Anoma 백서

Anoma

원문

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ransitions and states through proofs of execution and authentication, and who can send and receive messages to and from each other. An AVM program itself specifies agents only ab- stractly, but it can be executed (or compiled, then executed) by any agent, who must specify the role they wish to play (this is a sort of local naming sys- tem). The AVM can be compiled through LLVM for transparent execution, and through VampIR for circuits suited to ZKP or FHE execution. As an operationally neutral abstract representation, the AVM is also the level at which the Anoma architec- ture defines cost semantics and identity of programs, e.g. different parties may compile AVM programs to different concrete cryptographic and transparent back- ends for execution. 8.4.3 VampIR VampIR is a language and compiler designed to pro- vide an abstract representation of polynomials, cir- cuits, and constraint systems which can be compiled to different concrete proof systems. The IR is designed to capture the denotational semantics of circuits while remaining agnostic to operational semantics of instan- tiation in various proof systems and cryptographic backends, including ZKP and FHE. 8.5 Fractal instance components 8.5.1 Sybil resistance Fractal instances must provide a Sybil resistant mech- anism in order to assign voting power in consensus. This can be proof-of-stake, proof-of-authority, hybrid (partially fungible) proof-of-stake, or some form of liquid democracy based on the cryptographic identity substrate. 8.5.2 Governance Fractal instances may provide a governance mecha- nism for enacting irregular state changes by a (some- what) more regular process than what would take place without any such system. This governance mech- anism itself requires Sybil resistance, which can be the same as used in consensus or a slight variant. 8.5.3 Resource pricing Fractal instances must provide a Sybil resistance mech- anism for performing expensive computational opera- tions upon the receipt of messages which can be sent by anyone in an open network. This Sybil resistance mechanism could be based on fees paid in a network token, identity-based quotas or subscriptions of com- pute, storage, etc., or low flat per-message limits in combination with network-based rate limiting. 9 Future directions 9.1 Complex counterparty discovery The trade-off axis between counterparty discovery, fairness, and data locality is quite fundamental: in order to find a counterparty in any way more effi- cient than random testing, you must provide some information about your preferences, and in order to provide fairness across a larger set of parties in cases of uncertain information (e.g. variable prices), you must make your preferences public to a larger set of solvers who can see more intents at once and compete to find the fairest solutions. Encrypted solving, while possible in principle, pairs the already NP problem of solving with the overhead of heavy-duty HE, and is likely to remain infeasible in the near future, but research into improved algorithms, application-specific solutions, and dedicated hardware could bring these overhead costs down over time. 9.2 End-to-end behavioural verifica- tion Anoma’s architecture covers the domain from (ab- stract) Turing machines operating node software to (abstract) users authoring intents, and provides guar- antees for the behaviours of the system with respect to the latter given certain assumptions about the be- haviours of the former. In practice, safe usage of a 17 deployment of Anoma depends not only on the cor- rectness of this system but also on the correctness of the hardware utilised by nodes and the correctness of interfaces utilised by users. Eventually, this verifica- tion could be extended further into the interface and hardware domains. 10 Acknowledgements References [1] Bitcoin Wiki, “Bitcoin Script.” 2021. [2] V. Buterin, “Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform.” 2014. [3] E. G. Weyl, P. Ohlhaver, and V. Buterin, “Decentralized society: Finding Web3’s soul,” Available at SSRN 4105763, 2022. [4] E. Buchman, J. Kwon, and Z. Milosevic, “The latest gossip on BFT consensus,”arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.04938, 2018. [5] T. Rocket, “Snowflake to avalanche: A novel metastable consensus protocol family for cryp- tocurrencies,”Available [online].[Accessed: 4- 12-2018], 2018. [6] C. Goes, “The interblockchain communica- tion protocol: An overview,”arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.15918, 2020. [7] J. Bebel and D. Ojha, “Ferveo: Threshold decryption for mempool privacy in BFT net- works,”Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2022. [8] M. Prewitt, “PLURAL MONEY: A NEW CURRENCY DESIGN.” 2022. [9] Heliax, “Typhon.” 2022. [10] I. Sheff, X. Wang, R. van Renesse, and A. C. Myers, “Heterogeneous paxos,” inOPODIS: International conference on principles of dis- tributed systems, 2021. [11] G.Danezis, L.Kokoris-Kogias, A.Sonnino, and A. Spiegelman, “Narwhal and tusk: A DAG- based mempool and efficient BFT consensus,” inProceedings of the seventeenth european con- ference on computer systems, 2022, pp. 34–50. 18
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