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0 (5 billion). All of these tokens are
locked at the launch of the main-net and will then be released gradually, in monthly
intervals. These initial tokens will be divided between the following parties:
1. Core Team
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• Private Equity Investors: Up to 600 Million CFXs will be allocated to our
private investors. In the last investment round, CFX tokens are sold at 0.1
USD per CFX. See Section IV.B. for the unlock timeline of these tokens. At
the time of the writing of this paper, more than 520 Million CFXs in this
category are already sold to investors. Unsold tokens in this category at the
launch of Conflux will be allocated as Foundation Holdings.
• Foundation Holdings: 200MillionCFXsplusanyunsoldCFXsintheprevious
category will be allocated to support the long term financial need of Conflux
Foundation. These tokens will be unlocked monthly over 2 years.
• Genesis Team: 1,800 Million CFXs will be awarded to the founding team
including the IIIS team (of Tsinghua University) and Alt-Chain Technologies
shareholders (where Conflux spins off from), Conflux Foundation employees,
and advisors. The Genesis team’s tokens will be unlocked over 4 years.
2. Community and Ecosystem Building
• Community Fund: 400 Million CFXs will be used for marketing and commu-
nity building. These tokens will be unlocked over 4 years.
• Ecosystem Fund: 2,000 Million of CFXs in the Genesis Issue will become an
ecosystem fund to solve cold start problems and to invest promising dApp
projects that run on the Conflux network. These tokens will be unlocked over
4 years.
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B. Investor Token Unlock Rules
The allocated private investor CFX tokens will be unlocked monthly over two years
following the launch of Conflux. Based on the market spot CFX price, the investor
tokens may be unlocked in-advance to provide liquidity to the CFX market in facing
price volatility. The in-advance unlock rules are as follows.
1. If the last five-day average market spot price of CFX exceeds0.6 USD, upon the
approval of Conflux Foundation, all private investors can receive the CFX tokens
that should be unlocked in the firsttwo months following the launch of Conflux.
2. If the last five-day average market spot price of CFX exceeds0.8 USD, upon the
approval of Conflux Foundation, all private investors can receive the CFX tokens
that should be unlocked in the firstfour months following the launch (i.e., two
additional months in-advance on top of the previous rule).
3. If the last five-day average market spot price of CFX exceeds1.0 USD, upon the
approval of Conflux Foundation, all private investors can receive the CFX tokens
that should be unlocked in the firstsix months following the launch.
4. If the last five-day average market spot price of CFX exceeds1.2 USD, upon the
apporval of Conflux Foundation, all private investors can receive the CFX tokens
that should be unlocked in the firsteight months following the launch.
5. If the last five-day average market spot price of CFX exceeds1.5 USD, upon the
apporval of Conflux Foundation, all private investors can receive the CFX tokens
that should be unlocked in the firstten months following the launch.
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C. Token Forms
The issued tokens exist in two forms: liquid and illiquid. In the liquid form, they
can be immediately transferred/used on the Conflux network. There are also three ways
in which tokens can be locked up, which makes them illiquid. Illiquid tokens cannot be
transferred. Locking can take three different forms.
1. Tokens can be staked so as to earn the user interest.
2. They can be placed into bonded storage to purchase space on the network (e.g.,
for running dApps).
3. They can be locked up for a pre-determined amount of time to purchase votes in
the network governance.
D. Interest/Seignorage Payments
The network will distribute interest on all illiquid tokens at a fixed rate. Token
holders obtain this interest only if they stake their tokens (i.e., move them to the illiquid
state). The interest will be added to the user’s holdings at the time when the user
un-stakes the token and converts it to the liquid state.
Based on performance-tests from the test-net, Conflux creates two blocks every sec-
ond so that there are approximately 63,072,000 blocks per year. We use rc for the
system base interest rate, expressed in annual terms, and interest is compounded per
block. Therefore, a user that stakes forb blocks receives interest payment:
(
1 + rc
63, 072, 000
)b
− 1
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per staked token. For instance, if the annual interest isrc = 4%, a user that stakes for
15,768,000 blocks (around a fiscal quarter) will receive interest1% per staked token. In
those calculations we round the interest payment in tokensdown to the nearest (1) drip.
By setting a nominal rate ofrc, the resulting annual rate is given by:
effective annual rate=
(
1 + rc
63, 072, 000
)63,072,000
− 1.
For instance, forrc = 4% we have an effective annual rate≈ 4.08%.5
The economic mechanism is straightforward: suppose, for simplicity, that all tokens
have been issued, that all tokens have been staked, and that no token has changed hands.
Then paying interest does not create new value — all that has changed is that there is
an increase in the number of tokens (the “monetary base” ) that represent the network.
Owners of tokens neither gain nor lose anything in real terms.6 When users do not stake
their tokens, their interest goes to the public fund. Therefore, the interest payments
implicitly shift value from those who do not stake to those who stake.
E. Storage Resources
A key component of the incentive system is thebonded storage. Anyone who wants
to deploy a smart contract on Conflux network needs to submit a number of tokens
to create a bonded storage. The interest payments to tokens in bonded storage are
continually disseminated to the miners, instead of those who have locked those tokens.
5Since we have large number of payment intervals, we can approximatelimn→∞(1 +x/n)n− 1 = ex.
6Another analogy is that of stock splits: when a firm splits its stocks, say, 1:2, then owners receive
for each one “old” stock two “new” stocks. This process does not change the value of the firm, however,
and therefor stockholders are no richer or poorer after the stock split.
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Therefore, those interest payments create an implicitreward streamfrom the chain space
occupiers to the maintainers of the network.
The required deposit for storage resources is measured in the native token: 0.5 CFX
for 1 kB. The process is as follows: a user (such as a dApp developer) locks up a number
oftokens. Theuserthenoccupiesspaceonthenetwork( e.g., deployingadApporstoring
data due to the execution of dApps), tokens are withdrawn from the locked tokens and
put into bonded storage. The interest payments for tokens in bonded storage go to the
miners. To release tokens from bonded storage, users must free up the space they occupy.
F. Voting Rights
The medium term goal is that the public fund transforms to a DAO, and that Conflux
stakeholders vote on its operations using their voting rights. Users obtain voting rights
through the locking of tokens: to cast a vote, users must agree to lock up their tokens
and the lock-up time determines the number of votes. The lock up duration starts at
the time (aka block) of casting of a vote. The voting rights will be awarded
number of quarters×number of tokens× 0.25.
For instance,
• Locking maturity less than a quarter: No voting rights
• Locking maturity more than a quarter: One CFX has 0.25 votes
• Locking maturity more than half a year: One CFX has 0.5 votes
• Locking maturity more than a year: One CFX has 1 votes
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We measure “time” in blocks based on the assumed number of 63,072,000 per year. While
tokens are locked to obtain votes, users retain the right to staking interest. The longest
locking duration for voting is 4 years. While tokens are locked to gain a voting right,
users cannot withdraw the tokens or decrease the locking duration.
G. Network Bootstrap
We next discuss how to economically bootstrap the Conflux network and how the
Community Fund and the Ecosystem Fund will be managed in the long term.
Community Bootstrap: To bootstrap the Conflux community, Conflux Foundation
offered bounties and grants in the form of FC (Fan’s Coin) tokens to those community
members who made contributions to Conflux prior its launch. Conflux Foundation will
convert the issued FC tokens into CFXs from the Community Fund once the Conflux
networkgoeslive. NotethatthescaleofConfluxbountyandgrantprogramsismoderate.
The total amount of issued FC tokens at the time of Conflux launch will be less than 20
millions. After the launch, we will continue the bounty and grant programs with CFXs
in the Community Fund at a similar scale.
Ecosystem Bootstrap: One challenge of bootstrapping the Conflux ecosystem is to
attract developers to develop and deploy dApps on Conflux. Sending massive CFX
airdrops to developers is not an ideal solution because one can game the system and can
selltheairdroppedCFXsatthesecondarymarketinsteadofusingthemfordevelopment.
To address this challenge, Conflux has a unique sponsor mechanism in which one can
become a sponsor for a deployed smart contract to cover its transaction fees and storage
costs. Conflux Foundation will use the Ecosystem Fund to sponsor deployed smart
contracts on Conflux during the bootstrapping period. Unlike normal airdrops, the
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sponsor mechanism in Conflux guarantees that these sponsoring CFXs will not go into
circulation unless they are paid first to the miners as transaction fees.
DAO Governance:Conflux Foundation plans to gradually transfer the governance of
the Community Fund and the Ecosystem Fund to the DAO of the Conflux stakeholders.
The current road map is to complete the transition within two years after the launch of
Conflux.
Ecosystem Fund Investment:In the long term, we can use the Ecosystem Fund to
establish investment funds to invest on significant dApp projects that are beneficial for
the Conflux ecosystem. Conflux Foundation will invite prior Conflux private investors
to co-manage such investment funds. We believe the establishment of such investment
funds should be under the supervision of the Conflux stakeholder DAO.
H. Mining Rewards
System Maintainers of the Conflux network will receive income from three sources:
transaction user fees, block rewards, and interest income that arises from users “renting”
space on the blockchain.
User Fees: Users will need to compensate miners when submitting transactions and
changing the state on the blockchain. The transaction user fee is distributed propor-
tionally to the binary base factors of blocks as defined in Li and Yang (2020).
BlockRewards: AsacommonpracticeinPoWnetworks, theminingofablockinvolves
a coin-based reward that increases the monetary base and leads to inflation. We denote
this block-reward driven inflation rate byrb. Ignoring any market-driven price changes,
economically coin-based rewards are a transfer of wealth from existing holders of CFX
collectively to the winning miner.
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The initial base block reward per block is 7 CFX, corresponding to rb = 8.83%.
The base block reward remains constant for the first four years. It then decreases at a
quarterly rate of 0.958, effectively halving every four years, until the base reward reaches
1.75 CFX per block.
There are some technological subtleties that go beyond the scope of this paper,
but that we want to mention here. Namely, although block rewards are determined
deterministically in the decentralized network, there is no a pre-defined number of coins
that a miner who successfully mines a block receives. Instead, blocks are organized in
“epochs” and block rewards are determined/distributed for each epoch. For each block,
the protocol assigns a “weight” based on so-called directed acrylic graph features, which
is effectively a measure of importance in the parallelly-arranged chain and the reward is
based on the block’s weight. For details, we refer the reader to the technical white paper.
Storage interest:When tokens are used as bonds for storage, the interest paid on those
tokens is given to miners. Similar to the block reward the total amount of interest from
bonded storage will be distributed in proportion to the actually received base reward of
each block.
Although the details of block rewards are non-trivial to describe, the basic principle
is the same as in any public PoW network: miners provide computing power, the more
power they provide the more likely they are to win a block, the more blocks they win,
the higher is their income, and so forth.
In the next section, we present a calibrated model of user uptake and inflation to
provide guidelines for the expected mining revenue.
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A
Tx2: X sends 8 to Y
H
D
C E
F J I K
Genesis
Tx0: Mint 10 coin to X
Tx1: Mint 10 coin to Z
B
Tx3: X sends 8 to Z
Tx4: Z sends 8 to Y
G
Tx4: Z sends 8 to Y
Besides Genesis, A, B, G, other
blocks contain no transaction.
Epoch of Genesis Epoch of A Epoch of C Epoch of E Epoch of H
New Block
Parent edge:
Ref. edge:
Figure 1
TreeGraph structure example in Conflux
Anti-cone Penalty Ratio: The mining block reward of a block is modified by an
anti-cone penalty ratio in Conflux. In this paper, we define the penalty ratio of blockb:
max
{
0, 1−
(|Anticone(b)|
100
)2}
where Anticone(b) denotes the set of blocks that are not in the past sub-graph ofb
(i.e., reachable via parent and/or reference edges fromb) and that are not in the future
sub-graph of b (i.e., reachable via parent and/or reference edges tob). For example,
Anticone(F ) = {A,C,D,G } in Figure 1. Because the anti-cone of a block may keep
growing, Anticone(b) here only includes blocks that are within 10 epochs after the epoch
where b resides in. Note that for simplicity, we exclude difficulty adjustment from the
consideration of the formula and assume the difficulty remains constant. See Li and
Yang (2020) for the full formula.
For a new block, the base reward is the maximum block reward the generator can
possibly receive. For every anti-cone block of the new block, a portion of the block
reward will be deducted till zero. Intuitively, this block reward formula encourages the
generator to conform with the honest behavior as defined by the consensus protocol. It
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encourages the generator to refer as many blocks as possible to avoid anti-cone blocks
due to unreferenced blocks. It also encourages the generator to propagate the new block
as soon as possible to avoid anti-cone blocks due to network delay. Unlike the winner-
take-all mining game for the longest chain in Bitcoin, all blocks in Conflux receive block
rewards and miners who cooperate with one another minimize the anti-cone. This makes
Conflux secure against selfish mining attacks which exploit the winner-take-all nature
of Bitcoin mining; see Eyal and Sirer (2013).
In our calibrations, we abstract from the anti-cone and set it to zero; the implicit
assumption is that all miners reference all previous blocks correctly and make no errors.
I. Evolution of the Conflux Rate
The market price of the freely traded CFX tokens due to the permissionless nature
of the network is evidently beyond the control of Conflux. Although one cannot prevent
speculation, eventually one could argue that (like any other asset or commodity) the
price of the token will be driven by demand for Conflux services. In what follows we
provide a formal model to underline the relationship between service usage and price.
Fundamentally, the price of CFX depends on two main parameters: the built-in
inflation of the system, and the impact of market price in the outside world. It is
analogous tocovered interest parity, which is an economic concept to describe exchange
rate changes over time. If we usep0 to denote the price for CFX today in fiat currency
(i.e., how much in fiat one pays for one CFX),p1 for the price of the token one year
into the future (formally, the 1-year forward rate),rc +rb for the real interest rate in
Conflux (caused by both block rewards and storage interest payments), andr for the
compounded-average real interest rate of the fiat-economy (e.g., over a basket of major
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fiat currencies)
p1 =p0× 1 +r1 +rc +rb.
In other words, if Conflux pays a higher interest rate than what is available in fiat
markets, then the price of CFX is expected to mechanicallydecreaseover time.
V. Calibrated Model for Miner Rewards
A. Overview
One important factor for a PoW network to function is that miners are willing to
spend resources on mining blocks in exchange for some form of compensation. The
security of such a network is directly related to the computational power provided by
participating miners. As computational power can be costly, sufficient miner compensa-
tion is required to sustain the involvement of miners, and hence crucial to the security of
the chain. In this section, we develop our approach to determine the expected revenues
that miners gain from participating in such a system. We calibrate our model based on
our technical specification as well as observations from a blockchain project, Ethereum
given the similarity in available features.
Miners receive direct revenue from three sources: block rewards, user fees, and in-
terest paid on the tokens that users need to deposit as bonds when they want to store
data on the blockchain.
Block rewards are newly minted tokens and therefore, they increase the monetary
base of Conflux. Ignoring changes to the price of Conflux tokens, an increase in the
monetary base lowers the value of each Conflux token and block rewards are therefore a
value transfer from native token holders (who receive “security” and ledger consistency
21
as a service) to miners. As such, it is our view that the appropriate way to think about
block rewards is in terms of the annual inflation rate they create. We will formally
discuss how block rewards and block inflation interact in the next subsection.
User fees depend on the ultimate usage of the blockchain, and therefore to determine
user fees, we need to develop a model of user uptake; we do this in Subsection C. and then
wederivetheassociatedfeerevenueinSubsectionD.. Interestpaymentsalsoincreasethe
monetary base and we develop a model for these payments in Subsection E.. Moreover,
interest payments to miners depend on how much storage users choose to occupy; we
build a model for this in Subsection F. and then derive interest payments to miners in
Subsection G.. Miners likely have to pay their bills (for electricity and h/w equipment)
in fiat. Therefore, one needs build a model for the price of CFX to accommodate this
pricing, a topic that is discussed in Subsection H.
In Subsection I. we align all these components to determine the total revenue that
miners will obtain. As the final part of this exercise, we present simulation results for
this revenue and different parameters in Subsection J.
All notations introduced in this Section is summarized in Table I below.
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Table I
List of Symbols for Section V.
Symbol Meaning
G genesis tokens, 5B
D number of seconds in a day,60× 60× 24
d days since main-net launch
B block reward
b(d) block rewards per day, defined in equation (1)
rb annual inflation rate from block rewards
u(d) user uptake rate∈ (0, 1); estimated from Ethereum data using equation (2)
uETH estimated user uptake rate using Ethereum as a benchmark, described in equation (3)
ufast(d), uslow(d) user uptake rates, modelled based on Ethereum but one where shift in growth occurs faster and
another where it occurs slower; defined in equations (4) and (4)
T (d) transactions on dayd; computed asu(d)×D× 4000 (maximum theoretical throughput)
f average transaction fee paid in fiat-equivalent terms
F (d) total transaction fees paid to miners on dayd, defined in equation (6)
α fraction of tokens that an average user locks up to receive interest payments
rc annual rate of inflation created by interest payments in the Conflux network
R daily interest rate for compound transactions; derived in equation (7)
γ(d) fraction of gas used by computations that are not plain token trans프로젝트로 돌아가기