Helium 백서

Helium

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asing the probability of Miners being selected as potential targets based on their individual scores. Let the set of miners be defined as: N ={m1,m 2,m 3... m n|n> 1} Let the set of miner scores be defined as: S ={φm,m∈N} We assign the target selection probability to each miner in the following way: P (m) = 1−φm n− n∑ i=1 φmi (1) The above equation ensures that the Miner with the lowest score is assigned the highest probability of being selected as a potential target while the opposite holds for the Miner with the highest score. Furthermore, it also asserts that the probabilities are inversely proportional to the score of an individual Miner. This allows us to successfully target potentially low scoring Miners and improve the overall balance of the scoring system. Another valuable aspect of assigning the probability as shown above is that all the probabilities together form a discrete probability distribution. A discrete probability distribution satisfies the following equation: ∑ i P (M =i) = 1 10 3.3.6 Verifying the Proof Once TL has delivered Ks, or λ has elapsed, the Proof- of-Coverage is considered complete. When C submits this proof, via a special type of transaction, all receiptsKs from T1...TL are included in the transaction published to the Helium network. As all the steps originally completed by C are deterministic in nature with verifiable and recreatable randomness, it is simple for a verifying Miner,V , to recreate the original steps and verify that the proof is legitimate. Verifying Miners in the consensus group [Section 6] who see the proof transaction are able to verify the Proof-of-Coverage by recreating the following steps: 1. The verifying Miner,V , reconstructs the set of MinersN; 2. The random seed η can be verified by V to have been created at approximately the correct time by the private key ofC; 3. V then selectsT fromN, as seeding withη will result in the same target selection; 4. The set of candidateTn are reconstructed from whichT1 andTL are determined; 5. Dijkstra’s algorithm is used to reconstruct the graphTg; and 6. TheKs receipts contained inBC are verified to have been signed by the private keys ofT1..T ..TL Assuming these steps are completed successfully, the Proof- of-Coverage is verified the score ofC is adjusted appropri- ately. 3.4 Constructing Proof-of-Serialization To achieve cryptographic time consensus among decentral- ized clients, we implement a simplified form of Google’s Roughtime [12]. Roughtime is a protocol that aims to achieve rough time synchronization in a secure way that does not depend on any particular time server, and in such a way that, if a time server does misbehave, clients end up with crypto- graphic proof of that behavior. This section describes the construction of the Proof-of- Serialization protocol. 3.4.1 Creating the Proof We outline the approximate process to achieve cryptographi- cally secure time as follows: 1. To begin, a MinerM pseudo-randomly picks two Miners M1 andM2, with whom to prove contact serialization; 2. It is assumed M has a public key for M1 and M2, otherwiseM should obtain it from the blockchain; 3. M generates a nonce,R, which is a SHA512 hash of the Proof-of-Coverage, whichM has partially constructed; 4. M then generates a salted hash commitment, K, called the proof-kernel, whereK =H (R||M1||M2); 5. M sendsK toM1.M1 replies withT , a signed message including the current timeT1 andK; and 6. M knows that the reply fromM1 was not pre-generated because it includes the nonceR thatM generated Because M can not trust M1, it will ask for another time fromM2: 1. For the second request, a new nonceR is generated using T truncated to 512-bits, blinded by XOR’ing a randomly generated 512-bit number; 2. M then generates a sub-proof-kernel,L =H (R||T||K), and sends it toM2; 3. M2 replies withU, a signed message including the current timeT2 andL; and 4. U is now a proof artifact that shows thatM desired and then proved a serialization betweenM1 andM2 With only two servers,M can end up with proof that some- thing is wrong, but no idea of the correct time But with half a dozen or more independent servers, M will end up with chain of proof of any server’s misbehaviour, signed by several others, and enough accurate replies to establish the correct time,Tt. M M1 M2 K=H(R || M1|| M2) T=(T 1|| K) U=(T 1|| L) L=H(R || T|| K) K L UT Figure 9. Creating Proof-of-Serialization 3.4.2 Verifying the Proof If we assume that the times fromM1 andM2 are significantly different, and the time from M2 is beforeM1, thenM has proof of misbehaviour. The reply fromM2 implicitly shows that it was created later because of the way thatM constructed the nonce. If the time from M2 is after M1, then M can reverse the roles of M1 andM2 and repeat the process to obtain, assuming steady clocks, a misordered proof as in the other case. To verify the correct time, it is necessary for M to repeat the time synchronization process with enough Miners to gain consensus on the correct time: 11 1. A Miner M again pseudo-randomly selects n Miners M1...Mn; 2. M generates a salted hash commitment,K, and delivers it toM1, whereK =H (R||M1||M2); 3. M1 again responds withT , a signed message containing the current timeT1 andK; 4. M generates a sub-proof-kernel,L =H (R||T||K), and sends it to the next MinerMn; 5. The next Miner replies withU, a signed message includ- ing the current time andL; 6. These steps repeat through Mn until at least three time responses,Tn, are monotonic; and 7. Tn can then be confirmed to beTt, the correct time M M1 M2 Mn K L U T Figure 10. Verifying Proof-of-Serialization 3.4.3 Utilizing the Proven Time Once the correct time, Tt, has been determined via Proof- of-Serialization, it is used byM and included during proof construction as described in [Section 2.2]. The randomness, η, used to computeO and, thus, obtain the Proof-of-Coverage is tied to the previous block, which containsTt. This allows us to prove, with relative certainty, that some piece of data D was created between the time of the previous blockbt and Tt.D in this case is the Proof-of-Coverage. Thus, we know thatD must have been constructed betweenbt andTt. This ensures that the Proof-of-Coverage cannot be pre-computed. 4. Proof-of-Location Using Proof-of-Coverage and Proof-of-Serialization, we achieve cryptographic proof of a Miners location and crypto- graphic time consensus among Miners. We can take advan- tage of these proofs to determine the physical geolocation of WHIP-compatible Devices and generate a new type of proof based on the Devices geolocations. We call this Proof- of-Location. 4.1 Motivation Location tracking is one of the most valuable use cases for low power Devices. It is expected that there will be at least 70 million asset tracking devices shipping by 2022 [14]. Today, Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are used by the majority of Devices which require geolocation services, with GPS being the most popular implementation. GPS systems use a technique called Time of Arrival (TOA) to determine the location of a receiver in relation to 20 or so satellites orbiting the earth. GPS satellites synchronize their time using a high precision on-board clock and regular synchronization with control servers on the ground. GPS receivers receive precisely timestamped data from a number of satellites overhead and use a technique called trilateration to provide a precise location on earth. GPS has matured into an extraordinarily reliable service used in a wide range of applications for providing both location and time services. However, there are significant drawbacks to GPS particularly in the realm of low power Devices that the Helium network is designed to facilitate. It can take around 2 minutes for a GPS receiver to achiehve lock with sufficient satellites, which translates to drastically reduced battery life. As an example, a Device transmitting its location around 25 times a day may only last a month on a AA battery compared with several years of life on the same battery without GPS. Using GPS indoors is generally impossible, as the GPS receiver typically needs line of sight with the sky in order to see the 3-4 satellites required to calculate an accurate location. GPS data is also delivered unencrypted, which leaves the system extremely vulnerable to spoofing, jamming, and other attack vectors. We are interested in low power implementations of location services that, in conjunction with an immutable distributed ledger, can be used to verify location and time. Given the above factors, we conclude that GPS is an unacceptable mechanism for these requirements. 4.2 Constructing Proof-of-Location Our goal is to verify the physical geolocation of a given Device,D, without using GNSS hardware. To do this, we rely on the fact that we have already determined and proven the physical geolocation and cryptographic time consensus of a given Miner,M, using the Proof-of-Coverage and Proof- of-Serialization protocols described in [Section 3]. 4.2.1 Precise timestamping of RF data There are a handful of techniques used by positioning systems without the use of GNSS, which include Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI), Time of Arrival (ToA), and Time Differential of Arrival (TDoA). These techniques use 12 radio frequency transmissions, usually received by one or more receivers, combined with various algorithms based on characterstics of those transmissions. Our conclusion is that TDoA is the most accurate but chal- lenging technique to implement [15], [16], [17], [18]. TDoA, in simple terms, relies on the variance between precisely synchronized and recorded timing information between a transmitter and several receivers. As such, it is critical to ac- curately timestamp RF packets Devices emit, and synchronize the clocks of Miners on the Helium network. An example timestamping flow is as follows: 1. A Device,D, broadcasts a packetP containing arbitrary data via the Helium network; 2. Several Miners,Mn, hearP , and record a timestampTn of their reception time ofP ; 3. Tn is created based on the nanosecond time received via GNSS and stamped using raw radio sample data received by the Hotspot radio frontend; 4. A signed transaction includingP andTn are delivered to the routerR belonging toD byMn; and 5. R has now received several copies of P , each of which has a slightly varying value ofTn Gateway 1 GPS/GNSS Gateway 2 Device Gateway 3 t t t 2 3 1 Figure 11. Geolocation via TDoA Typically, it is challenging to accurately record these times- tamps as any nanosecond-level variance in the timestamp can lead to significant variance in the resulting location so- lution. To achieve this level of precision it is necessary to use extremely high-bandwidth raw in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) data from the Miner’s radio hardware and a fast enough processor to sample this data, identify an appropriate packet, and record the timestamp. Typically, aField Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is used as the processor for this data as these types of processors are able to process data in a deter- ministic way. However, FPGAs are fairly expensive, power hungry, and emit significant heat. Instead, our Hotspot mining hardware uses a novel technique using commodity low-cost components to process I/Q data and achieve timestamping at this level of precision. As a comparative example, an ex- isting low-cost LoRaW AN [23] access point is only capable of providing timestamp data accurate within several millisec- onds of precision - as radio waves travel at the speed of light, each millisecond equates to approximately 300,000 meters of physical distance, which we deem practically useless for any accurate geolocation. Further information on the tech- niques, components and schematics used in our Hotspot will be released as open source software at launch of the Helium network. 4.2.2 Using timestamps to derive location Now that the Devices Router,R, is in possession of a variety of signed messages, which include the precise timestamps, Tn, it is possible to solve for the location of the Device D. A variety of TDoA algorithms exist such as [20], [21], [19] and [22]. If a sufficient density ofMn and, therefore,Tn are recorded for a given packet, the location ofD can be derived down to a few meters depending on a variety of factors. We encourage the interested reader to read the cited papers for further details on TDoA algorithms, as they are beyond the scope of this whitepaper. 4.2.3 Verifying Proof-of-Location OnceR has computed a location ofD, it may become nec- essary to verify that the reported location ofD was accurate at that given moment in time. As the Proof-of-Location is deterministic and derived from information publicly avail- able in the blockchain it is possible to reconstruct every step involved: • From the signatures contained within the timestamped packets, Tn, every Miner involved in providing times- tamps can be verified; • By inspecting the assert_location [Section 5.3.3] transaction, the claimed GPS location of those Miners can be determined; and • The Proofs-of-Coverage and scores [Section 3] for each Miner can be retrieved from the blockchain and inspected By auditing the above steps the router operator can crypto- graphically prove (or disprove) the location of each of the Miners involved in providing the components for Proof-of- Location for a given DeviceD. 13 The accuracy of the proof will depend heavily on the number ofMn involved and, therefore,Tn received. Additional RF factors, such as reflections and multipath, can significantly affect the accuracy of the location calculation. 5. Transactions Transactions in the Helium network provide functionality that enables address-to-address transfers of protocol tokens, simi- lar to many existing blockchain networks, but also provide a set of primitives that enable core functionality that is critical to the operation of a DWN. We will first address Helium’s need for microtransactions and propose a new solution. 5.1 The Helium Nework’s Need for Microtransactions Devices Pay Per Packet The goal of the Helium network is to offer Internet data transport fees (the fees paid by Devices to Miners) that are an order of magnitude less than anything currently available for this type of service. This transport fee would need to be metered per-packet in order to allow for maximum flexibility — this way, a Device could transact with any Miner, even just to send or receive a single packet without having previously established a relationship with that Miner. All Transactions Occur On-Chain The Helium network is built on the philosophy that all transactions should occur on-chain; that is, blocks should be sized and mined with a frequency such that every transaction which occurs on the Helium network should be stored in the blockchain. To accomplish this goal, the cost of mining must be low, blocks must be large enough to encapsulate a large number of transactions, and blocks must be created frequently enough that transactions are processed quickly. Allow Devices to Persist Data to the Blockchain Because the Helium network services a specific use, the DWN, blocks must additionally be able store fingerprints of data sent from Devices along with the transaction, which pays a Miner for its transport service. We believe that this holistic tamper-proof data trail will enable entirely new use cases where the authenticity and veracity of sensor data is critical. 5.2 Limitations of Existing Solutions Now that we have discussed the requirements of transactions within the Helium network, we outline the existing solutions for micropayments on a blockchain and address their short- comings as they apply to the Helium network. Heavyweight Transactions This first option is suitable only for larger transactions as the service fee is smaller than the payment. This method does not work well for very small transactions as whoever pays the transaction fee ends up potentially paying more for the transaction fees than the value being exchanged. This is a similar problem to buying small-value items using credit cards today. The vendor pays a minimum fee on each credit card transaction, and under a certain charge they lose money on the transaction. These heavyweight transactions are clearly not suitable for use as a micro transaction system within the Helium network. Zero-fee Transactions While highly desirable from a device perspective, a true zero-fee blockchain would be fraught with spam transactions. It would be trivial to write a script to pollute the blockchain with transactions meant only to waste space on the blockchain and increase conges- tion on the network. Some ostensibly zero-fee blockchain implementations solve this issue in clever ways, such as of- floading the work of processing and verifying transactions to the transactors themselves. However, these implementa- tions have their own issues, for example IOTA [24] has not yet proved it is capable of operating this type of system without the need for a centralized coordinator. State Channels State channels [31] allow two parties to exchange value, usually in small increments at a time, with very limited risk. If one party thinks the other is acting dishonestly, it can publish the final transaction in the state channel to the blockchain and close the channel. At most one payment is usually at risk. However, there are several downsides: the payer has to lock up significant funds for the lifetime of the state channel, meaning they may be unable to open state channels with other parties or pay other dues; transactions in the state channel do not appear on the main chain at all; and these implementations are relatively complex to execute well (note that neither Lightning [29] nor Raiden [30] have become widely used yet). Payment in Arrear Payment in arrear, after the services have been rendered, is an extremely risky method in a decentralized pseudo-anonymous system. There is no mechanism to gain certainty around the intent or honesty of the entities transacting, nor do you know if the entities control the requisite funds when the debt comes due. This model only works when the parties involved trust each other or have some other recourse to recover funds. 5.3 Types of Fees in Helium In this section we outline the types of fees needed on the Helium network, and propose solutions that take advantage of the unique characteristics of the Helium Consensus Protocol [Section 6]. 14 5.3.1 Transport Fees Devices using the Helium network to send and receive data to and from the Internet must pay Miners what is known as a transport fee. This fee compensates the Miner for delivering data packets between the Device and the intended router on the Internet, and is unrelated to the transaction fee that Miners earn for mining transactions as part of blocks that are recorded to the blockchain. The fee is negotiated between the Router to which the Device belongs, and the Miner, as Devices are not directly connected to the blockchain. Miners set the price they are willing to accept to transport data to and from the Internet on a per-byte basis. A Devices router pays Miners the transport fee on transmis- sion or reception of the data. This means that the Miner will receive the transport fee prior to the transaction being mined in a block and recorded into the blockchain. This entails some risk for the Miner, as they must believe that the trans- port payment is not malicious or fraudulent prior to it being confirmed in the blockchain. However, given how low the per-byte transport amount is likely to be, this risk seems toler- able. A Miner can blacklist a Device or organization address if they continually abuse the system. An example transport fee process is as follows: 1. A Miner,M, hears a packet,P , broadcast by DeviceD; 2. M uses the address of D, attached to P , to identify a router,R, as the owner ofD; 3. M sends the signature, K(P ), of P and an offer of n tokens for transport toR; 4. R recei
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