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Beldex

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Beldex A Decentralized Ecosystem for Confidential Computation Version 3.2.1 June 23, 2026 Legal Disclaimer This document does not constitute or imply a prospectus of any sort. No wording contained herein should be construed as a solicitation for investment. Accordingly, this whitepaper does not pertain in any way to an offering of securities in any jurisdiction worldwide whatsoever. Rather, this whitepaper constitutes a technical description of the functionality of the Beldex Coin and the deployment of a user-friendly platform that will allow users to trade in cryptocurrencies. The purpose of the document is to present the Beldex exchange project and details about BDX only. There should not be a redistribution of this without further written permission of the BELDEX team or this document and the information contained herein may not be sent or addressed wholly or in part directly or indirectly to any person in countries restricted. Nothing in this white paper shall be deemed to offer a document of any sort of a solicitation for investment or not in any way to offer any securities in any jurisdiction. The project plan was considered carefully before preparing this document. Beldex makes no representations and gives no warranties or guarantees of whatever na- ture in respect of this document including but not limited to the completeness of any information, facts or opinions contained therein. The founders, advisors, partners, direc- tors, employees, and agents of Beldex and itself cannot be held liable for the use of and reliance on the content in this document. The information set forth in this White Paper is subject to change. The information set forth below may not be exhaustive of all information that Beldex represents and does not imply any elements of a contractual relationship. This White Paper may be modified to provide more detailed information at any time. 1 Abstract A complete confidential computation based ecosystem that anonymizes transac- tions, messages, and your online footprint by incentivizing network validators and creating an economic model that ensures sustainable development of the ecosys- tem. The confidential ecosystem consists of the Beldex blockchain, decentralized and confidential messenger, browser, Virtual Private Netwrok (VPN), and wallet. This whitepaper provides an overview of the Beldex ecosystem. Any future additions or changes to the ecosystem will be released in subsequent versions of this paper. 1 Why Beldex? Confidentiality in communication and transactions was often overlooked as a luxury in the past. However, there is now a heightened awareness among individuals regarding their confidentiality as global digitization continues to expand. Blockchain technology is considered a potential solution to this challenge. Early adopters of cryptocurrency believed that blockchain transactions were inherently untraceable. However, this mis- conception was quickly dispelled with the rise of blockchain analysis firms that provide tools for tracing transactions. This issue extends to Bitcoin transactions as well [Nak08]. Most cryptocurrency transactions do not conceal the transaction amounts, sender or re- ceiver addresses, or their balances. Cryptocurrencies such as Monero [AHJ17] and other confidentiality focused coins have sought to address the issue of confidentiality. These blockchains were met with issues of scalability in proof-of-work consensus [MSBL+19]. For example, if there are no decentralized wallets, the user may have to rely on a centralized wallet to store their coins. An institution with sufficient information about the inputs and outputs of a wallet can perform chainalysis to find information pertaining to a transaction, also known as an EABE attack 1. Beldex proposes a unique, viable solution to the problems of confidential computation, scalability, and ecosystem. 2 Introduction Beldex is a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) coin with masternodes as block proposers and validators. Beldex protocol core advantages are as follows: • Untraceable Roots - Beldex uses RingCT network type but with a higher size of the Ring. • Confidential Transactions - Transactions are completely unidentifiable and se- cure, ensuring user confidentiality. • Airdrop - If an individual stakes a certain amount of crypto in the wallet they get a specific number of rewards in terms of the same coins. 1https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/1673#issuecomment-312968452 2 2.1 Cryptonote Features The CryptoNote protocol proposed a combination of ring signatures, ringCT (confidential transactions), and stealth addresses [vS13]. The protocol offers greater confidential computation to CryptoNote transactions [AHJ17]. When interactions occur across the Beldex independent layers, for example, the second and the first, to reduce the risk due to time-based analysis, an exchange medium that underpins the ecosystem is provided. This means that, when initiating a Flash transaction, users will retain the confidential computation guarantees offered by the Beldex chain and vice versa. 2.1.1 Untraceable Transactions Untraceability and unlinkability are the two main features discussed in this section. The sender should not be required to trust the receiver or any other intermediary. Auton- omy in transactions is a core feature of untraceable transactions in Beldex. Thus, each transactor independently produces cover traffic to mask their identity. 2.1.2 Definitions Elliptic curve parameters The fast scheme EdDSA is chosen as our base signature algorithm, which is developed and implemented by D.J. Bernstein et al. [vS13]. It is based on the elliptic curve dis- crete logarithm problem, which is similar to Bitcoin‘s ECDSA, so this model could also be applied to Bitcoin in future. Common Parameters q: a prime number; q = 2255− 19; d: an element of Fq ; d =−121665/121666; E: an elliptic curve equation; −x2 +y2 = 1 +dx2y2 ; G: a base point; G = (x,−4/5); l: a prime order of the base point; l = 2252 +27742317777372353535851937790883648493; Hs : a cryptographic hash function {0, 1}∗→ Fq ; Hp : a deterministic hash function E(Fq)→E(Fq). 2.1.3 Terminology Enhanced confidential computation requires a new terminology which should not be con- fused with Bitcoin entities. private ec-key is a standard elliptic curve private key: a number a∈ [1,l− 1]; public ec-key is a standard elliptic curve public key: a point A =aG; one-time keypair is a pair of private and public ec-keys; private user key is a pair (a,b ) of two different private ec-keys; tracking key is a pair (a,B ) of private and public ec-key (where B =bG and a̸=b); public user key is a pair (A,B ) of two public ec-keys derived from (a,b ); standard address is a representation of a public user key given into human friendly string with error correction; truncated address is a representation of the second half (point B) of a public user key given into human friendly string with error correction. 3 The transaction structure remains similar to the structure in Bitcoin: every user can choose several independent incoming payments (transactions outputs), sign them with the corresponding private keys and send them to different destinations. Contrary to Bitcoin‘s model, where a user possesses unique private and public key, in the proposed model a sender generates a one-time public key based on the recipient‘s address and some random data. In this sense, an incoming transaction for the same recipient is sent to a one-time public key (not directly to a unique address) and only the recipient can recover the corresponding private part to redeem his funds (using his unique private key). The recipient can spend the funds using a ring signature, keeping his ownership and actual spending anonymous. The details of the protocol are explained in the next subsections. 2.1.4 Unlinkable payments Classic Bitcoin addresses, once being published, become unambiguous identifier for in- coming payments, linking them together and tying to the recipient‘s pseudonyms. If someone wants to receive an untied transaction, he should convey his address to the sender by a private channel. If he wants to receive different transactions which cannot be proven to belong to the same owner he should generate all the different addresses and never publish them in his own pseudonym. Figure 1: Traditional Bitcoin Keys/Transaction model; Source: CryptoNote v 2.0 [vS13] We propose a solution allowing a user to publish a single address and receive uncon- ditional unlinkable payments. The destination of each Beldex output (by default) is a public key, derived from recipient‘s address and sender‘s random data. The main advan- tage against Bitcoin is that every destination key is unique by default (unless the sender uses the same data for each of his transactions to the same recipient). Hence, there is no such issue as address reuse by design and no observer can determine if any transactions were sent to a specific address or link two addresses together. First, the sender performs a Diffie-Hellman exchange to get a shared secret from his data and half of the recipient‘s address. Then he computes a one-time destination key, using the shared secret and the second half of the address. Two different ec-keys are required from the recipient for these two steps, so a standard Beldex address is nearly twice as large as a Bitcoin wallet address. The receiver also performs a Diffie-Hellman exchange to recover the corresponding secret key. A standard transaction sequence goes as follows: 1. Alice wants to send a payment to Bob, who has published his standard address. She unpacks the address and gets Bob‘s public key ( A,B ). 2. Alice generates a random r∈ [1,l− 1] and computes a one-time public key P = Hs(rA)G +B. 4 Figure 2: Beldex Keys/Transaction model; Source: CryptoNote v 2.0 [vS13] Figure 3: Standard Transaction structure; Source: CryptoNote v 2.0 [vS13] 3. Alice uses P as a destination key for the output and also packs value R =rG (as a part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange) somewhere into the transaction. Note that she can create other outputs with unique public keys: different recipients’ keys (Ai,Bi) imply different Pi even with the same r. 4. Alice sends the transaction. 5. Bob checks every passing transaction with his private key ( a,b ), and computes P′ = Hs(aR)G +B. If Alice’s transaction for with Bob as the recipient was among them, then aR =arG =rA and P′ =P . 6. Bob can recover the corresponding one-time private key: x = Hs(aR) +b, so as P =xG. He can spend this output at any time by signing a transaction with x. 7. As a result Bob gets incoming payments, associated with one-time public keys which are unlinkable for a spectator. Some additional notes: • When Bob recognizes his transactions he practically uses only half of his pri- vate information: ( a,B ). This pair, also known as the tracking key, can be passed to a third party (Carol). Bob can delegate her processing of new trans- actions. Bob does not need to explicitly trust Carol, because she can’t recover 5 Figure 4: Incoming Transaction check; Source: CryptoNote v 2.0 [vS13] the one-time secret keyx without Bob’s full private key (a,b ). This approach is useful when Bob lacks bandwidth or computation power (smartphones, hard- ware wallets etc.) • In case Alice wants to prove she sent a transaction to Bob’s address she can either discloser or use any kind of zero-knowledge protocol to prove she knows r (for example by signing the transaction with r). • If Bob wants to have an audit compatible address where all incoming trans- action are linkable, he can either publish his tracking key or use a truncated address. That address represent only one public ec-key B, and the remaining part required by the protocol is derived from it as follows: a = Hs(B) and A = Hs(B)G. In both cases every person is able to recognize all of Bob’s in- coming transaction, but, of course, none can spend the funds enclosed within them without the secret key b. 2.2 Ring Signatures Ring signatures take many inputs from multiple sources and combine them with the original input from the sender. The original sender’s information is concealed with a number of inputs. This masks the true history of outputs from a transaction. All Beldex transactions will employ Ring signatures and will have a fixed ring size 11 per transaction. For every unique transaction, there are ten other inputs in a ring transaction. Thus, the sender may not have to sign the transaction using their private key, but instead only the ring signature made of the private keys of ring participants. Ring signatures are composed of a ring and a signature. Each signature is generated with a single private key and a set of unrelated public keys. Each ring is the set of public keys comprising the private key’s public key, and the set of unrelated public keys. Some- body verifying a signature would not be able to tell which ring member corresponds to the private key that created it. Ring signatures were originally called Group Signatures because they were thought of as a way to prove a signer belongs to a group, without necessarily identifying him. In the context of Beldex they will allow for unforgeable, signer-ambiguous transactions that leave currency flows largely untraceable. 6 Ring signature schemes display a number of properties that will be useful for producing confidential transactions: • Signer Ambiguity: An observer should be able to determine the signer must be a member of the ring (except with negligible probability), but not which member. Beldex uses this to obfuscate the origin of funds in each transaction. • Linkability: If a private key is used to sign two different messages then the mes- sages will become linked. As we will show, this property is used to prevent double- spending attacks in Beldex (except with negligible probability). • Unforgeability: No attacker can forge a signature except with negligible proba- bility. This is used to prevent theft of Beldex funds by those not in possession of the appropriate private keys. 2.2.1 One-time ring signatures Ring signatures are composed of a ring and a signature. Each ring is a set of public keys, one of which belongs to the signer and the rest of which are unrelated. The signature is generated with that ring of keys, and anyone verifying it would not be able to tell which ring member was the actual signer. A protocol based on one-time ring signatures allows users to achieve unconditional unlinkability. Unfortunately, ordinary types of cryptographic signatures permit to trace transactions to their respective senders and receivers. Our solution to this deficiency lies in using a different signature type than those currently used in electronic cash systems. We will first provide a general description of our algorithm with no explicit reference to electronic cash. A one-time ring signature contains four algorithms: (GEN, SIG, VER, LNK): • GEN: Takes public parameters and outputs an ec-pair (P,x ) and a public key I. • SIG: Takes a messagem, a setS′ of public keys{Pi}i̸=s , a pair (Ps,xs) and outputs a signature σ and a set S =S′∪{Ps}. • VER: Takes a message m, a set S, a signature σ and outputs true or false. • LNK: takes a set I ={Ii}i, a signature σ and outputs linked or indep. The idea behind the protocol is fairly simple: a user produces a signature which can be checked by a set of public keys rather than a unique public key. The identity of the signer is indistinguishable from the other users whose public keys are in the set until the owner produces a second signature using the same keypair. • GEN: The signer picks a random secret key x∈ [1,l− 1] and computes the cor- responding public key P = xG. Additionally he computes another public key I =xHp(P ) which we will call the key image . 7 Figure 5: Ring Signature Anonymity; Source: CryptoNote v 2.0 [vS13] • SIG: The signer generates a one-time ring signature with a non-interactive zero- knowledge proof using the techniques from [CDS94]. He selects a random subset S′ ofn from the other users‘ public keys Pi , his own keypair (x,P ) and key image I. Let 0≤s≤n be signer’s secret index in S (so that his public key is Ps ). He picks a random {qi|i = 0,...n } and{wi|i = 0,...n,i ̸= s} from (1,...l ) and applies the following transformations: Li =    qiG if i =s qiG +wiPi if i̸=s Ri =    qiHp(Pi) if i=s qiHp(Pi) +wiI if i̸=s The next step is getting the non-interactive challenge: c =Hs(m,Li,...,L n,R 1,...,R n) Finally the signer computes the response: ci =    wi if i̸=s c−∑ni=0cimodl if i =s ri =    qi if i̸=s qs−csxmodl if i =s The resulting signature is σ = (I,c 1,...,c n,r 1,...,r n) • VER: The verifier checks the signature by applying the inverse transformations:    L′i =riG +ciPi R′i =riHp(P ) +ciI 8 Finally, the verifier checks if n∑ i=0 ci ? =Hs(m,L′1,...,L ′n,R′1,...R ′n)modl If this equality is correct, the verifier runs the algorithm LNK. Otherwise the verifier rejects the signature. • LNK: The verifier checks if I has been used in past signatures (these values are stored in the set I). Multiple uses imply that two signatures were produced under the same secret key. The meaning of the protocol: by L-transformations the signer proves that he knows suchx that at least one Pi =xG. To make this proof non-repeatable we introduce the key image asI =xHp(P ). The signer uses the same coefficients (ri,ci) to prove almost the same statement: he knows such x that at least oneHp(Pi) =Ix−1. If the mapping x→I is an injection: 1. Nobody can recover the public key from the key image and identify the signer. 2. The signer cannot make two signatures with different I’s and the same x. 2.2.2 Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group (LSAG) signatures Originally, group signature schemes required the system be set up, and in some cases managed, by a trusted person in order to prevent illegitimate signatures, and, in a few schemes, adjudicate disputes. Relying on a group secret is not desirable since it creates a disclosure risk that could undermine anonymity. Moreover, requiring coordination between group members (i.e. for setup and management) is not scalable beyond small groups or within companies. Liu et al. presented a more interesting scheme [LWW04] in building on the work of Rivest et. al. in [RST01]. The authors detailed a group signature algorithm characterized by three properties: anonymity, linkability, and spontaneity . In other words, the owner of a private key could produce one anonymous signature by selecting any set of co-signers from a list of candidate public keys, without needing to collaborate with anyone. Ring signature schemes are very Schnorr-like. In fact, our signature scheme can be considered a one-key ring signature. We get to two keys by, instead of defining r right away, generating a decoyr′ and creating a new challenge to define r with. Let m be the message to sign, R ={K1,K 2,...,K n} a set of distinct public keys (a group/ring), and kπ the signer‘s private key corresponding to his public key Kπ∈R , where π is a secret index. • Signature 1. Generate random number α∈R Zl and fake responsesri∈R Zl (i = 1, 2,...,n ) excluding i =π. 2. Calculate cπ+1 =Hn(R, m, [αG]) (1) 9 3. For i =π + 1,π + 2,...,n, 1, 2,...,π − 1 calculate, replacing n + 1→ 1, ci+1 =Hn(R, m, [riG +ciKi]) (2) 4. Define the real response rπ such that α =rπ +cπkπ (mod l) The ring signature contains the signature σ(m) = (c1,r 1,r 2,...,r n) and the ring R. • Verification 1. For i = 1, 2,...,n iteratively compute, replacing n + 1→ 1 c′i+1 =Hn(R, ˜K, m, [riG +ciKi]) (3) 2. If c′1 =c1, then the signature is valid. Note that c′1 is the last term calculated. In this scheme we store (1 + n) integers, have one EC key image, and use n public keys. • Why it works? We can informally convince ourselves the algorithm works by going through an example. Consider ring R =K1,K 2,K 3 with kπ =k2. First the signature: – Generate the random numbers α,r 1,r 2∈ Zl. – Cal
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