Avalanche 백서

Avalanche

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es in the seed anchor set, then the accepted state transitions must have been marked as accepted by at least one correct node. This state discovery process is also used for network discovery. The membership set of the network is defined on the validator chain. Therefore, synchronizing with the validator chain allows the node to discover205 the current set of validators. The validator chain will be discussed further in the next section. 3.3 Sybil Control and Membership Consensus protocols provide their security guarantees under the assumption that up to a threshold number of members in the system could be adversarial. A Sybil attack, wherein a node cheaply floods the network with malicious identities, can trivially invalidate these guarantees. Fundamentally, such an attack can only be210 deterred by trading off presence with proof of a hard-to-forge resource [3]. Past systems have explored the use of Sybil deterrence mechanisms that span proof-of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS), proof-of-elapsed-time (POET), proof-of-space-and-time (PoST), and proof-of-authority (PoA). At their core, all of these mechanisms serve an identical function: they require that each participant have some “skin in the game” in the form of some economic commitment, which in turn provides an economic215 barrier against misbehavior by that participant. All of them involve a form of stake, whether it is in the form of mining rigs and hash power (PoW), disk space (PoST), trusted hardware (POET), or an approved identity (PoA). This stake forms the basis of an economic cost that participants must bear to acquire a voice. For instance, in Bitcoin, the ability to contribute valid blocks is directly proportional to the hash-power of the proposing participant. Unfortunately, there has also been substantial confusion between consensus protocols220 8 Kevin Sekniqi, Daniel Laine, Stephen Buttolph, and Emin G¨ un Sirer versus Sybil control mechanisms. We note that the choice of consensus protocols is, for the most part, orthogonal to the choice of the Sybil control mechanism. This is not to say that Sybil control mechanisms are drop-in-replacements for each other, since a particular choice might have implications about the underlying guarantees of the consensus protocol. However, the Snow* family can be coupled with many of these known mechanisms, without significant modification.225 Ultimately, for security and to ensure that the incentives of participants are aligned for the benefit of the network, $AVAX choose PoS to the core Sybil control mechanism. Some forms of stake are inherently centralized: mining rig manufacturing (PoW), for instance, is inherently centralized in the hands of a few people with the appropriate know-how and access to the dozens of patents required for competitive VLSI manufacturing. Furthermore, PoW mining leaks value due to the large yearly miner subsidies. Similarly,230 disk space is most abundantly owned by large datacenter operators.Further, all sybil control mechanisms that accrue ongoing costs, e.g. electricity costs for hashing, leak value out of the ecosystem, not to mention destroy the environment. This, in turn, reduces the feasibility envelope for the token, wherein an adverse price move over a small time frame can render the system inoperable. Proof-of-work inherently selects for miners who have the connections to procure cheap electricity, which has little to do with the miners’ ability235 to serialize transactions or their contributions to the overall ecosystem. Among these options, we choose proof-of-stake, because it is green, accessible, and open to all. We note, however, that while the $AVAX uses PoS, the Avalanche network enables subnets to be launched with PoW and PoS. Staking is a natural mechanism for participation in an open network because it enables a direct economic argument: the probability of success of an attack is directly proportional to a well-defined monetary cost240 function. In other words, the nodes that stake are economically motivated to not engage in behavior that might hurt the value of their stake. Additionally, this stake does not incur any additional upkeep costs (other then the opportunity cost of investing in another asset), and has the property that, unlike mining equipment, is fully consumed if used in a catastrophic attack. For PoW operations, mining equipment can be simply reused or – if the owner decides to – entirely sold back to the market.245 A node wishing to enter the network can freely do so by first putting up a stake that is immobilized during the duration of participation in the network. The user determines the amount duration of the stake. Once accepted, a stake cannot be reverted. The main goal is to ensure that nodes substantially share the same mostly stable view of the network. We anticipate setting the minimum staking time on the order of a week.250 Unlike other systems that also propose a PoS mechanism, $AVAX does not make usage of slashing, and therefore all stake is returned when the staking period expires. This prevents unwanted scenarios such as a client software or hardware failure leading to a loss of coins. This dovetails with our design philosophy of building predictable technology: the staked tokens are not at risk, even in the presence of software or hardware flaws.255 In Avalanche, a node that wants to participate issues a special stake transaction to the validator chain. Staking transactions name an amount to stake, the staking key of the participant that is staking, the duration, and the time that validation will start. Once the transaction is accepted, the funds will be locked until the end of the staking period. The minimal allowed amount is decided and enforced by the system. The stake amount placed by a participant has implications for both the amount of influence the participant has in the260 Avalanche Platform 2020/06/30 9 consensus process, as well as the reward, as discussed later. The specified staking duration, must be between δmin and δmax, the minimum and maximum timeframes for which any stake can be locked. As with the staking amount, the staking period also has implications for the reward in the system. Loss or theft of the staking key cannot lead to asset loss, as the staking key is used only in the consensus process, not for asset transfer.265 3.4 Smart Contracts in $AVAX At launch Avalanche supports standard Solidity-based smart contracts through the Ethereum virtual ma- chine (EVM). We envision that the platform will support a richer and more powerful set of smart contract tools, including: – Smart contracts with off-chain execution and on-chain verification.270 – Smart contracts with parallel execution. Any smart contracts that do not operate on the same state in any subnet in Avalanche will be able to execute in parallel. – An improved Solidity, called Solidity++. This new language will support versioning, safe mathematics and fixed point arithmetic, an improved type system, compilation to LLVM, and just-in-time execution. If a developer requires EVM support but wants to deploy smart contracts in a private subnet, they275 can spin-up a new subnet directly. This is how Avalanche enables functionality-specific sharding through the subnets. Furthermore, if a developer requires interactions with the currently deployed Ethereum smart contracts, they can interact with the Athereum subnet, which is a spoon of Ethereum. Finally, if a developer requires a different execution environment from the Ethereum virtual machine, they may choose to deploy their smart contract through a subnet that implements a different execution environment, such as DAML280 or WASM. Subnets can support additional features beyond VM behavior. For example, subnets can enforce performance requirements for bigger validator nodes that hold smart contracts for longer periods of time, or validators that hold contract state privately. 4 Governance and The $AVAX Token 4.1 The $AVAX Native T oken285 Monetary Policy The native token, $AVAX, is capped-supply, where the cap is set at 720 , 000, 000 tokens, with 360, 000, 000 tokens available on mainnet launch. However, unlike other capped-supply tokens which bake the rate of minting perpetually, $AVAX is designed to react to changing economic conditions. In par- ticular, the objective of $AVAX’s monetary policy is to balance the incentives of users to stake the token versus using it to interact with the variety of services available on the platform. Participants in the platform290 collectively act as a decentralized reserve bank. The levers available on Avalanche are staking rewards, fees, and airdrops, all of which are influenced by governable parameters. Staking rewards are set by on-chain gov- ernance, and are ruled by a function designed to never surpass the capped supply. Staking can be induced by increasing fees or increasing staking rewards. On the other hand, we can induce increased engagement with the Avalanche platform services by lowering fees, and decreasing the staking reward.295 10 Kevin Sekniqi, Daniel Laine, Stephen Buttolph, and Emin G¨ un Sirer Uses Payments True decentralized peer-to-peer payments are largely an unrealized dream for the industry due to the current lack of performance from incumbents. $AVAX is as powerful and easy to use as payments using Visa, allowing thousands of transactions globally every second, in a fully trustless, decentralized manner. Furthermore, for merchants worldwide, $AVAX provides a direct value proposition over Visa, namely lower300 fees. Staking: Securing the System On the Avalanche platform, sybil control is achieved via staking. In order to validate, a participant must lock up coins, or stake. Validators, sometimes referred to as stakers, are compensated for their validation services based on staking amount and staking duration, amongst other properties. The chosen compensation function should minimize variance, ensuring that large stakers do not305 disproportionately receive more compensation. Participants are also not subject to any “luck” factors, as in PoW mining. Such a reward scheme also discourages the formation of mining or staking pools enabling truly decentralized, trustless participation in the network. Atomic swaps Besides providing the core security of the system, the $AVAX token serves as the universal unit of exchange. From there, the Avalanche platform will be able to support trustless atomic swaps natively on310 the platform enabling native, truly decentralized exchanges of any type of asset directly on Avalanche. 4.2 Governance Governance is critical to the development and adoption of any platform because – as with all other types of systems – Avalanche will also face natural evolution and updates. $AVAX provides on-chain governance for critical parameters of the network where participants are able to vote on changes to the network and315 settle network upgrade decisions democratically. This includes factors such as the minimum staking amount, minting rate, as well as other economic parameters. This enables the platform to effectively perform dy- namic parameter optimization through a crowd oracle. However, unlike some other governance platforms out there, Avalanche does not allow unlimited changes to arbitrary aspects of the system. Instead, only a pre-determined number of parameters can be modified via governance, rendering the system more predictable320 and increasing safety. Further, all governable parameters are subject to limits within specific time bounds, introducing hysteresis, and ensuring that the system remains predictable over short time ranges. A workable process for finding globally acceptable values for system parameters is critical for decentral- ized systems without custodians. Avalanche can use its consensus mechanism to build a system that allows anyone to propose special transactions that are, in essence, system-wide polls. Any participating node may325 issue such proposals. Nominal reward rate is an important parameter that affects any currency, whether digital or fiat. Unfor- tunately, cryptocurrencies that fix this parameter might face various issues, including deflation or inflation. To that end, the nominal reward rate is subject to governance, within pre-established boundaries. This will allow token holders to choose on whether $AVAX is eventually capped, uncapped, or even deflationary.330 Avalanche Platform 2020/06/30 11 Transaction fees, denoted by the setF, are also subject to governance.F is effectively a tuple which de- scribes the fees associated with the various instructions and transactions. Finally, staking times and amounts are also governable. The list of these parameters is defined in Figure 1. – ∆ : Staking amount, denominated in $AVAX. This value defines the minimal stake required to be placed as bond before participating in the system. – δmin : The minimal amount of time required for a node to stake into the system. – δmax : The maximal amount of time a node can stake. – ρ : (π∆,τδ min)→ R : Reward rate function, also referred to as minting rate, determines the reward a participant can claim as a function of their staking amount given some number ofπ publicly disclosed nodes under its ownership, over a period of τ consecutiveδmin timeframes, such that τδ min≤δmax. – F : the fee structure, which is a set of governable fees parameters that specify costs to various transactions. Fig. 1. Key non-consensus parameters used in Avalanche. All notation is redefined upon first use. In line with the principle of predictability in a financial system, governance in $AVAX has hysteresis, meaning that changes to parameters are highly dependent on their recent changes. There are two limits335 associated with each governable parameter: time and range. Once a parameter is changed using a governance transaction, it becomes very difficult to change it again immediately and by a large amount. These difficulty and value constraints relax as more time passes since the last change. Overall, this keeps the system from changing drastically over a short period of time, allowing users to safely predict system parameters in the short term, while having strong control and flexibility for the long term.340 5 Discussion 5.1 Optimizations Pruning Many blockchain platforms, especially those implementing Nakamoto consensus such as Bitcoin, suffer from perpetual state growth. This is because – by protocol – they have to store the entire history of transactions. However, in order for a blockchain to grow sustainably, it must be able to prune old history.345 This is especially important for blockchains that support high performance, such as Avalanche. Pruning is simple in the Snow* family. Unlike in Bitcoin (and similar protocols), where pruning is not possible per the algorithmic requirements, in $AVAX nodes do not need to maintain parts of the DAG that are deep and highly committed. These nodes do not need to prove any past history to new bootstrapping nodes, and therefore simply have to store active state, i.e. the current balances, as well as uncommitted350 transactions. Client Types Avalanche can support three different types of clients: archival, full, and light. Archival nodes store the entire history of the $AVAX subnet, the staking subnet, and the smart contract subnet, all the 12 Kevin Sekniqi, Daniel Laine, Stephen Buttolph, and Emin G¨ un Sirer way to genesis, meaning that these nodes serve as bootstrapping nodes for new incoming nodes. Additionally these nodes may store the full history of other subnets for which they choose to be validators. Archival355 nodes are typically machines with high storage capabilities that are paid by other nodes when downloading old state. Full nodes, on the other hand, participate in validation, but instead of storing all history, they simply store the active state (e.g. current UTXO set). Finally, for those that simply need to interact securely with the network using the most minimal amount of resources, Avalanche supports light clients which can prove that some transaction has been committed without needing to download or synchronize history. Light360 clients engage in the repeated sampling phase of the protocol to ensure safe commitment and network wide consensus. Therefore, light clients in Avalanche provide the same security guarantees as full nodes. Sharding Sharding is the process of partitioning various system resources in order to increase performance and reduce load. There are various types of sharding mechanisms. In network sharding, the set of participants is divided into separate subnetworks as to reduce algorithmic load; in state sharding, participants agree on365 storing and maintaining only specific subparts of the entire global state; lastly, in transaction sharding, participants agree to separate the processing of incoming transactions. In Avalanche Borealis , the first form of sharding exists through the subnetworks functionality. For example, one may launch a gold subnet and another real-estate subnet. These two subnets can exist entirely in parallel. The subnets interact only when a user wishes to buy real-estate contracts using their gold holdings,370 at which point Avalanche will enable an atomic swap between the two subnets. 5.2 Concerns Post Quantum Cryptography Post-quantum cryptography has recently gained widespread attention due to the advances in the development of quantum computers and algorithms. The concern with quantum computers is that they can break some of the currently deployed cryptographic protocols, specifically digital375 signatures. The Avalanche network model enables any number of VMs, so it supports a quantum-resistant virtual machine with a suitable digital signature mechanism. We anticipate several types of digital signature schemes to be deployed, including quantum resistant RLWE-based signatures. The consensus mechanism does not assume any kind of heavy crypto for its core operation. Given this design, it is straightforward to extend the system with a new virtual machine that provides quantum secure cryptographic primitives.380 Realistic Adversaries The Avalanche paper [6] provides very strong guarantees in the presence of a powerful and hostile adversary, known as a round-adaptive adversary in the full point-to-point model. In other terms, the adversary has full access to the state of every single correct node at all times , knows the random choices of all correct nodes, as well as can update its own state at any time, before and after the correct node has the chance to update its own state. Effectively, this adversary is all powerful, except for385 the ability to directly update the state of a correct node or modify the communication between correct nodes. Nonetheless, in reality, such an adversary is purely theoretical since practical implementations of the strongest possible adversary are limited at statistical approximations of the network state. Therefore, in practice, we expect worst-case-scenario attacks to be difficult to deploy. Avalanche Platform 2020/06/30 13 Inclusion and Equality A common problem in permissionless currencies is that of the “rich getting390 richer”. This is a valid concern, since a PoS system that is improperly implemented may in fact allow wealth generation to be disproportionately attributed to the already large holders of stake in the system. A simple example is that of leader-based consensus protocols, wherein a subcommittee or a designated leader collects all the rewards during its operation, and where the probability of being chosen to collect rewards is proportional to the stake, accruing strong reward compounding effects. Further, in systems such as Bitcoin,395 there is a “big get bigger” phenomenon where the big miners enjoy a premium over smaller ones in terms of fewer orphans and less lost work. In contrast, Avalanche employs an egalitarian distribution of minting: every single participant in the staking protocol is rewarded equitably and proportionally based on stake
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