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ransitions and states through proofs of
execution and authentication, and who can send and
receive messages to and from each other.
An AVM program itself specifies agents only ab-
stractly, but it can be executed (or compiled, then
executed) by any agent, who must specify the role
they wish to play (this is a sort of local naming sys-
tem). The AVM can be compiled through LLVM
for transparent execution, and through VampIR for
circuits suited to ZKP or FHE execution.
As an operationally neutral abstract representation,
the AVM is also the level at which the Anoma architec-
ture defines cost semantics and identity of programs,
e.g. different parties may compile AVM programs to
different concrete cryptographic and transparent back-
ends for execution.
8.4.3 VampIR
VampIR is a language and compiler designed to pro-
vide an abstract representation of polynomials, cir-
cuits, and constraint systems which can be compiled
to different concrete proof systems. The IR is designed
to capture the denotational semantics of circuits while
remaining agnostic to operational semantics of instan-
tiation in various proof systems and cryptographic
backends, including ZKP and FHE.
8.5 Fractal instance components
8.5.1 Sybil resistance
Fractal instances must provide a Sybil resistant mech-
anism in order to assign voting power in consensus.
This can be proof-of-stake, proof-of-authority, hybrid
(partially fungible) proof-of-stake, or some form of
liquid democracy based on the cryptographic identity
substrate.
8.5.2 Governance
Fractal instances may provide a governance mecha-
nism for enacting irregular state changes by a (some-
what) more regular process than what would take
place without any such system. This governance mech-
anism itself requires Sybil resistance, which can be
the same as used in consensus or a slight variant.
8.5.3 Resource pricing
Fractal instances must provide a Sybil resistance mech-
anism for performing expensive computational opera-
tions upon the receipt of messages which can be sent
by anyone in an open network. This Sybil resistance
mechanism could be based on fees paid in a network
token, identity-based quotas or subscriptions of com-
pute, storage, etc., or low flat per-message limits in
combination with network-based rate limiting.
9 Future directions
9.1 Complex counterparty discovery
The trade-off axis between counterparty discovery,
fairness, and data locality is quite fundamental: in
order to find a counterparty in any way more effi-
cient than random testing, you must provide some
information about your preferences, and in order to
provide fairness across a larger set of parties in cases
of uncertain information (e.g. variable prices), you
must make your preferences public to a larger set of
solvers who can see more intents at once and compete
to find the fairest solutions.
Encrypted solving, while possible in principle, pairs
the already NP problem of solving with the overhead
of heavy-duty HE, and is likely to remain infeasible in
the near future, but research into improved algorithms,
application-specific solutions, and dedicated hardware
could bring these overhead costs down over time.
9.2 End-to-end behavioural verifica-
tion
Anoma’s architecture covers the domain from (ab-
stract) Turing machines operating node software to
(abstract) users authoring intents, and provides guar-
antees for the behaviours of the system with respect
to the latter given certain assumptions about the be-
haviours of the former. In practice, safe usage of a
17
deployment of Anoma depends not only on the cor-
rectness of this system but also on the correctness of
the hardware utilised by nodes and the correctness of
interfaces utilised by users. Eventually, this verifica-
tion could be extended further into the interface and
hardware domains.
10 Acknowledgements
References
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[2] V. Buterin, “Ethereum: A Next-Generation
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[3] E. G. Weyl, P. Ohlhaver, and V. Buterin,
“Decentralized society: Finding Web3’s soul,”
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[4] E. Buchman, J. Kwon, and Z. Milosevic,
“The latest gossip on BFT consensus,”arXiv
preprint arXiv:1807.04938, 2018.
[5] T. Rocket, “Snowflake to avalanche: A novel
metastable consensus protocol family for cryp-
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[6] C. Goes, “The interblockchain communica-
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[7] J. Bebel and D. Ojha, “Ferveo: Threshold
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[8] M. Prewitt, “PLURAL MONEY: A NEW
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[9] Heliax, “Typhon.” 2022.
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International conference on principles of dis-
tributed systems, 2021.
[11] G.Danezis, L.Kokoris-Kogias, A.Sonnino, and
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