart contract. This pattern simplifies interactions and reduces
the gas consumption of platforms interacting with multiple markets of Morpho
Blue, such as abstraction and delegation layers. It also concentrates liquidity
for Flash Loans, described in section 4.3.
4.2 Callbacks
In the ‘supply‘, ‘supplyCollateral‘, ‘repay‘, and ‘liquidate‘ functions, which all
perform a token transfer from the user to Morpho Blue, a callback to the user
can be performed before the tokens are sent in the execution. In the callback
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function, one can do whatever they need to, including re-entering Morpho Blue.
This notably removes the dependency on external Flash Loans and significantly
reduces gas costs to perform advanced operations.
4.3 Free Flash Loans
Morpho Blue’s singleton has a free flash loan function. Flash loans are loans that
can be taken without any collateral if they are repaid in the same transaction.
Thanks to its singleton architecture (see section 4.1), flash loans have access
to the liquidity and collateral of all markets simultaneously. This is typically
useful in DeFi for liquidations, for opening and closing leveraged positions, and
for arbitrages.
4.4 Account Management
Morpho Blue has an authorization system that enables users to grant permis-
sions on their position to any address. An authorized address can borrow on
behalf, withdraw on behalf, and withdraw collateral on behalf of the authorizer.
Authorization can be managed in two manners: via a classic function call or
via a message signature following the EIP-712 standard, similar to permit EIP-
2612 for ERC20s. This feature allows notably for externally owned accounts to
batch their interactions with Morpho Blue by authorizing a bundler contract.
If needed, a more granular account management system can be implemented on
top.
Acknowledgments
This whitepaper results from extensive collaboration among various companies,
universities, and individual contributors. The authors would like to thank Paul-
Adrien Nicole, Merlin Egalite, Romain Milon, Jean Grimal, Julien Thomas, and
Simon Crotty from Morpho Labs, Morpho investors and advisors.
Disclaimer
This paper is for general information purposes only. It does not constitute
investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any in-
vestment and should not be used in the evaluation of the merits of making any
investment decision. It should not be relied upon for accounting legal or tax ad-
vice or investment recommendations. The opinions reflected herein are subject
to change without being updated.
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